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The efficiency of the private markets is important in ensuring a healthy economy. 
This study sets out to shed light on the decision-making process applied by South 
African venture capitalists when they allocate capital. Venture capital is defined in 
this study as including private equity. 
The study comprises an extensive survey by way of a detailed questionnaire which 
was mailed to 66 members and non-members of the South African Venture Capital 
and Private Equity Association (SA VCA) and achieved a 77% response rate. The 
questionnaire was based on previous work done in Western and Eastern Europe, and 
India. This ensured that quantitative South African results could be compared with 
international results. Quantitative statistical analyses were conducted and the results 
are presented. The study first identifies the criteria applied in the general evaluation 
of investments. Second, the required rates of return are established for each stage in 
the business cycle of the potential investment. Third, various risk factors which might 
affect the required rate of return are considered. Fourth, the study identifies the 
valuation methods employed at each stage in the business cycle of the potential 
investment. Fifth, the use of portfolio theory by South African venture capitalists and 
private equity investors is examined. 
In keeping with most similar studies around the world, South African VCs seek out 
quality entrepreneurial teams. They do this using an array of evaluation criteria which 
endeavour to flush out the risks inherent in the investments they are evaluating. In 
South Africa VCs seek strong management and overwhelmingly rate integrity as the 
most important management quality. Far less important are market issues, followed 
by product or service issues. This may reflect the perceived dearth of management 
talent in South Africa. 
This study analyses the required rates of return of different groupings of VCs by 
investment stage. It yields results consistent with financial theory as it applies to 
venture capital: the earlier the stage of investment, the higher the perceived risk 
profile of that investment. The study finds that more mature VC funds have lower 











empowerment objective have lower required rates of return than those without. 
Independent funds require higher rates of return than captive and semi-captive funds. 
The required rates of return have only increased by about 2% since the more buoyant 
mid to late 1990s. The debt-equity ratio has an increasing effect on the required rates 
of return as the investment moves through the earlier stages of investment to the later 
stages. While the required rate of return of an investment is generally determined by 
the risk band in which it falls, the effect of the debt equity ratio is dependent upon an 
assessment of the individual risk characteristics of the investment. 
The general and specific factors which affect risk and required rate of return are 
ranked by South African VCs and the results are in keeping with international results. 
The general factors identify the lack of importance of the state of the general economy 
and long-term gilts to the VC's required rate of return, but the importance of the state 
of the actual sector in which the investee participates. Insofar as specific risks are 
concerned, management is of particular importance as an indicator of risk, both in 
respect of the quality of management and the predictability of management's 
behaviour. 
An analysis was done of the valuation methods which' are used at the different stages 
of the investment cycle. South African VCs prefer to use the discounted cash flow 
method of valuation at all stages of the investment, although different techniques are 
also used in the earlier stages of the investment cycle. A final valuation is based on a 
preferred method while using the other methods as a check. Gut feeling is an 
important component of this process. This research also confirms that the newly 
adopted SAVCA (BVCA) Valuation Guidelines have not affected the valuation 
process when an investment is made. 
Most South African VCs apply reasonably sophisticated portfolio theory to their 
investment portfolios and the majority regard their portfolios as well-diversified. 
Implications for both South African entrepreneurs and South African VCs are also 
presented. 
KEYWORDS: venture capital, private equity, investment evaluation criteria, 
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"The real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an unreasonable world, nor 
even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest kind of trouble is that it is nearly 
reasonable, but not quite. Life is not an illogicality; yet it is a trap for logicians. It 
looks just a little more mathematical and regular than it is; its exactitude is obvious, 
but its inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in wait." (GK Chesterton)! 
This study is all about the management of risk as we endeavour to achieve the best 
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they are venture capitalists. It is the author's hope that this study will bring greater 
understanding to both practitioners and particularly entrepreneurs of a financial 
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• My colleagues at Venfin Ltd were, I suspect, amused at my industrious efforts 
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• Mike Wright and Andrew Burrows both took the time to communicate with 
me all the way from the University of Nottingham and gave me access to their 
questionnaire. 
• Josh Lerner kindly furnished me with some excellent papers and notes on VC 
from the Harvard Business School. 
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of the statistical analysis. 
• Tom Blok and PricewaterhouseCoopers acted as the independent data 
recipient and both lent their enormous credibility to my efforts and contributed 
a willing and hugely helpful slave in the form of Riette Niewoudt. 
• Hein Carse, Jo' Schwenke, Cees de Haan and Richard Flett, fellow VC 
colleagues, contributed time and patience by allowing me to pre-test several 
versions of my questionnaire on them. 
• Francois Jooste and Gerhardus Scheltema helped me out with some IT 
technical issues. 
• Sabine Lorrimer was ever helpful after hours, correcting and sending out 
strings of questionnaires. 
• Olga Kotze helped me collect economic data. 
• Finally, the people who have borne the brunt of my studies have been my 
family. I would not have finished this without Susan's enthusiasm and active 
interest in my thesis. Olivia graciously tolerated my pre-occupation despite all 












"What is it that distinguishes the thousands of years of history from what we think of 
as modern times? .. The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modern 
times and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion that the future is more than a 
whim of the gods and that men and women are not passive by nature." (Peter L 
Bernstein)2 
The efficient allocation of resources is an important element of a robust economy. 
Considerable study has improved our understanding of the public markets in this 
regard but far less research has been conducted on how the private markets, consisting 
of the private equity and venture capital markets, function. Little is known as to what 
extent the private markets are more or less efficient than the public markets and the 
reasons for this. 
A greater understanding of the investment decision-making process whereby private 
equity and venture capital ("VC"), being a subset of risk capital, is accessed and 
allocated in South Africa ("SA") should benefit the South African economy. For 
reasons set out later, venture capital is defined in this study as including private 
equity. 
The objective of this study is to better understand the decision-making process of 
South African venture capitalists ("VCs"). This is set out schematically in Figure 1.1. 
The following question is addressed in this study: 
When considering a venture capital investment, what considerations do South 
African venture capitalists apply to: 
1 the general evaluation of VC investment opportunities, 
2 specifically in respect of the valuation ofVC investment opportunities, 
• the evaluation of risk, 











• the required rate of return at each stage in the business cycle of the 
investment opportunity (eg seed, start-up, expansion, buy-out etc) 
• the valuation methods employed at each stage, and 
3 the broad application of portfolio theory to their funds, and, 
where comparative data are available in respect of the above three issues, how do 















REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN 
VALUATION 
Venture capital revolves around the management of risk. "Venture capital firms 
attempt to reduce the riskiness of their portfolios, either by diversification 
(syndication) or information gathering (uncertainty reduction)" (Mull 1993: 17). 
There are few detailed quantitative studies of the VC decision-making process in SA. 
The South African economy is a melange of developed and emerging economies 











existing international studies may be inappropriate to South African circumstances. 
This study will resolve this potential problem. In addition to many of the issues raised 
by various international studies, this study endeavours to extend the general body of 
knowledge of venture capitalism by examining some broader and deeper issues 
relating to South African venture capitalists. 
The value of this study should be fourfold: 
1 SA VCs can see how their practices compare both locally and internationally. 
With SA's recent re-admittance into the global community, the South African 
VC industry needs to understand how it compares to other international VC 
markets. This will enable it, on the one hand, to benchmark itself in an effort 
to improve its own performance as well as, on the other hand, to understand 
unique South African market issues which may explain differences in 
practices. The SA venture capital market is relatively immature. 
Consequently many venture capitalists are. less experienced than their 
developed market counterparts and they lack the knowledge of comparative 
international standard practices. 
2 A better understanding of their decision-making process will empower SA 
VCs to improve their investment performance. 
Although VCs make internally consistent decisions, they do not always 
understand their decision-making process (Zacharakis 1995; Zacharakis & 
Meyer 1998). Notwithstanding this lack of understanding, VC-backed 
companies have a greater chance of success than new ventures in general 
(Dorsey 1979, Davis and Stetson 1984, Bruno & Tyebjee 1982). Mull 1990 
also finds quantitative evidence to support the contention that American VCs 
"achieve higher growth rates in the firms in which they invest than do non-
venture capital investors" (Mull 1990:80). Finally, the survival rate of VC-
backed firms is higher than that of non-VC-backed businesses (Kunkel & 
Hofer 1990, Sandberg 1986, Timmons 1994). The failure rate of businesses3 
backed by venture capital is approximately 40 percent in the USA (Zacharakis 
1995). Since it is not possible to improve performance if there is no 
understanding of the underlying process, this study should contribute to a 
better understanding and thus better performance by South African VCs. 











3 Entrepreneurs will benefit if they better understand the VC decision-making 
process. 
Many entrepreneurs are unclear as to how to deal with the approach and 
evaluation process of a venture capitalist, particularly with respect to the 
pricing of the proposal. Once passing the initial screening stage, meritworthy 
investment proposals still often fail to receive a favourable response from 
venture capitalists. 
4 This study should contribute to a growing body of international comparative 
study of venture capitalism. 
Many studies have focused generally on the formal and informal screening criteria 
used by VCs. This study first examines the general evaluation criteria used by South 
African VCs and then focuses on the evaluation stage (second phase, detailed 
evaluation and valuation). It builds on, and extends, a series of comparative 
international studies conducted in Western and Central Europe and India by the 
University of Nottingham's Centre for Management Buy-out Research (Manigart, 
Wright, Robbie, Desbrieres & de Wae1e 1997, Karsai, Wright & Filatotchev 1997, 
Karsai, Wright Dudzinski & Morovic 1998, Wright & Robbie 1996, Wright, Lockett 
& Pruthi 2000). These studies and surveys are referred to throughout this study as 
"the precedent studies" or ''the precedent surveys". 
The precedent studies identify the general evaluation criteria and then focus on 
understanding the second phase evaluation stage of when the venture capitalist 
conducts a detailed evaluation and valuation of an investment proposal. In particular, 
the precedent studies consider general evaluation criteria, information sources, the 
required rate of return and factors (including risk indicators) which affect it, and the 
valuation methods employed generally. The precedent studies research these issues in 
the developed countries of the UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, the 
transition economies of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, and an emerging economy, 
being India. 
This study comprises a survey of South African VCs by way of a questionnaire. In 
Chapter 2 the literature and theory is reviewed, in Chapter 3 the research methodology 
is discussed, and the results are presented in Chapter 4. Finally, conclusions are 











2 LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORY 
"Investment management is not art, not science, it's engineering ... We are in the 
business of managing and engineering financial investment risk." (Charles 
Tschampion, managing director of General Motors pension fund)4 
The literature and theory is reviewed by first discussing how the literature was 
sourced. Thereafter some VC concepts are clarified in an effort to ensure analytical 
consistency. Third, a brief overview is presented on the development and status of the 
VC industry both internationally and in South Africa. Fourth, the actual VC decision-
making process is considered as a lead-in to the fifth section which reviews the 
precedent studies in detail. Sixth, the literature on the various criteria used by VCs to 
evaluate investments is discussed and synthesised. The seventh section deals with the 
valuation of VC investments. The eighth section covers portfolio theory. The 
required rate of return and the influence of various risk factors are considered in the 
ninth section. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in the tenth section. 
While considerable research of the VC industry is being conducted, this is only a 
recent phenomenon. There is a disparate body of research and an attempt is made to 
draw it together in this wide-ranging and comprehensive literature review. 5 
2.1 SOURCING OF LITERATURE 
The explosive growth of the venture capital industry'S public profile has resulted in a 
plethora of literature on the topic. While there are innumerable magazine and 
newspaper articles, there is little academic research. This may be ascribed to the fact 
that venture capital has only recently become a significant investment asset class as 
4 As quoted in Bernstein 1996:247. 











well as the difficulty of researching private companies and private investment funds. 
There is very little public information available other than various annual national 
venture capital performance surveys. 
Most of the newspaper and magazine articles are anecdotal. Because of their general 
lack of substantiation or peer review, little emphasis has been placed on them, 
although many of these articles provided useful background to issues confronting 
venture capitalists in their day-to-day activities. 
Both print and electronic information sources were consulted in the preparation of the 
literature review. 
1. Use was made of electronic information sources and databases which included 
mainly South African material such as: 
• SA Citations, 
• SACat, 
• The Union Catalogue for Thesis and Dissertations (UCTD), 
• NA VTECH, and 
• BORIS (UCT Library's former OPACS). 
2. Electronic information sources including mainly foreign material were used 
such as: 
• ABI Inform, 
• Dissertation Abstracts Ondisc, 
• UMI Proquest Digital Dissertations, 
• MIT Theses and E-Theses Online; and 
• Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
3. The on-line facilities offered by the Jagger Library at the University of Cape 
Town ("UCT") were extensively utilised. Use was also made of UCT's 
Graduate School of Business library. 
4. The Internet was used to source academic papers, venture capital organisation 
websites and statistics. While the scholarly nature of the sources available 
through UCT is of a high standard, the Internet was approached with some 
caution. For this reason, the Internet was mainly used to access bona fide 
websites of various venture capital organisations (such as www.nvca.com. 
www.evca.com and www.bvca.co.uk), VC statistics from auditors' websites 











www.cob.ohio-state.edu. Other general venture capital sites were accessed for 
background information. 
5. Contact was made directly with overseas academics who have researched 
issues relevant to this survey. Both the Harvard Business School and the 
primary driver behind the precedent studies, the University of Nottingham's 
Centre for Management Buy-Out Research, were approached. 
Interesting anecdotal evidence of the growth in inter~st in venture capital in South 
Africa can be derived from the results of a search for venture capital articles. Using 
the University of Cape Town's on-line facility (SA CitationsIISAP), a search for the 
adjacent words "venture capital" yielded the following numbers of articles containing 
the term in South African periodicals: 1996 (0), 1997 (14), 1998 (52), 1999 (71), 2000 
(73). 
2.2 VENTURE CAPITAL CONCEPTS 
Venture capital is well-established in developed countries. Comparative surveys 
conducted in different countries in different stages of economic development need to 
be founded on consistent concepts so as to ensure analytical comparability. 
The most important concept is that of "venture capital" itself. There is a difference in 
definition between the American and the European terminology. In America "venture 
capital" excludes management buy-outs or buy-ins which, when these are included 
with VC, are classified as "private equity" (nvca.com 2000 6). The European Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association ("EVCA") notes that "venture capital is, 
strictly speaking, a subset of private equity and refers to equity investments made for 
the launch, early development, or expansion of a busiriess. In Europe, these terms are 
generally used interchangeably and venture capital thus includes management buy-
outs and buy-ins" (evca.com 2000 \ Furthermore, the precedent studies were based 
on the European terminology. The South African Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Association ("SA VCA") has adopted the EVCA terminology (SA VCA 1999). 
6 http://www.nvca.com/de£html. 6/112000. 











Therefore, unless otherwise stated, "venture capital" and "private equity" will be used 
interchangeably in this study and defined as describing equity or quasi-equity 
investments in (generally) unlisted businesses seeking strong growth (ie this excludes 
so-called "lifestyle" businesses8). Where the American terminology is intended, 
reference will be made to "(US) VC". The differences in definition are set out 
schematically in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 
In the USA this 





"VC", as "private 
equity" 
An important implication of the aforegoing discussion relates to the comparability of 
studies conducted by US researchers and those conducted by European researchers. 
Aggregated results in respect of the US VC industry will be based on a smaller, earlier 
stage subset of investments than those in Europe which will include management buy-
outs and buy-ins. Caution should therefore be exercised in making comparisons 
between US and European studies. This caution appears to be rarely observed in 
comparative studies where the practices of US VCs :are compared, for example, to 
European practices (eg Knight 1994). Many of the South African studies simply 
assume that research on VC in the USA applies to VC as defined by SAVCA. The 
confusion in South Africa is not helped by SA VCA stating on one hand that it follows 
the European convention (SAVCA 1999, SAVCA 2000) and on the other hand it 
endorses the American usage in the performance survey it has conducted with the 
accounting firm, KPMG (KPMG 2000). Even more mature and larger VC 
associations such as the European Venture Capital Association create confusion: the 
EVCA Mid-Year Survey 2000 (EVCA News Network 2000:1) defines VC more 
broadly than KPMG, but more narrowly than the definition in its own website 
(evca.com 2000)! 
8 A "lifestyle" business is not focused on growth, but only on achieving a size that will provide the 












It is submitted that the varIOUS national VC associations could perform a useful 
exercise in resolving the definitional issues surrounding the term "venture capital". 
This confusion might be dealt with by the national associations agreeing upon the 
accepted terminology. The terminology is less important than the value of having 
consistent concepts: a rose by any other name would smell as sweet. 
The precedent studies were conducted across the Uni.:ted Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and India. These are countries of great 
cultural, linguistic and economic difference. It would appear that a common glossary 
was not used in these surveys, which could potentially call the comparability of the 
results into question. 
However, the precedent surveys were conducted largely by the same researchers, and 
the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association defines most of these 
terms on its website (evca.com 20009), although it is unclear whether the terms were 
similarly defined in 1995 when the European studies were done. In any event, it is 
submitted that many of the concepts are reasonably well understood and, other than 
noting this potential problem, it has been assumed that the terms enjoyed a common 
understanding by respondents to these surveys. 
The accounting firm, KPMG, and the South African Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Association have recently conducted two performance surveys on members of 
SAVCA (KPMG 2000 and KPMG 2001). Notwithstanding the difference in 
definition of "venture capital" the SA VCAlKPMG glossary is materially consistent 
with the EVCA definitions (evca.com 2000 10). 
Finally, the term "venture capitalist" needs some elaboration. In this study, venture 
capitalists were regarded as those institutions with discretionary control I I over funds 
which they have raisedl2 for the purpose of making venture capital investments. The 
views of these types of institutions were sought because they could be expected to 
apply experienced, independent views of the VC market. Captive funds, which still 
make a large proportion of the VC industry in SA, are also included in the survey. A 
9 http://www.evca.comlpdflDefmitions. pdf, 6/1/2000. 
10 http://www.evca.comlpdfJDefmitions.pdf. 6/1/2000. 
11 This discretion will be subject to the fund investment mandate and perhaps investor representation on 
the investment committee of the specific fund. 











further distinction is made between the institutions (which manage different pools of 
funds) and the individual funds themselves!3. Responses were sought from as many 
funds as possible. It is possible that one institution may manage several funds. This 
might mean that one institution would furnish several identical responses for each 
fund because each fund served the same market. However, where the institution had 
several funds which serve different markets (eg a buy-out fund and a high tech early 
stage fund), then the responses by each individual fund would likely be different in 
respect of the criteria, required rates of return and valuation techniques. 
In reviewing the membership list of the South African Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association and the researcher's private database ofVC market participants as 
a source of potential respondents, intermediaries and institutions which raise ad hoc 
funds for individual projects were excluded since their views on the evaluation of 
investments are primarily determined by their investors or principals on a deal-by-deal 
basis. Also excluded were those which primarily supply debt or fund lifestyle 
businesses. 
2.3 THE STATE OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VENTURE CAPITAL AND TRADITIONAL 
CORPORATE FINANCE 
While corporate finance theory holds true in a venture capital setting, there are some 
important features of VC which give rise to differences in the application of corporate 
finance theory (Wright & Robbie 1998). The primary issue which drives these 
differences is the lack of publicly available information about VC investments which 
necessitates far closer and more active monitoring of investments than is required in 
the public markets where investment strategies are more passive. More active 
monitoring of VC investments is also driven by the lack of liquidity of shares in 
private companies. The application of typical corporate governance mechanisms is 











also insufficient in a VC investment and powerful contractual rights are normally 
required by investors to manage the conflicts identified in agency theory. Capital 
raising by entrepreneurs is restricted to a relatively small group of VC financiers 
rather than the broad public markets. Although this is less so with management buy-
outs, the raising of finance is still not as efficient as in the public markets. The 
valuation process in a VC setting is constrained by the lack of history and a greater 
uncertainty in respect of future cash flows. This means that the palette of valuation 
methods available to a VC is not as large as those used in the public markets. The 
valuation process is further complicated by the real options inherent in the staging of 
VC investments which are not typically available in the public markets. These 
differences are further analysed later when the concept of the perfect capital market is 
examined. 14 
INTERNATIONAL 
The international venture capital industry has largely taken its cue from developments 
in the USA. The venture capital industry as we know it today began developing in the 
USA in the 1950s and 1960s (nvca.com 2000) driven largely by wealthy individual 
investors ("business angels,,15). This was the dominant method of investment until the 
end of the 1970s. The evolution of the limited partnership in the early 1980s coupled 
with subsequent regulatory and fiscal changes resulted in explosive growth in the 
American venture capital market. Professional venture capital fund managers 
proliferated and from 1980 to 1995 managed funds grew from US$ 4.7 billion to US$ 
175 billion (Fenn, Liang & Prowse 1997). During this period venture capital (as 
defined in the USA) grew fifteenfold and non-venture capital private equity (as 
defined in the USA) grew a massive sixty five times (Fenn et al 1997). 
In the UK market the growth lagged the USA, but, was no less explosive (O'Banlon 
1990). Indeed, the buy-out sector of the UK private equity market has, as with the 
USA, been preferred because it has generated better returns for less risk (O'Banlon 
1990). More recently (since about 1995 in the USA and about 1998 in the UK) 
venture capitalists have directed a greater proportion of funds into earlier stage 
14 See also Bygrave & Timmons 1992. 
15 See Freear, Sohl & Wetzel 1995 for a discussion of the role of business angels in the American VC 











investments. This has been driven largely by the enormous growth in the information 
technology sector (such as software, the Internet, electronics, wireless and 
telecommunications). Notwithstanding the recent market corrections in this regard, 
this growth is expected to continue. As might be expected in a growing market, 
average returns for VC funds have fallen internationally since the early 1980s (Wright 
& Robbie 1998). 
The PricewaterhouseCoopers and 3i "Global Private Equity 2000" survey which 
focuses on 6 regions worldwide found that US$ 136 billion had been raised in the 12 
months to mid-2000, an increase of 5 percent from the previous year (as reported in 
Business Day 2000). While a considerable amount was uninvested, the sectors seeing 
the greatest growth in attention were technology investments (at US$ 45 billion, up to 
33 percent from 29 percent the previous year) and early stage investments (at US$ 22 
billion, up to 16 percent from 11 percent the previous year). The USA accounted for 
73 percent ofthe total raised (US$ 99.4 billion), nearly four times that in Europe. 
The emerging markets have embraced venture capital for reasons which include the 
decline of Communism, globalisation, weak public markets and an improved 
regulatory environment. Notwithstanding this, many emerging economies have 
inexperienced venture capital industries both due to the relative youth of the industry 
and also due to infrastructural and macroeconomic conditions (Aylward 1998a, Karsai 
et al 1997 and 1998, Sagari & Guidotti 1992, Wright et al 2000). The infrastructural 
problems which may bedevil an emerging economy refer not only to power, 
communications and transport, but include matters such as the legal entities which 
VCs may use and which are often not appropriate for marrying the interests of the VC 
manager and those of the investors (Barger, Carter & Kuczynski 1996). In addition, 
emerging economies may face challenges relating to the legal and fiscal environment, 
and the existence, health and liquidity of public markets where exits may be effected. 
It would appear that the basic financial theory of VC is applicable to developing 
countries in much the same way as it applies to developed countries. In a study of 
European and Asian VC practices, Aylward 1998a:239 notes that "the investee 
company structure and governance arrangements used in venture capital in developing 











typically do in standard corporate finance practices elsewhere. There do not appear to 
be any inherent differences in venture capital in developing countries that would make 
corporate finance norms generally inapplicable". Thus, while South Africa may be 
subject to special circumstances which may distort the results of this study, none of 
the circumstances should be so different that they result in a fundamental deviation 
from accepted financial theory ofVC. 
The above assertion, that corporate finance theory in developed countries is largely 
applicable to developing countries, should be seen in a more complex context. In an 
extensive review of the literature on venture capital, Wright & Robbie 1998 explore 
the linkages between various areas of disparate study of VC and tie them back to an 
overall view of the current state of knowledge of VC. In so doing, they highlight 
some difficulties in applying some of the accepted theories of finance, particularly 
corporate governance issues relating to the agency problem. 
Aylward 1998b studied VC trends in Central and Eastern Europe and also in Asia 
drawing on the membership of the local associations,,IFC investees and the author's 
own database. Aylward 1998b found that the median return on realised investments 
was 26% (in US$) measured up to mid-1995. 
In a study of the international competitiveness of developing countries for risk capital, 
Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp, Agarwill, Langhammer & Spinanger 1991: 130 points out 
that "macroeconomic instability and policy-induced distortions of goods and factor 
markets were all shown to significantly reduce locational advantages of individual 
countries in the international competition for investable funds". 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Relatively little VC research has been conducted in South Africa. The business press 
comprises largely anecdotal reporting and much of the student work which has been 
done is unpublished and qualitative in nature. However, good quantitative surveys 
conducted in South Africa to date are those of SA VCA and KPMG (KPMG 2000 and 
KPMG 2001) which assessed the composition and performance ofVC funds in South 











equity firms in South Africa. Questionnaire responses were received from 29 of them 
and information was gathered on a further 11 non-respondents. For the 2000 survey, 
KPMG identified 56 potential private equity firms .. 30 responses representing 41 
funds were received. Information was gathered on a further 16 non-respondents. This 
suggests that there has been little growth in the number of participants in the South 
African industry which is now nearing maturity. While there is legitimate criticism of 
performance surveys generally16, it is submitted that the KPMG 2001 figures are the 
best that are available. It is expected that the annual SAVCAlKPMG survey will 
continue to gather momentum and credibility in the VC industry. 
The VC industry still largely comprises captive funds, although independent funds are 
growing. R 33.1 billion of private equity funds is under management including R 7.5 
billion of undrawn commitments (KPMG 2001). Total VC investments as at the end 
of 2000 were US$ 4.3 billion which, to put this in perspective, is approximately 4.2 
percent of South Africa's gross domestic product (KPMG 2001). This is a greater 
percentage than the UK (2.3 percent), the Netherlands (1.3 percent), and Sweden (1.2 
percent) and compares favourably with the USA (4.9 percent) (KPMG 2001). This is 
an indication ofa maturing of the South African VC industry. 
Campbell 2000 estimates that at the beginning of 2000, South Africa's VC market 
comprised some 77 institutions. This appears high, and may be explained by the 
possibility that this figure includes a number of intermediaries which raise VC funds 
for individual investments on a commission basis. It is also possible that included in 
the number of institutions are a number of funds man. aged by the same institution or 
corporate group. Campbell found that the vast majority (77 percent) of VC 
institutions is based in Gauteng. KPMG identified about 55 funding institutions in 
16 The criticisms of performance surveys encompass a lack of transparency and consistency. The 
results are affected by whether unrealised or realised returns are included. In the USA, for example, 
only realised returns are included whereas in the Netherlands unrealised returns (which often includes 
the poorer returns of non-performing investments) are also included which generally results in lower 
overall returns. For example, between 1986 and 1990 Dutch VC returns were 13 percent overall and-
3 percent for early stage (Wright & Robbie 1998). The method of valuation of unrealised investments 
is crucial. Although VC valuation guidelines (which are voluntarily applicable) generally require 
recent unrealised investments to be valued at cost, older unrealised investments may be valued in 
several ways. Furthermore, some surveys measure gross IRRs and others measure net IRRs (ie after 
deduction of all the fees and costs of the fund). These comments are not designed to refute the value of 
the SA VCAlKPMG performance surveys, but rather to place them in the context of the challenges 
faced by this kind of research. KPMG 2001: 18 sets out clearly the limitations to its own research on 











1999 and this figure had not increased by much as at the end of 2000 where KPMG 
only identified 56 funding institutions (KPMG 2000, KPMG 2001). This may partly 
be because the world-wide decline in technology VC. performance since April 2000 
has shaken out the market resulting in considerable attrition amongst VC funds. 
Campbell found that about half of the institutions had some kind of foreign influence 
through either foreign ownership or executives with foreign experience and is of the 
opinion that this will enhance the quality of participation in the South African 
industry. Most VC institutions were younger than three years in 2000 (Campbell 
2000). This relative lack of maturity of the SA industry is corroborated by Watling 
1998, a study ofVC investment monitoring in South Africa, which reveals that only 5 
of the 31 V C respondents had been in V C for longer than 10 years. 
Several South African studies have highlighted the fatt that most South African VCs 
seem to eschew early stage and start-up investments (Stillman, Sunderland, Heyl & 
Swart 1999, Campbell 2000). By way of apparent contradiction, another recent 
survey noted that 40 per cent of the SA investors which were surveyed invested in 
start-up initiatives and fully 70 per cent invested in early stage investments (Capital B 
Management 1999). This contradiction may be explained in that the Capital B 
Management result is likely influenced by the relatively small sample of respondents 
and respondents possibly stating intent rather than fact. For example, 40 per cent of 
institutions may well target a small portion of their funds to start-ups, but may not 
find meritworthy opportunities and, when they do, they may still only commit a 
relatively small amount of funding. 
The issue of risk aversion is more elegantly dealt with by considering actual 
investment of total funds by SA VC institutions 17. As at the end of 1999, only 0.4 
percent of funds invested had been made in seed investments and only 5.7 per cent in 
start-ups and early stage opportunities (KPMG 2000). This is comparable with a level 
of 6 percent in the European market in 1995/6 (Wright & Robbie 1998). However, 
the percentage investment (by funding value) had increased to almost 19 percent in 
Europe in 2000 (EVCA News Network 2000). In keeping with this trend, by the end 
of 2000, KPMG 2001 found that 25 percent of investments (by funding value) were 
17 Wells 1974 regards ves as risk averse because the risk premia they apply to their valuations exceed 











made in seed and early stage opportunities. Obviously, given the lower average 
value of earlier stage investments, the number of companies receiving earlier stage 
funding comprises a significantly higher percentage of total companies receiving 
funding across all stages ofVC investment. 
KPMG 2001 identifies South African VCs as having invested R3.4 billion in 2000. 
This was divided amongst the various stages of the business cycle and is summarised 
in Table 2.1. 
Stage 
Seed 
Start-up and early 
Expansion 
Buyouts & replacement 







KPMG estimates that there are a total of about 319 investment executives in the 
domestic industry (KPMG 2001), many of whom have consulting backgrounds 
(Campbell 2000). Mullet 1998 points out that many of these executives have 
corporate finance experience which is rooted in merchant banking and an accountancy 
training. This background has often been anecdotally raised as the reason why SA 
VCs are regarded as risk averse. 
Campbell 2000 concludes that, while the South African VC market is "young and in a 
state of flux ... there are indications of maturity" (Campbell 2000: 117). Campbell 
2000 also makes the unsubstantiated claim that the investment screening process 
amongst South African VCs is as rigorous and "at least on a par with their USA 
counterparts" (Campbell 2000:120), although they may place emphasis on different 
areas to their American peers. 
An interesting feature of South African venture capital has been the growth of so-
called "empowerment" funds being those with a stated policy of favouring 
investments which empower previously disadvantaged communities in South Africa. 











kind of policy. The instant study may shed light on whether empowerment funds 
require a different rate of return to their non-empowerment peers. The empowerment 
issue is addressed in the design of the instant questionnaire to include questions 
relating thereto. This is dealt with more fully in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
Table 2.2 summarises the gross internal rates of return ("IRRs") as reported by each 
of the respondents in the KPMG/SA VCA studies for 1999 and 2000. Obtaining this 
kind of information is a sensitive matter for obvious reasons. An IRR is the discount 
rate at which the net present value of a series of cash flows is equal to zero. It should 
not be confused with the opportunity cost of capital18. The reported IRRs are set out 
in Table 2.2. SA VCA has recently adopted the British Venture Capital Association 
("BVCA") valuation guidelines in an effort to standardise the valuation of a fund's 
underlying investments which make up its reported IRRs. The impact of these 
valuation guidelines will be discussed later. While in the KPMG/SAVCA study for 
1999, 18 VCs claimed to have applied either the BVCA or SAVCA Valuation 
Guidelines, in the same study for 2000, only 13 VCs applied the Valuation 
Guidelines, a disturbing trend. Due to both this and "Other inconsistencies identified 
by KPMG, the results should be treated as merely indicative. Note that "realised" 
returns are those where an actual valuation event has taken place and "unrealised" 
returns are those where the VC institution applies its own valuation to the underlying 
investments 19. 
18 "Here is a word of caution. Some people confuse the internal rate of return and the opportunity cost 
of capital because both appear as discount rates in the NPV formula. The internal rate of return is a 
profitability measure which depends solely on the amount and timing of project cash flows. The 
opportunity cost of capital is a standard of profitability for the project which we use to calculate how 
much the project is worth. The opportunity cost of capital is established in capital markets. It is the 
expected rate of return offered by other assets equivalent in risk to the project being evaluated" 
(Brealey & Myers 1991:81). 
19 While the realised IRRs would be less subjectively calculated typically reflecting assets valued by 












INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN REPORTED BY RESPONDENTS TO SURVEY 
Year 
Return description 
Number of funds 
reporting 
IRR below 15% 
IRR between 15% and 
40% 
IRR in excess of 40% 
Source: KPMG 2001:19 
Table 2.2 
2000 
Total gross Realised 
IRR since gross IRR 







Total gross Realised 
IRR since grossIRR 






It is useful to note that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange permits an initial public 
offering to three different boards, each with its own set of requirements. A "main 
board" listing has the most stringent listing requirements in SA. A "development 
capital" listing has less stringent requirements and a "venture capital" listing has the 
least stringent requirements. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange's use of the term 
"venture capital" typically refers to young, high risk, listed companies rather than 
unlisted companies (which are the arena of the VC investor). Thus the venture capital 
board is a potential exit mechanism for VCs (notwithstanding that, to some extent, it 
is an alternative source of finance to VCs themselves). Accordingly, the Venture 
Capital board is ignored for the purposes of this study.2o 
Stillman 1999 analyses those funds which focus on socially responsible investment in 
black empowerment initiatives21 and notes that almost all exclude investments of less 
than R2 million, thus ignoring the vast majority of black entrepreneurial businesses 
requiring funding. 
A valuable study in respect of black empowerment is embodied in two papers, KNC 
20 See also Loubser 1998. 
21 Any reference to 'black empowerment' should be seen as a reference to the empowerment of any 











2001a and KNC 2001b, which investigates the black empowerment issues prevalent 
in the South African venture capital industry. It echoes the distinction drawn by the 
Black Economic Empowerment Commission between the narrow definition (merely 
the transfer of ownership, often to small groups of black businesspeople) and the 
broad definition of empowerment (which envisages the transformation and broader 
participation of black people in the economy). KNC 2001b notes that the difficulties 
which black entrepreneurs face in raising venture capital and conclude that for 
structural reasons, the VC industry is generally not geared to handle the unique issues 
of empowerment. 22 Their empowerment proposals endeavour to address these 
structural issues?3 
2.4 THE VENTURE CAPITAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Many studies have examined the separate steps that make up the investment decision-
making process of VCs (Wells 1974, Pence 1982, Tyebjee & Bruno 1984, Silver 
1985, Hall & Hofer 1993). While there are some minor differences in terminology 
and whether certain steps should be split up further, the analyses are all largely 
similar. For the sake of convenience, the analysis of Hall & Hofer 1993 is used in this 
study. 
Hall & Hofer 1993 identifies five broad steps or processes, being "deal originating" 
(finding potential investments), "screening" (first phase, initial filtering), "evaluation" 
22 These include, fIrst, the quality and experience of previously disadvantaged people who, by 
defInition, will need mentorship and training. Second, there is an equity gap between the small size of 
the average empowerment initiative and the preferences of VCs. Third, VCs typically require that the 
entrepreneur has invested some of his or her own funds which requires a personal capital base not 
usually available to the average black person. Other underlying problems are the high transaction costs 
of investments and the greater aversion to risk found in less wealthy people. See also Ferreira & 
Potgieter 1989. 
23 While outside of the scope of this work, some comments on empowerment initiatives are in order. 
Black empowerment is a complex issue with noble intent. It has often been implemented naiVely, at 
best, and cynically, at worst, with little thought being given to its fmancial implications and its 
philosophical and social underpinnings. It is submitted that the fact that many black empowerment 
initiatives have failed or underperformed since 1999 provides art opportunity for black empowerment 
protagonists to recapture this runaway train and craft initiatives that satisfy not only the hue of annual 
fInancial reports, but also the needs and aspirations of those who continue to suffer hardship due to 












(second phase, detailed examination and valuation), "deal structuring" (agreement of 
contractual terms) and "post-investment activities" (investment monitoring and value 
realisation). 
The evaluation stage (second phase, detailed examination and valuation) can be 
further subdivided. During evaluation, venture capitalists will typically follow sub-
process in their investment-making cycle as follows (Manigart et aI1997): 
1. Gathering of information on the investment opportunity, management and profit 
potential. 
2. Use of information to estimate the expected cash flows and profit potential. 
3. Use of information to appraise the investment opportunity's risk and thus the 
required rate of return. 
4. Application of one or more valuation methods. 
The various stages are set out schematically in Table 2.3. 
VENTURE CAPITAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
1 2 3 4 5 
Deal Screening Evaluation Deal Post-
origination structuring investment 
activities 
SUB-PROCESSES: 





2. Estimation of cash 
flows and profit 
potential 
3. Appraisal of risk 
(and hence required 
rate of return) 
4. Application of one 
or more valuation 
methods 
Table 2.3 
Notwithstanding the identification of separate stages in the general evaluation of 
investment opportunities, only a few studies (such as Wells 1974, Hall & Hofer 1993, 
Zacharakis 1995, Zacharakis & Meyer 1998) make the distinction between these 











there are distinct sub-processes, the entire process does not, in practice, happen in a 
sequential or compartmentalised fashion. The process is largely an iterative one 
(Manigart et al 1997) and this makes this kind of study difficult to conduct in a 
satisfactory manner. "This means not only that it is highly probable that different 
criteria are used in different stages but also that any new research of venture capitalist 
decision-making must use methodologies that can and will capture any possible 
differences among stages. It also means that the findings reported to date have 
probably 'mixed' different stage criteria and possibly even generated some spurious 
results" (Hall & Hofer 1993 :29). The issue of the stage at which criteria are applied 
will be revisited later when the literature on evaluation criteria is reviewed. Suffice to 
say at this point that there are good reasons why the time at which criteria are applied 
may be a red herring. 
It has further been shown that the application by venture capitalists of criteria to the 
general screening process is both poorly understood and potentially subjective 
(Zacharakis 1995, Zacharakis & Meyer 1998). Further, it would appear that intuition 
is used interstitially by venture capitalists to fill the ga s between theory and practice. 
This means that studying the decision-making process is complicated by unarticulated 
non-rational prejudices and personal preferences. While this is not unusual in other 
investment asset classes, it is compounded by both poor market efficiency in the 
venture capital market and the lack of the investee's pre-investment track record. 
Manigart et al 1997 assumes that the investment opportunity has passed the initial 
screening successfully. The second phase evaluation (which includes a valuation) is 
in progress. "Recent research ... has shown that the due diligence24 process is an 
iterative one, where the first step is to assess whether a proposal meets the investment 
criteria of the venture fund (for example, with respect to the investment stage, sector, 
24 In South Africa the term "due diligence" typically refers to a verification process which takes place 
after a transaction has been agreed, but before cash is actually invested. Investment transactions are 
usually subject to a "due diligence" investigation at which stage the investor is afforded an opportunity 
of verifying the correctness of statements which were made by the entrepreneur. This might, for 
example, include verifying the incorporation of the investee company, reviewing original supply 
agreements, checking that patents are indeed registered, and ensuring that the staff incentive scheme is 
duly constituted. The precedent studies (including, for example, Hall & Hofer 1993) regard due 
diligence as a broader concept which includes detailed evaluation of the potential of the investment 
opportunity. "Venture capitalists perform an extensive due diligence process before investing in a 
company. In this way, they want to minimise their investment risk by getting to know the entrepreneur 
or the management team, the product, and the market potential presented in the investment 
proposal.. . (T)he due diligence process is an iterative one, where the first step is to assess whether a 











or magnitude of the investment proposal) and whether the proposal is viable at first 
sight. A formal valuation of a company will only be performed when the proposal 
passes this initial test" (Manigart et aI1997:29). 
The presentation above regarding the different stages of the decision-making process 
is a useful conceptual model. It may be less useful in understanding the practice of a 
VC in evaluating and valuing an investment opportunity. For example, Wright & 
Robbie 1996 and Manigart et al 1997 seek to evaluate the documentation used by 
venture capitalists at the "valuation" stage. In practice, the entire process of 
evaluating the investment opportunity contributes to the venture capitalist's 
assessment of value25 . Thus, while this exercise may be valid conceptually, it is 
submitted that in practice it would be difficult for a VC to determine at what stage he 
or she was considering certain documentation. This complexity is further 
compounded by the lack of understanding of the decision-making process (Zacharakis 
1995). 
As a further example, Manigart et al 1997 notes from a European survey that venture 
capitalists generally do not consider the curriculum vitae of management as an 
important document at the time of conducting the valuation, arguing that this is 
contrary to the well-regarded notion that the quality of management is a primary 
indicator of the success of a venture capital investment opportunity. Manigart et al 
1997 may be correct, but the conclusion does not necessarily follow from this 
argument. It is submitted that few venture capitalists will actually read the curriculum 
vitae at the time that they are determining, for example, the required rate of return. 
Rather they will have previously read the curriculum vitae, have met management, 
and have an intuitive feel for management's capabilities and the risk inherent in 
management's capabilities. 
It is submitted that, while still subjective, research on valuation methods during the 
valuation exercise is somewhat less subjective than the general screening process. 
This is because the venture already enjoys a positive view from the venture capitalist, 
25 It is reasonable to assume, for example, that the evaluation of the riskiness of an investment starts 
from the fIrst exposure of the venture capitalist to the entrepreneur and continues through to the fInal 
conclusion of the investment transaction. Even in the fmal negotiation, a venture capitalist may decide 
that the way in which the entrepreneur is negotiating is in bad faith and this increases his earlier sense 











it falls within the venture fund criteria, and the valuation is about to be conducted with 
a view to negotiating an investment. 
2.5 THE PRECEDENT STUDIES 
This study builds on, and extends, a senes of comparative international studies 
conducted in Western and Central Europe and India by the University of 
Nottingham's Centre for Management Buy-out Research (Manigart et al1997, Karsai 
et al 1997, Karsai et al 1998, Wright & Robbie 1996, and Wright et al 2000) ("the 
precedent studies"). 
WRIGHT & ROBBIE 1996 (UK) 
Wright & Robbie 1996 focuses on the general policies which are applied during the 
second phase detailed screening by UK venture capitalists in respect of their due 
diligence, valuation techniques, required rates of return and risk indicators. Wright & 
Robbie 1996 assessed these matters by conducting a survey of full members of the 
British Venture Capital Association ("BVCA") in eaIly 1994. In order to overcome 
the challenges of uncertain future prospects and adverse selection26, venture capitalists 
consider a wide range of information, both accounting and non-financial. A thorough 
due diligence is conducted which includes testing the robustness of the financial 
projections and often the use of sensitivity analyses. Wright & Robbie 1996 
concentrates on the second phase detailed evaluation of the investment opportunity 
which includes a valuation. 
Wright & Robbie 1996 grouped valuation methods broadly into asset value, price 
earnings multiple and discounted future cash flow ("DCF") methods. It found that the 
most commonly used methods fell into the group comprising price earnings multiples. 
These results are summarised in Table 2.4 below. 












METHODS USED IN V ALUING POTENTIAL INVESTMENTS (BVCA) 
Ranking Valuation Technique 
1 Capitalised maintainable earnings (PE multiple) 
(prospective) 
2 Capitalised maintainable earnings (PE multiple) 
(historical) 
3 Capitalised maintainable earnings (EBIT multiple) 
4 Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector 
5 Discounted future cash flows 
6 Industry 'rule of thumb' ratios (eg turnover ratios) 
7 Responses to solicit bids for the investee (initiated by VC) 
8 Historic cost book value 
9 Dividend yield basis 
10 Liquidation of assets (orderly sale) 
11 Replacement cost asset value 
12 Recent PE of the parent company's shares 
13 Liquidation of assets (forced sale) 
* Where 5=almost always used and 1 =almost never used 

















Over 80 percent of respondents placed greatest reliance on one valuation method and 
used the others as a check. Also, many VCs made use of the internal rate of return of 
an investment as a measure of performance notwithstanding the theoretical drawbacks 
of this approach. 
Insofar as appraising the investment was concerned, the most important features 
related to management. In order, this included proven leadership, thorough 
familiarity with the chosen sector and then the ability to evaluate and react to risk 
well. Further, a capacity for sustained effort, a relevant track record, good references, 
a thorough and coherent business plan, sound financial controls and a strong market 












Wright & Robbie 1996 also examines the rates of return required by venture capital 
investors and how these are arrived at. The benchmark required IRR was a mean of 
29.2 percent (a median of 30 percent)27. The earlier the stage of investment, the 
higher was the required IRR. Adjustments were made for smaller deals (an increase 
of 3.9 percent) or those which would require greater "post-deal reorganisation" (an 
increase of7.6 percent). 
Further, Wright & Robbie 1996 shows that the majority of BVCA members "felt that 
it was important or essential that the proposed investment met a specific rate of return 
on equity according to the individual characteristics of each investment, though the 
size of the standard deviation indicates that a substantial minority of venture 
capitalists do not share this view" (Wright & Robbie 1996: 162). 
Factors which affected the required rates of return were studied. The most common 
factors were, in order, the expected time to exit, market conditions in the investee 
sector, general economic conditions, the investee $ector itself and, finally, the 
expected gearing ratio. Changes in general financial variables were considered 
relatively unimportant. Also less important were the size of the investment, 
geographical location and whether a majority of the equity was held. 
The riskiness of the investment was assessed on the basis of management's 
contribution of skills followed by the state of the market targeted by the investee's 
product. While still important, actual financial contribution by management was less 
important as a risk indicator, as was the expected time to exit. 
Wright & Robbie 1996 also shows that "venture capitalists focusing on later stage 
investments placed significantly greater emphasis on valuation methods which made 
use of past performance information and sale prices than did those also prepared to 
fund early stage projects. The latter placed greater emphasis than the former on DCF 
valuation methods" (Wright & Robbie 1996:164). VCs targeting later stage 
investments rated the importance of financial information more highly than VCs 
looking at early stage investments, presumably owing to the greater reliability of 
trading track records. 











Wright & Robbie 1996 shows that differences in practice arise between venture 
capitalists and analysts of publicly quoted ordinary shares28 . Differences also arise 
amongst venture capitalists on the basis of whether they are independent or captive 
funds on the one hand, and whether they focus on all stages in the investment cycle of 
the business or whether they concentrate only on later stage investments. Independent 
funds have to raise their own funds from third parties while captives have access to 
the balance sheet of their parent. In addition to the challenges of fund raising and 
reporting to investors with which an independent fund must deal, the independent 
fund typically has a fixed life time and is forced to focus more aggressively on quick 
value realisation than a captive fund. Furthermore, because many captives have 
financial institutions as parents, they are inclined to ~prefer later stage projects. In 
1994, independent VCs in the UK invested 54% of all new funds invested29. 
MANIGART ET AL 1997 (UK, FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS & BELGIUM) 
Manigart et al 1997 extends the study of Wright & Robbie 1996 to France, the 
Netherlands and Belgium by surveying members of the respective national venture 
capital associations. They found that there are noticeable differences between each of 
these countries and the UK insofar as required rates of return, valuation techniques 
and informational requirements are concerned. 
Manigart et al 1997 uncovers some striking differences in the required rates of return 
across the various countries (Belgium and the Netherlands yielded very similar results 
and are grouped togetherio. The required rates of return are set out in Table 2.5. 
28 See, for example, Arnold & Moizer 1984. 
29 While not properly comparable, in South Africa 40 percent of funds by value was managed by 
independents in 2000 (KPMG 200 I). 
30 Differences in attitude towards value realisation between UK and French entrepreneurs is evident 











REQUIRED INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN PER INVESTMENT STAGE, 
EXPRESSED IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES 
MEDIAN OF UK 
REOUIRED IRRs 
Overall (all stages) 30%* 
Seedlstart-up/early 46-55% 
Expansion! development 26-30% 
MBO 31-35% 
MBI 31-35% 
Secondary Not asked 
*The mean required rate of return was 29.2%. 










Two potential issues which are not dealt with expressly in Manigart et al 1997 need to 
be clarified. First, what is the effect of different national accounting policies on these 
returns and how are the returns calculated? The returns are based on the required IRR 
of the investments over the period of the fund's life (typically 10 years). While not 
expressly stated, this presumably refers to the realised required rates, although the use 
of unrealised rates should not make any difference. Differences in accounting will not 
affect this process since the valuation process endeavours to establish the exit value 
and this is not determined by accounting practice. Second, how are the inflation 
differentials adjusted to ensure that the returns in the separate countries are 
comparable? This is not a trivial issue for investors in countries with volatile national 
currencies such as South Africa where the inflation differential between SA on the 
one hand and the USA and the UK on the other hand has fluctuated around 4 percent 
per annum for the last 5 years. While the differential hetween the risk-free rates of the 
UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands is small, the required rates of return have 
been adjusted nonetheless and re-stated in two different ways: first, as returns in 
South African Rands (Table 4.13) and, second, as risk premia with the risk-free rates 
stripped out (Annexure 7.6). Table 4.13 will be of interest to South Africans who will 
be able to evaluate the required rates of return directly in local currency terms. 
Annexure 7.6 will be of interest to those who wish to evaluate the required rates in 
another currency because they will simply need to add that currency's risk-free rate to 











The investment stage is a key determinant of the required return. The required returns 
of British venture capitalists are considerably higher than the other countries. One 
might have expected to see lower returns because of the market being more mature 
and possibly more competitive. The authors conclude that this may be because 
British venture capitalists have more experience (and are thus more critical) than their 
Continental counterparts. 
Also interesting was the result that expansion projects required a lower return than 
later stage investments. The authors argue that this is probably because there is no 
potentially disruptive change in ownership or management. Notwithstanding this, 
they note that "the expected time horizon (to exit) seems to be a good, albeit not 
perfect, indicator of perceived risk" (Manigart et al1997:37). 
In reviewing the factors that influence the required rate of return, the most important 
factor was the degree of innovation of the proposal. Notably, changes in long bond 
rates, borrowing rates or the equity markets have little influence on the required 
return. While Manigart et al 1997 expresses surprise at this result, it is submitted that 
this is in keeping with theoretical considerations simply because the changes in long 
bond rates account for such a small percentage of the total required rate of return. 
Finally, little importance was placed on whether the investment was pure equity or not 
and whether a majority stake was held by the venture capitalist. 
The final part of the study focused on the methods of valuation. Five groupings of 
valuation method were identified and the overall ranking was as follows: (1) earnings 
multiples, (2) discounted cash flows, (3) dividend yields, (4) sector-specific ratios 
(such as the price sales ratio) and (5) asset value methods. As can be seen from Table 











VALUATION METHODS IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE 
UK FRANCE 
Earnings Multiples Earnings Multiples 
(Historical/prospective (Historical/prospective 
PIE or EBIT) PIE or EBIT) 
DCF Rule of Thumb ratios 
Rule of Thumb ratios DCF 






PIE or EBIT) 
Rule of Thumb ratios 
It is interesting that, in keeping with studies of the public markets (Ogle & Uliana 
2000), British and French venture capitalists use earnings multiples whereas in many 
countries VCs prefer to use the discounted cash flow method3!. 
KARSAI ET AL 1997 AND 1998 (HUNGARY, POLAND & SLOVAKIA) 
Karsai et al 1997 studies the initial development of the Hungarian venture capital 
market. Karsai et al 1998 extends the study and compares some of the issues raised in 
Manigart et al 1997 and Wright and Robbie 1996 by examining the screening and 
valuation approaches of venture capitalists in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Karsai 
et al 1998 shows that there are differences between the various Central and Eastern 
European ("CEE") venture capitalists and their developed country counterparts (The 
UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium). The authors note that, given the small 
number of respondents, the statistical results should be treated with caution, but they 
do provide interesting data. 
There are differences between the CEE countries and the UK. As hypothesised, VCs 
in the CEE countries were less discriminating about the industries in which they 
invested, and they applied less sophisticated and more standardised approaches to the 
financial benchmark ratios of the investees as indicators of likely success. VCs in the 
CEE countries used standard benchmarks for establishing the required rates of return 
rather than adjusting the return for each individual investment, as is done in the UK. 
31 The French also use earnings multiples as a primary valuation method, but the higher standard 












General and sector market conditions in the CEE countries were considered more 
important than in the UK, as was the amount of the shareholding (the greater the 
better in the CEE countries) and the length of investment. These latter findings reflect 
the specific problems faced by the CEE countries in dealing with information 
asymmetries which result from less sophisticated reporting and other legal 
requirements. 
In assessing riskiness, Karsai et al 1998 shows that VCs in the CEE countries like to 
see a greater financial contribution by the entrepreneurs than their UK counterparts. 
Interestingly, the CEE venture capitalists make far greater use of DCF valuation 
methods and dividend yield methods while earnings multiple methods are eschewed, 
probably a reflection of the unsophisticated public markets in the CEE countries32. 
Asset-based valuation methods, as in the UK, are not widely used, although where 
they were used in the CEE countries, attention was focused on replacement and 
liquidation values. 
WRIGHT ET AL 2000 (INDIA) 
Wright et al 2000 examines the screening criteria used in the Indian venture capital 
market. It draws on the methodology of the studies of Wright and Robbie 1996, 
Manigart et al 1997 and Karsai et al 1998, and notes that there are differences 
between the approaches of developed and developing venture capital markets. 
Caution should be exercised in respect of these statistical results due to the small 
number of respondents. 
The studies of Wright et al 2000 and Karsai et al 1997 and 1998 give context to a 
study of South African VC activity. "It is important to recognise, however, that the 
(various) emerging venture capital markets while representing different socio-cultural, 
economic and legal environments to Western economies, are themselves 
heterogeneous, embracing as they do transition, developed and developing market 
economies. These differences suggest that the well-known informational asymmetry 
32 It is also very likely that the quality of the financial statements is regarded as less reliable in 
developing markets. This would mean that using earnings, which is a figure dependent on the 












problems between insiders (entrepreneurs) and outsiders (venture capital firms) may 
vary between countries, with consequent implications for the behaviour of venture 
capital firms" (Wright et al2000:1). 
As with the legal and regulatory infrastructures in the CEE countries, Indian 
differences in the legal and regulatory infrastructures and the relative lack of 
sophistication compared to Western economies lead to different investment patterns 
to, for example, the UK, France, the Netherlands or Belgium. Wright et al 2000 finds 
that for Indian VCs the sector in which a potential investment falls is more important 
than for UK VCs. This is in keeping with the findings of Roberts-Baxter and 
Stapelberg 2000 in respect ofthe South African market. Further, and as with the CEE 
countries, the expected time to exit, the application of less sophisticated standardised 
required rates of return and the importance of an own due diligence report were all 
more highly regarded by Indian VCs than by UK VCs. 
In India, there are differing regulatory regimes which apply to foreign and domestic 
VC firms (such as registration and fiscal considerations). These have an influence on 
the differences noted between foreign and domestic Indian firms, although there were 
considerable similarities insofar as sources of information required for valuation 
purposes were concerned. This suggests that local conditions affect the nature of the 
investment evaluation process. 
The precedent studies did not survey the valuation methods by investment stage, but 
surveyed them generally for any venture capital investment, regardless of whether 
they were early stage or later stage. It is submitted that a survey of valuation methods 
used during such disparate stages in the business cyc1e~ (from seed through to buy-out) 
of a VC investment might usefully shed light on the valuation process. 
2.6 CRITERIA BY WmCH INVESTMENTS ARE EVALUATED 
Due to lack of literature on the VC evaluation process, an effort has been made to 











disparate nature of the literature an effort has also been made to conclude with a 
synthesis thereof. 
It is, at the outset, necessary to distinguish between a normative model of evaluation 
criteria and a positive model thereof. In some ways, the difference may also be 
highlighted by asking who benefits from the results of the study. In a normative 
model, the VC would learn what criteria he or she should apply to achieve the best 
investment performance. In a positive model, the entrepreneur would learn what the 
VC was looking for and this would enhance the entrepreneur's ability to raise funding 
but the VC would not know whether the evaluatiop. criteria enhanced his or her 
performance. 
Developing a normative model of VC evaluation is a challenging endeavour which is 
outside the ambit of this study. This study, being an initial study in South Africa, 
describes the actual criteria applied by VCs and makes no attempt to determine which 
criteria will result in the best VC investment performance. 
There have been many attempts to determine a normative model of VC evaluation in 
the USA and a useful discussion of the entrepreneurial criteria appears in Fausnaugh 
1995. The early models largely revolve around the theory of entrepreneurship and the 
importance thereof in relation to strategic and market considerations. Macmillan, 
Siegel & Subbanarisimha 1985 concludes that the quality of experience of the 
entrepreneur is central to ensuring funding from (US) VCs, but MacMillan, Zamman 
& Subbanarisimha 1987 finds no statistically significant correlation demonstrating 
that any characteristics of the entrepreneurial team are 
predictors of new venture success33 . Interestingly, MacMillan et al 1987 only 
identifies two criteria which were predictors of success (although neither was 
regarded as essential). They were the effectiveness of the barriers to competitive 
entry and the extent to which the market adopted the product or service - neither 
relate directly to entrepreneurial characteristics. Fausnaugh 1995 cites only one study 
which has been in any way successful in linking new venture performance with 
33 MacMillan et al 1987 used the same criteria as in MacMillan et al 1985 and carried out a study by 
asking 67 VC fIrms to rate successful and unsuccessful investments in which they had invested. No 
characteristics of the entrepreneurial team were found to be predictors of success. Cluster analysis 
revealed that the VCs attributed the lack of success of 68 percent of the unsuccessful ventures directly 
to entrepreneurial characteristics. Notwithstanding this, regression analysis showed that entrepreneurial 











entrepreneurial characteristics34• She notes that "research has failed to consistently 
confirm the existence of any statistically significant link between demographic, 
psychological, or sociological characteristics of the :entrepreneur studied and new 
venture performance" (Fausnaugh 1995: 10). 
Insofar as positive models are concerned, there have been many studies of VC 
investment patterns which focus on the criteria used in the general evaluation of 
investment opportunities by foreign VCs (Wells 1974, Poindexter 1976, Tyebjee & 
Bruno 1984, Silver 1985, MacMillan et al1985 and 1987, Timmons et a11987, Dixon 
1991, Hall & Hofer 1993, Knight 1994, Zacharakis 1995, Guild & Bachher 1996, 
Zacharakis & Meyer 1998). There are no detailed published studies of the criteria 
used by South African VCs. 
Hall & Hofer 1993 have been referred to earlier as having raised a concern about 
studies which do not identify the stage of the VC decision-making process at which 
evaluation criteria are applied. However, Fausnaugh 1995 argues that the criteria are 
not cognitively applied at specific stages, but as and when there is enough information 
to draw a conclusion. In fact, Hall & Hofer 1993 allude to this when they observe that 
"not all criteria were assessed in each proposal. Rather, the process proceeded until 
the venture capitalists identified a reason to reject the proposal or completed that stage 
of review without discovering a 'fatal flaw'" (Hall & Hofer 1993:34). Accordingly, it 
is submitted that far more sophisticated research methodologies would be required to 
accurately assess at which stage which criteria were actively considered to be of key 
importance (rather than determining at which stage compliance with the criteria was 
most easily established). It is further submitted that this may not be a useful exercise 
because in practice each evaluation criterion is probably only applied once sufficient 
information is available to make a decision regarding that criterion. 
Boocock & Woods 1996 comprises a case study of the investment patterns of a two 
year old UK venture capital fund and it notes that compliance with certain investment 
criteria are more easily identified at different stages of the investment process. For 
example, a VC would determine whether the market was growing fast enough to be 
interesting at an early stage in the process, but may take some time to determine 












whether management had the wherewithal to be successful. Boocock & Woods 1996 
argues that it would be inappropriate to conclude that market growth was an important 
consideration during initial screening and that the quality of management was only 
important during second phase evaluation. It is submitted that this argument is correct 
and that the early stage screening process relies on the use of easily measurable 
proxies which are indicators of the general quality of the proposal. 
Boocock & Woods 1996 also questions the weighting or significance of different 
evaluation criteria used by VCs. The paper concludes that, in practice, both 
entrepreneurial skills and market potential appear to be considered to be very 
important throughout the evaluation process. 
It should also be noted that there is some evidence of a shifting in investment criteria 
over time. As long ago as 1985, Macmillan et a11985:126 noted that "the major shift 
that has occurred since Tyebjee and Bruno's study is that venture capitalists in the 
mid-1980s have reduced their expectation of specific skills (marketing, technical, and 
so on) on the part of the entrepreneur and shifted these expectations to the venture 
team". In addition, Knight 1994 finds that some of the Canadian criteria have 
changed in ranking over time and suggests that this is a result of the maturing of the 
Canadian VC industry. The impact of the Internet and wireless technology may be 
expected to change some of the criteria further, particularly in their ranking of 
importance. Thus a study of evaluation criteria needs to be contemporarily 
comparable. The precedent studies were carried out about 5 years prior to the instant 
study which, it is submitted, is sufficiently contemporaneous for the purposes of 
comparison of evaluation criteria. Direct comparison is, however, hindered by the 
fact that MacMillan et al1985 studies the criteria applied by (US) VCs. 
The criticisms raised in the preceding paragraphs will be relevant to placing the 
results of the instant survey of evaluation criteria in context. An appreciation of these 
issues should serve as a warning that to simply assume that a highly rated evaluation 
criterion is sacrosanct would be erroneous. The evaluation process is far richer and 
the context more lush than a statistical result might indicate. 
What do the studies of positive evaluation models reveal, particularly insofar as 











interviews so as to rank the criteria used by 7 (US) VC firms and found that, in order 
of weighting, management commitment, product, market, and management marketing 
skill ranked the highest. Wells 1974:116 noted that contrary to VC folklore that 
management skill is the most important factor in venture capital investment decision-
making, both the product and the market ranked as highly as management skill, which 
was the highest weighted management skill factor. 
In a study aimed at identifying the criteria used by VCs at different stages of the 
investment process, Hall & Hofer 1993 conducted semi-structured interviews with 
four (US) VC firms and asked them to "think aloud,,35 in considering protocols 
comprising summarised case studies. The study found that VCs decide whether to 
proceed with a proposal during initial screening in less than 6 minutes and in less than 
21 minutes when the proposal is assessed during the second stage. At the initial 
screening stage, VCs were found to favour those investments which fell within their 
investment mandate and a market offering long term growth and profitability. At the 
evaluation stage (second phase), greater emphasis was placed on the source of the 
proposal and whether it had been previously reviewed by a trusted party. Hall & 
Hofer established that during the early stage of the :VC's investment process, and 
contrary to previous studies, the entrepreneurial team and the business strategy were 
granted relatively little importance (ie no proposals were rejected because of a poor 
strategy). "The basic conclusion based on both the more general observations and the 
two exceptions is that the characteristics of the entrepreneur are not important in 
proposal screening and proposal assessment, except at the extreme ends of the 
distribution of entrepreneurial talent (i.e., the very incompetent and the potentially 
very competent." (Hall & Hofer 1993:39) 
Two interesting papers analyse the evaluation criteria used by VCs from a cognitive 
psychology perspective. Zacharakis 1995 and Zacharakis & Meyer 1998, in a 
preliminary study, found that entrepreneurs and VCs who were parties to the same 
failed ventures often disagreed on the reasons (perhaps due to attribution theory36), 
which suggests that one of the parties did not always understand the correct reasons. 
35 Verbal protocols require the interviewee to provide a verbal commentary of their thoughts while 
carrying out a task. The protocols are then analysed by an expert. 
36 "People tend to attribute their own failures to environmental circumstances, but others' failures to 











The dilemma arising from this conclusion is that at least one of the parties made a 
decision based on faulty reasoning. 
In addition, Zacharakis 1995 and Zacharakis & Meyer 1998 reason that if VC 
decision-making is internally consistent, then there is an opportunity to learn from and 
develop the process better by understanding it. If the process is inconsistent, then the 
opportunity for improvement is limited. They note that in a study by Stahl and 
Zimmerer 1984 of 42 executives making merger and acquisition decisions, even 
though the executives did not have insight into why they actually made the decisions, 
their decisions were internally consistent. 
Applying social judgement theory37 from cognitive psychology, Zacharakis & Meyer 
1998 endeavours to understand the differences which arise between the VC's stated 
decision-making process, and the actual process which the VC uses during the initial 
screening process. Two sets of facts were developed which had been summarised 
from 50 different actual business plans. The researchers already knew whether the 
various businesses had survived or failed. One' set of facts contained four 
informational cues or facts, and the other set contained eight such cues. The 
respondents (51 US VCs) were divided up and asked to identify which businesses had 
survived and which had failed on a seven point Likert scale. Regression analyses of 
the results were then computed. 
The results of Zacharakis 1995 and Zacharakis & Meyer 1998 were striking: 
• VCs' actual decision-making policies differ from their stated decision-making 
policies, although they have "relatively good insight". 
• VCs actually focus far more on market competition than they realise. 
• V Cs, while ranking entrepreneurial leadership as. most important in their stated 
policies, in fact rank it as relatively unimportant in their actual decision policies. 
• The VCs who were confronted with less information (the first set of data 
comprising only four informational cues) better understood their decision 
processes. 
37 Social judgement theory is predicated on the assumption that decision-makers do not possess real 
information, but perceive it from proximal cues. The cues are used to quantitatively identify the 











• VCs stated that they rated product superiority 2.3 to 3 times more importantly than 
other factors (including the entrepreneurial team), while product superiority is 
actually regarded as 3.5 to 5.5 times more important. 
• VCs apply their actual decision-making policies very consistently. 
• VCs turn their attention from the entrepreneur to the market as the amount of 
information they have increases (ie the entrepreneur is crucial if there is little 
market information, but once the VC is comfortable with the market, the 
entrepreneur becomes less important). 
• Only 24 percent of surveyed VCs used some kind of checklist or scorecard, but as 
their experience grows, VCs could improve their initial screening process by 
developing such a checklist. 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 
Studies which have been conducted in other parts of the world are included here for 
the purposes of completeness. 
Bachher 1995 performed a survey of Canadian business angels, private venture 
capitalists, and public venture capital funds and concludes that for all three types of 
investor "the general characteristics of the entreprenetir( s) (are) most important when 
deciding to invest in an early stage technology based company" (Bachher 1995:102). 
Bachher 1995 notes that very few of the studies of screening and evaluation criteria 
which he reviewed paid much attention to the evaluation of the technology of the 
product or service. 
Chotigeat, Pandey & Kim 1997 surveyed the criteria applied in the developing Asian 
markets of Taiwan, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The study concludes that in Taiwan the 
most important issues are financial returns and market potential, in Sri Lanka the most 
important issues are financial indicators and the management team and in Thailand 
the management team is the most important consideration.38 











Knight 1994, a cross-cultural comparison of evaluation criteria used by (US) VCs, 
replicates the USA study of MacMillan et al 1985 and focuses on Canada, Europe and 
the Asia Pacific region. Unfortunately Knight 1994 does not clarify whether the early 
stage focus of the study of MacMillan et al 1985 was controlled for in comparing to 
the results of the EVCA members (which, by definition, include later stage investors). 
It is unclear whether the respondents from other countries apply the American 
definition of VC or the European definition. The implication of this is that the 
comparability the results of Knight 1994 may be suspect. Nonetheless, it provides 
useful qualitative insights for the purposes of this discussion. The study finds 
concurrence across national boundaries insofar as the primary importance of 
entrepreneurial personality and experience are concerned. The differences which 
emerge may well be explained by definitional differences: the aversion to "high tech" 
investments in the rest of the world other than America may well be due to the fact 
that the rest of the world includes buy-outs in the definition of "venture capital". This 
is certainly a likely explanation for the apparent requirement for higher rates of return 
by American VCs than their counterparts in the rest of the world. Other cross-cultural 
differences can be accounted for as deriving from the classic concerns of early stage 
investors as opposed to later stage investors. 
SOUTH AFRICAN EVIDENCE 
Fourie 1999 studies the evaluation criteria used by five seed and start-up stage VC 
funds in SA. While the sample is not very representative of this section of the VC 
industry39, the results are presented in Table 2.7 as being of an exploratory nature. 
39 Two of the respondents are primarily providers of debt and 'one is an agent that raises funds for 











EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR SEED AND EARLY STAGE VC INVESTMENT 
FUNDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Evaluation criteria Rating* 
Target market enjoys good growth 3.8 
Product is beyond the point of a functioning prototype 3.8 
Management is cajJable of sustained effort 3.8 
Management is familiar with market 3.8 
Management reacts well to risk 3.6 
Personality of Management is compatible with VC 3.6 
Existing market being expanded 3.2 
Management displays leadership ability 3.2 
Management has a relevant track record 3.2 
Management is familiar with industry 3.0 
Product/technology is proprietary 3.0 
Management is articulate in describing the business 3.0 
Management displays attention to detail 3.0 
Limited competition 2.8 
Venture is creating a new market 2.8 
Venture's jlroduct enjoys market acceptance 2.8 
Investment opportunity was referred to VC 2.6 
Management has a good reputation 2.4 
Product can be described as "high tech" 2.2 
* Rating based on a four point Likert scale where 1 is irrelevant and 4 is essential 
Source: Adapted from Fourie 1999 
Table 2.7 
Roberts-Baxter & Stapelberg 2000 studied the requirements of 15 early stage 
investors which evaluated investment opportunities. They discovered that 67 percent 
of their sample vary their required rates of return according to the sector in which they 
are investing (eg high tech, media, agriculture). Notwithstanding the significance and 
representativeness 40 of their sample, further research of this issue would be valuable 
because the instant study suggests that, while the sector is important, there are a 
considerable number of issues which are more important. 
Roberts-Baxter & Stapelberg 2000 interestingly identify a potential weakness in their 
study that suggests that respondents may not have understood the definition of an 
internal rate of return because of the significant divergence in required rates of return. 
An alternative conclusion might be that this is anecdotal evidence that the VC 
industry is less sophisticated than expected. Other SA commentators have identified a 
4°There appear to have been only 11 VCs. The inclusion of agriCUlture as a sector would not typically 











lack of maturity in the SA VC industry (Watling 1998, Campbell 2000). In any event, 
a broader South African study might cast an interesting light on the conclusions of 
Roberts-Baxter & Stapelberg 2000. 
Both Roberts-Baxter & Stapelberg 2000 and Stillman 1999 note that SA VCs only 
seek to hold between 20 percent and 49 percent of an investment, with 77 percent of 
those surveyed in Roberts-Baxter & Stapelberg 2000 stating that they did not wish to 
have control of the investment. 
Stillman 1999, drawing on interviews with about 50 stakeholders, is a study 
commissioned by the South African Department of Trade and Industry to understand 
the role which government might play in encouraging the growth of small business 
entrepreneurs in South Africa. It is an extensive study of comparable initiatives in 
other countries and is focused on making policy recommendations to government. 
Risk aversion, lack of expertise, inexperience and (implicitly) high transaction costs 
are cited as reasons for the slow growth in early stage investments or (US) VC. 
Investment criteria include only investment opportunities which have existing 
successful businesses (at least two years old), good management, a shareholding 
anywhere between 20 percent and 49 percent and a minimum required rate of return 
in excess of 30 percent per annum. Stillman 1999:66 highlights the importance of gut 
feel or intuition in the initial assessment of investments and notes that many VC 
interviewees feel that they are not sufficiently street-wise in this regard. 
SYNTHESIS 
The aforegoing discussion has been lengthy because the literature review has tried to 
draw together disparate research. The review has addressed the issue of the 
applicable stage in the VC decision-making process, which criteria are applicable at 
which stage and what those criteria are. There are conflicting views on the applicable 
stage and there are differing results in respect of which criteria are most important. 











1 The decision-making criteria can be categorised into three broad groups: 
• Certain criteria are very mechanistic in their application. The investment 
opportunity can be quickly filtered by these criteria because they are 
usually answered in a single question. Examples include the size range of 
the investment, the percentage of the equity offered, the industry, and 
geographic location. These filtering criteria could be administered by a 
relatively inexperienced person. 
• Certain criteria require more consideration, greater analysis and may 
include some of the apparently mechanistic issues (such as the stage of the 
business cycle and whether there is proprietary intellectual property). 
Examples of criteria requiring more consideration also include enquiries as 
to whether the market is large or growing, whether the product has 
international potential and whether there are barriers to entry. 
• Finally, certain criteria are very difficult to:assess in a short period of time 
and require a longer process of experienced consideration. Examples 
include assessing the riskiness of the business, the market potential of the 
product or service and the quality of the entrepreneurial team. 
2 The process of evaluation moves from initial filtering through to detailed 
evaluation unabated. The various informational cues are considered at the 
time they are encountered and are disposed of more quickly if they are 
mechanistic in nature and take longer to dispose of if they are more complex. 
If a fatal flaw arises, the evaluation is terminated. 
3 Informational cues can be divided in terms of how immediately the VC needs 
the information to proceed. The level of immediacy diminishes as the issues 
require greater subjective judgement. 
• At certain points in the evaluation the VC requires specific information at 
his or her immediate disposal to proceed further. This is particularly true 
at the time of valuation (for example, the financial projections, audited 
accounts, market growth expectations and valuation comparables). 
• Other information is less immediately necessary but important nonetheless 











• Finally, some information is not immediately necessary but will have been 
assimilated by the VC in an almost osmotic fashion during the evaluation 
process but will still have an important impact on the valuation (for 
example, the quality of the entrepreneur and a general assessment of 
riskiness). 
4 At the time of valuation a point in the process has been reached where there 
are informational pre-requisites, failing which a valuation cannot properly be 
conducted. This is in contradistinction to the general evaluation of an 
investment where informational cues are received about the competence of 
management or the condition of the market. The valuation is done at a 
specific point in time, whereas the general evaluation may take place over a 
period of time. This suggests that the valuation stage is not only conceptually 
distinct but also practically distinct, and can therefore be studied as a specific 
stage in the decision-making process. 
5 Table 2.8 summarises the nature, sample size and results of various American 
studies of (US) VC criteria. Notwithstanding the oft-quoted mantra that 
management is the most important factor for the success of a business, the 
literature differs as to whether VCs actually follow this approach as a strict 
rule. It would appear that often market issues (such as the level of competition 
and the barriers to entry) and product issues (such as market acceptance and 
functionality) are more important. None of this suggests that the quality of the 
entrepreneurial management is unimportant, but sometimes VCs back a "B" 
team with an "A" product. 
Where appropriate, the design of the instant questionnaire was adjusted to take this 
review of the literature on evaluation criteria into account. This is dealt with in 











INFORMATION FACTORS USED IN (US) VC DECISION (SEED, START-UP AND EARLY STAGE INVESTMENTS) 
STUDY Wells Poindexter Tyebjee & MacMillan et MacMillan et Robinson Timmons et Hall & 
1974 1976 Bruno 1985 al1985 al1987 1987 al1987 Hofer 
1993 
METHOD Personal Questionnaire Phone survey Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire Unstructured Verbal 
interviews & interviews protocols 
questionnaire 
SAMPLE SIZE 8 97 46 (Study 1) 100 67 53 47 16 
41 (Study 2) 
Entreereneurial/team 
characteristics: 
Mgmt skill & X X X X X X X X 
experience 
Venture team X X X X 
Mgmt stake in firm X X 





Product attributes X X X X 
Product differentiation X X 
Proprietary X X X 
Growth potential X 
















Market size X 
Market growth X 
Barriers to entry 
Competitive threat 




Cash-out method X 
Expected IRR X 
Expected risk X 
Percentage of equity X 
Investor provisions X 




Venture development X 
stage 
VC investment criteria 
Source: Zacharakis & Meyer 1998:61 
Table 2.8 
Tyebjee & MacMillan et MacMillan et Robinson Timmons et Hall & 
Bruno 1985 al1985 al1987 1987 al1987 Hofer 
1993 
X X X 
X X X X 
X X 
X X X 
X 
X X 
X X X 
X 















THE PERFECT CAPITAL MARKET AND EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
The venture capital market is characterised by investments in private, unlisted 
companies. Much of the existing research on valuation techniques is based on studies 
of listed companies in the formal public markets. This is for good reason: our 
understanding of finance is rooted in the concept of the perfect capital market. Our 
understanding of valuation is based on this theory and has been refined to take 
account of real world circumstances. Miller & Modigliani 1961 identifies the 
assumptions underpinning the perfect capital market. These include the following: 
• no transaction costs, 
• no taxes, 
• sufficient buyers and sellers so that no individual can affect pricing, 
• all investors have equal access to the market, 
• informational symmetry, 
• homogeneous expectations, and 
• no financial distress costs. 
While it is generally accepted that few of these hold true in practice (Brigham & 
Gapenski 1996), it is useful to consider whether, notwithstanding the imperfections of 
the capital markets, they are efficient. Efficient capital markets presuppose that all 
information relating to a share price is freely available to all investors and that this 
information is reflected in the price of that share. The venture capital markets are far 
less efficient than the public markets (even where an over-the-counter market exists). 
They are more inefficient in that the transaction costs are far higher relative to making 
investments in the public markets. There are not large numbers of buyers and sellers 
because only institutional venture capitalists and wealthy business angels generally 
participate in this market. Because of the lack of reporting requirements, there are 
huge information asymmetries, both between management and investors and amongst 
investors themselves. Expectations may not be homogeneous because of the different 
investment mandates of the venture capitalists (eg some venture capitalists are 











venture capitalists have to satisfy development policy objectives). Finally, given that 
many young private companies fail, the distress costs are a serious factor in any 
venture capitalist's evaluation.41 
A further issue which requires consideration is that, in the formal public markets, 
agreements to sell shares are standardised. This is not the case in the venture capital 
market. Thus, where a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur differ on the valuation, 
the gap can sometimes be bridged by introducing terms into the contract which 
regulate the value according to performance. There are many types of mechanism 
that enable this - convertible preference shares, performance-based "ratchets", share 
"claw backs", staged investments etc (Bartlett 1988). It is submitted that they are far 
more important in the venture capital valuation process than in the public markets. 
Presumably the venture capitalist would value the company by notionally 
incorporating the value of the discount afforded by the use of the mechanism in some 
way. The study of the effect of these contractual mechanisms does not fall within the 
ambit of this study but their effect should not be underestimated. 
In 1972 Scholes observed that company shares were not unique works of art but 
abstract rights which could be approximated directly or indirectly. This is one of the 
implications of the efficient market hypothesis and, insofar as public markets are 
concerned, there is mixed and controversial research which suggests that increased 
capital inflows into the public markets may cause prices to rise. Gompers & Lerner 
2000 studied 4000 venture investments between 1987 and 1995 and drew the 
following conclusions: 
• A doubling of capital inflows into (US) VC funds resulted in (US) VC investee 
values increasing by between 7 percent and 21 percent. 
• A 100 percent increase in public market values results in (US) VC investee values 
increasing by between 15 percent and 35 percent. Given that this reflects 
improved market prospects, this result is not surprising. However, it is interesting 
that percentage increases in the public markets are not more closely mirrored by 
VC investee values. 
41 The major cost of failure is often not the cost of liquidation itself but the lost opportunity cost 











• Prices are most affected by the above variables in territories where (US) VCs are 
most active. 
• Capital inflows into funds with focused investment mandates increase the values 
of investees which fall within those mandates. 
"Overall, the evidence is most consistent with the demand pressure explanation" 
(Gompers & Lerner 2000:4). 
This appears to be a different finding to Manigart et al 1997, which found that, in the 
UK where VC activity is greater than in other EUropean countries studied, the 
required rates of return were, in fact, higher, thus resulting in lower valuations. This 
may be explained by the fact that Manigart et al 1997 does not purport to study the 
changes in required rates of return relative to inflows of investment, but rather 
compares different countries' required rates at a point in time. In addition, the 
discount rate is not the only variable in a valuation calculation. 
VALUATION THEORY 
It is trite financial theory that the valuation of an equity investment is determined as 
the net present value of its expected future cash flows, discounted at the required rate 
of return (Brigham & Gapenski 1996, Copeland, Koller & Murrin 1996, Brealey & 
Myers 1996, Correia, Flynn, Uliana & Wormald 1993). 
While the discounted cash flow (or net present value ("NPV"» valuation technique is 
accepted as the most sound (Brealey & Myers 1991)42, practitioners often resort to 
other techniques which are intended to be proxies for the DCFINPV method. Indeed, 
a recent study of Chartered Financial Analysts ("CF As") in the USA reveals that only 
15.2 percent of CFAs always use DCFINPV analysis in evaluating listed shares, and 
only 54.3 percent of CF As make any use of it at all (Block 1999). Accounting 
earnings can be a better measure of company perforinance than realised cash flow. 
Cash flow includes opportunistic cash flows whereas where there is a stable pattern of 












earnings this can be a better surrogate for measuring share performance (Ogle & 
Uliana 2000). 
The valuation process comprises three conceptually distinct steps (which are not 
necessarily sequential). The first is an information gathering exercise in respect of the 
investment opportunity, its prospects and its environment. Second, the information is 
used to consider the financial position of the investment opportunity which will 
typically include considering the likely future cash flews or income, the riskiness of 
their receipt and thus the required rate of return appropriate to the risk profile. 
Finally, a valuation method is used which is regarded by the venture capitalist as 
appropriate to the type of investment (Manigart et al 1997). 
Manigart et al 1997 divides valuation techniques into three broad methods, viz those 
based on future cash flow, those based on accounting figures and those based on 
"rules of thumb". They cite option pricing theory ("OPT") and arbitrage pricing 
theory ("APT") as being theoretically useful but impractical to use. 
Manigart et al 1997 used cluster analysis to arrive at the following groupings of 
valuation methods as identified by respondents: 
• methods based on multiples such as price earnings ratios (before or after tax 
earnings); 
• cash flow methods (such as DCF or NPV calculations); 
• "Rule of Thumb" methods (which are primarily sector-specific) such as 
turnover ratios, subscriber values, solicited offers, or parent company price 
earnings ratios; and 
• replacement cost methods based on accounting book values or liquidation 
values. 
Insofar as valuation "rules of thumb" (such as the number of patents owned by a 
biotechnology company) are concerned, Lerner 1994 has demonstrated that the 
breadth of patent scope significantly affects valuations of biotechnology firms. 43 
43 Lerner 1994 shows that a "one standard deviation increase in patent scope is associated with a 21 
percent increase in the fIrm's value. Broad patents are more valuable when substitutes in the same 











For the purposes of private equity valuation, the Harvard Business School 1998 
identifies the following: 
• comparable methods, 
• the DCF INPV method, 
• the adjusted present value method (which takes into account a changing capital 
structure), 
• the "Venture Capital" method (in terms of which the future earnmgs are 
multiplied by a price/earnings ratio at the time of expected exit, and then 
discounted back to NPV at a risk-adjusted discount rate), and 
• option pricing methods. 
Damodaran 1999 identifies three approaches to valuation. He identifies the DCF 
method as the correct way to value a financial asset and then lists two proxies for this 
method, relative pricing and contingent claims. Typically one would use the proxies 
where there is insufficient information to proceed with a DCF valuation. 
Keeley & Punjabi 1999 and Punjabi 1995 question the theoretical validity of using the 
DCFINPV method for valuing typical (US) VC investments which are staged in 
tranches at the option of the investor. They point out that the DCFINPV method's 
shortcoming lies in its inherent assumption that all follow-on rounds of funding or 
staged tranches will be invested, while the real value lies in the option to abandon. 
They point out that DCFINPV valuations undervalue VC investments, but that OPT 
results in valuations closer to those established by VC "rule of thumb" methods. 
Wright and Robbie 1998 point out that VC investments normally provide two kinds of 
options. The first arises from the staging of the investment in tranches or further 
rounds of financing. The second option is on the potential of the venture to generate 
extraordinary returns from its specific knowledge or expertise. 
Aylward 1998a also notes that simple DCFINPV valuation techniques are not 
properly able to take into account the real option value to a VC of staging an 











stage. This is of great value to a VC. Cooper 1977 and Tate 1989 also argue that 
financial theory is limited in its ability to deal with this kind multiperiod investment. 
In fact, OPT can be regarded as a type of DCF technique which incorporates the 
multiperiod nature of the options to invest. Where an option-type investment is 
utilised, the use of a single period DCF method might be regarded as naive in that it 
does not capture the true dynamics of the investment structure. It is submitted that the 
greatest problem with OPT is the unavailability of the information which is required 
to perform such a valuation. Further, it is unlikely that practitioners will embrace a 
valuation method which may result in them investing at higher values, let alone taking 
the time to learn a more complex valuation technique. Even building up the skill to 
apply OPT may expose VCs to more aggressive valuation negotiations with investees. 
This situation is only likely to change if some VCs are able to demonstrably enhance 
their investment performance by realising that they can afford to pay more for 
investments than VCs using more simplistic methods. This will be a very slow 
process. Although it is not expected that any South African VC practitioners use 
OPT, respondents in the instant survey were asked whether they used OPT. 
By applying DCF methodology, a VC is able to consider different scenarios for the 
purposes of understanding the sensitivities and value drivers underlying the business. 
In particular, by considering the probabilities of the different scenarios (as in Monte 
Carlo simulation44), a VC investor is able to gain consi~erable insight into the value of 
the options inherent in funding the investment through tranches or stages. 
THE IMPACT OF THE BVCA/SA VCA VALUATION GUIDELINES 
Venture capital managers face a moral hazard45 in that they may be inclined to 
overstate the value of their underlying investments so as to enable them to continue 
raising funding. The British Venture Capital Association has introduced a set of 
44 Monte Carlo simulation was popularised by David Hertz and McKinsey and Company. 












Valuation Guidelines in an effort to standardise the valuation of unrealised venture 
capital investments for performance reporting. These Valuation Guidelines, although 
not having stamped out the worst excesses of overexuberant reporting, are more 
progressive than in any other country46 (Gompers & Lerner 1997). Notwithstanding 
this progress, the BVCA Valuation Guidelines provide, for example, for four 
valuation methods during the development stage of investment and VCs retain some 
discretion as to which method they may use (Wright and Robbie 1998). 
In 1999 the BVCA Valuation Guidelines were circulated to SA VCA members for 
consideration and comment, it being intended by SAVCA that the South African 
industry adopts similar best practices. The BVCA Valuation Guidelines were 
formally adopted almost verbatim by SA VCA during 2000. Thus, where the context 
permits, any further reference to the SAVCA Valuation Guidelines includes the 
BVCA Valuation Guidelines, and vice versa. There was some discussion amongst 
SA VCA members regarding the usage of DCF for valuations. This method was 
rejected because of the subjective nature of forecasting future cash flows. "(T)he 
method recommended, ie applying a PIE to historic earnings is more prudent for 
reporting purposes" (Maxton 2000:4). Given that the guidelines propose potentially 
more conservative valuation methods for rep rting purposes, it would be interesting to 
establish empirically whether this has had any impact on the valuation methods used 
by South African VCs when valuing for the purposes of an entry into an investment. 
An effect is not anticipated. 
V ALUA TION PRACTICE 
A valuation is predicated upon expectations of the future which are adjusted to take 
account of the likely deviation from these expectations. The greater the amount of 
relevant information at the disposal of the valuer, the more certain the future and vice 
versa. The valuer's greatest challenge is usually informational. There is far less 
certainty or information at the earlier stages in the business cycle of an investment 











opportunity. This means that during the seed, start-up or early stage of an investment, 
VCs must often make use of proxies for a DCF valuati~n.47 
In practice, the DCF method is often applied by ves by only looking at the earliest 
years (say, 2 or 3 years) of likely cash flows and then assuming that the uncertainty 
thereafter is so great as to ignore the impact of any further cash flows. However, 
there are other methods. During the seed stage a VC may simply establish how much 
has been invested into the idea, determine how much is required until the next round 
of funding, and then pay a small premium, if any, to supply the required funding. A 
healthy dose of experience and intuition obviously assists in this kind of valuation. 
As the stages in the business cycle move from seed through to start-up and early 
stage, to the expansion, buy-out and replacement stages, the valuation techniques 
become more sophisticated and less subjective or intuitive. 
The issues raised in this section on valuation resulted in the design of the instant 
questionnaire to include questions relating to each of the investment stages. This is 
dealt with more fully in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
2.8 PORTFOLIO THEORY 
Portfolio theory shows that one can reduce the overall risk of one's portfolio by 
combining various assets (which are not perfectly positively correlated) in one 
portfolio (Brigham & Gapenski 1996). This suggests that one should hold assets in a 
portfolio and that the riskiness of individual assets should not be assessed 
individually, but as part of a well-diversified portfolio. Markowitz introduced the 
mean-variance approach in 1952. 











Venture capitalists will not typically invest more than a certain percentage of their 
funds under management in anyone project. In well-developed markets, such as the 
USA, venture capitalists will often focus on one niche area within a broad industry (eg 
business-to-business Internet opportunities). This is a result of informational 
asymmetries and transaction costs - one is forced to specialise. 
Knight predicted a portfolio strategy based on consolidation rather than diversification 
(1933, as cited in Aylward 1998a) in circumstances where there is great uncertainty 
not only as regards future outcomes, but also as regards the probability distribution of 
future returns. "The need to specialise investments is simply a means by which the 
return distribution of the asset can be sampled to more accurately measure its mean 
and variance. Then investment selection proceeds by choosing those assets, within 
the class, that are relatively efficient in terms of their return-to-risk ratios" (Aylward 
1998a:44). 
Wells 1974 found that none of the VCs surveyed actually tried to arrange their 
portfolio investments in such a manner that they held low or negatively correlated 
ventures. Interestingly, Wells recast the returns of the 17 ventures which he had 
examined on the basis of a hypothetical VC firm ~hich applied two approaches 
espoused by the respondent firms: first, no more than 10 percent of the fund was 
invested in any investment and, second, the decision rules of the various funds were 
applied to each investment. Overall the hypothetical firm achieved a return of 24 
percent and suffered no failures. This was in contrast to the actual performance of 
these 17 investments in the hands of VC managers which did not always apply their 
own rules - returns were lower and there was some investment failure (Wells 
1974:163). 
SOUTH AFRICAN EVIDENCE 
One of the few and earliest South African studies on the issue of portfolio policy in 
venture capital funds was that of Braver 1986, which only notes that the survey 
sample had "diversified their investments over the entire spectrum of stage of 











any kind of portfolio strategy is applied to the investment selection process of South 
African VCs. 
Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 sets out the changes to the instant questionnaire to reflect the 
issues raised in this review of portfolio theory. 
2.9 DETERMINATION OF REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN 
THEORY 
The required rate of return is a function of the market risk (also known as the 
systematic or non-diversifiable risk) of the investment. The market risk is therefore 
the risk-free rate plus an appropriate "equity premium" for that specific investment, 
assuming that it is part of a well-diversified portfolio (Brigham & Gapenski 1996, 
Copeland et a11996, Correia et a11993, Brealey & Myers 1996). 
The higher the risk, the higher will be the required rate of return. The risk will be a 
combination of both the risk of the specific investment opportunity as well as the 
prevailing general economic conditions. The capital asset pricing model provides a 
useful framework. It is predicated on the required rate of return of an investment 
opportunity being equal to the sum of the long term risk-free interest rate, and the risk 
premium (being the product of the non-diversifiable risk ("8") of the investment 
opportunity and the equity premium) (Copeland et aI1996). 
K§ = Krf+ RP 




















Theoretically one would expect that venture capitalists would adjust their required 
rate of return in accordance with general economic conditions which might influence 
the long term risk-free interest rate. VCs would then be expected to increase the rate 
by the risk premium. This would take into account the specific features of an 
individual investment opportunity which gives rise to the non-diversifiable risk 
thereof. 
THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM AND A WELL-DIVERSIFIED PORTFOLIO 
An important theoretical question arises as to whether, in selecting the required rate of 
return, the venture capitalist is seeking an equity premium on his or her own portfolio, 
on a well-diversified portfolio, a "Knightian" consolidated portfolio (1933, as cited in 
Aylward 1998a) or simply on the existing portfoliQ irrespective of whether it is 
well-diversified or consolidated. Since the questionnaire seeks to identify the nominal 
return required as a whole, the breakdown of how the required rate of return is 
comprised is ignored. It would therefore be useful to know whether, in the opinion of 
the venture capitalist, his or her portfolio is well-diversified, consolidated or neither. 
It may be reasonable to assume that VCs would seek a required rate of return that is 
higher than theoretically predicted where the portfolio is not well-diversified or 
consolidated. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE INTERNAL RATE OF 
RETURN 
While IRRs are commonly used to evaluate investment performance, they have been 
the subject of considerable theoretical criticism.48 Although IRRs can be a valuable 
tool in understanding investment performance, the NPV method is theoretically 
preferable. The unthinking use of internal rate of return as a measure of profitability 











can lead to inappropriate decision-making. The primary theoretical drawbacks for 
this study relate to: 
• the re-investment rate assumption, and 
• changing IRRs over the term of an investment. 
The IRR calculation assumes that the inflow of cash flows over the life of the 
investment are re-invested at the same rate of return as the IRR itself. Where the 
IRRs are high (as in the case of VC investments) this leads to an aggressive 
overstatement of the IRR. In reality, the re-investment rate should be the company's 
cost of capital because it is unrealistic to expect to have a continuing flow of 
successful investments into which the company can invest its spare cash. The use of a 
modified internal rate of return ('MIRR') can counter this problem, however, in that 
the cash flows are assumed to be re-invested at the cost of capital. Indeed, it may be 
more appropriate to regard the VC investment as a zero-coupon bond. This is 
particularly true of earlier stage technology investments where cash is consumed and 
dividends not normally paid until the company reaches a considerable level of 
maturity (by which time most VCs have exited). In such a case, there would not be a 
re-investment rate assumption because the final return of capital takes place as a bullet 
payment at the end of the term. 
The IRR calculation is unable to take the impact of a change in IRR over the term of 
the investment into account. A change in the required rate may occur as the 
investment's risk profile changes. For instance, a seed investment may warrant a 
100% discount rate in the first two years of its life, but the required rate may drop 
progressively as the investment becomes less risky such that by the fifth year of 
investment a 35% discount rate is appropriate. However, the IRR is unable to 
incorporate this change and all subsequent cash flows are discounted at 100%. As 
with the re-investment rate assumption, the application of high required rates results 
in more exaggerated distortions. 
VCs would likely argue that, had they adjusted the req~ired rate to take account ofthe 
improving risk profile, then they would have applied a discount rate of 150% for the 











there would be no cash inflows in the first two years of the investment's life, a more 
refined adjustment to the required rate would result in the entire investment being 
valued at, say, 35% as the cash inflows only commence around the fifth year. This 
would be equally unacceptable. 
Neither of the above issues were addressed in this study. It is submitted that they 
would be best investigated in a study examining the entire valuation process and the 
use of required rates of return and certainty equivalents, as is suggested later in this 
study. 
RISK INDICATORS 
In a venture capital setting, the required rate of return is often increased further by the 
inclusion of an adjustment for the illiquidity of the asset, and compensation for the 
value added by the supplier of capital. "This last adjustment is required to 
compensate venture capitalists for monitoring the company and playing an active role 
in management while leaving the limited partner with the appropriate rate of return 
after taking into account the venture capital fund's management fees and profit 
participation" (Sahlman 1990:513). 
Kane 1998 identifies the following as key types of risk: 
• management risk, 
• product risk, 
• market risk, and 
• operations risk. 
MacMillan et al 1985 derives six categories of VC risk from factor analysis of their 
sample of 102 (US) VC members of the National Venture Capital Association. These 
risks are as follows: 
• loss of entire investment, 
• inability to bailout, 












• management failure, and 
• leadership failure. 
Cooper 1977 identifies three types of risk which a (US) VC faces 
• the variability of the payoff from the investment, 
• the risk of abandonment of the investment if it is unsuccessful (which can be 
countered to some extent by staging of the investment in staggered tranches), 
and 
• the unpredictability of the behaviour of the entrepreneur (particularly because 
the relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur cannot be fully 
regulated by a written agreement). 
KNC 2001b:12 sets out a model of risk which needs to be addressed by a start-up 
venture: 
• development risk (Can the product or service be developed?) 
• manufacturing risk (Can it be made?) 
• marketing risk (Can it be sold?) 
• management risk (Can it be sold profitably?), and 
• growth risk (Can the growing venture be managed?) 
Canadian VCs, for example, display a preference within their area of industry focus 
for later stage investments due to the lower costs of selection and monitoring, and 
information asymmetry (Amit, Brander & Zott 1998). 
SAMPLE REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN 
Sahlman 1990 identifies American (US) VCs as using standard discount rates of 
between 40 and 60 percent. Plummer (1987, as cited in Sahlman 1990) suggests a 
range starting at a maximum of 70 percent for start-up stage investments through to 











Bygrave, Hay & Peeters 1994 studied the returns of (US) VC firms from 1969 to 1985 
and concluded that average annual returns had most often been in the teens. 
Occasionally the returns had been between 20 percent and 30 percent and only very 
rarely over 30 percent per annum. Wright and Robbie 1996 concluded that the overall 
mean required rate of return for VCs in the UK was 29.2 percent (median: 30%)49. 
SOUTH AFRICAN EVIDENCE 
An early South African study of required rates of return for venture capitalists (Braver 
1986) is unhelpful. This is mainly because the industry was so embryonic at the time 
and there were too few respondents to draw any meaningful conclusions. Seminal 
South African VCs required rates of return between 15 percent and 60 percent. They 
typically required higher rates of return for earlier stages in the investment cycle 
(although one South African VC required a higher rate of return for expansion/buy-
out stage investments than it did for early stage investments which is an indictment of 
the level of the sophistication of the South African m rket in the mid 1980s). 
In a survey of South African VCs, Capital B Management 1999 found that 
respondents were reluctant to disclose their hurdle rates of return, although the 
average across their sample was 36 percent. Some respondents targeted deal-specific 
returns of 70 to 80 percent, or multiples of their investment. 
Mullet 1998, from his interviews with VCs in South Africa, estimated the required 
rates of return set out in Table 2.10. 
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Limited research has been conducted on the VC industry although it is growing as an 
area of interest. The review endeavours to capture as much of this disparate and 
wide-ranging research as possible and then to synthesise it. This has necessitated a 
comprehensive literature review. 
This literature and theory review has covered how the literature was sourced, it has 
clarified some VC concepts, and it has given a brief overview on the development and 
status of the VC industry. Further, the VC decision-making process has been 
considered and the precedent studies have been reviewed. The criteria used by VCs to 
evaluate investments have been synthesised and various valuation methods have been 
examined. Finally, portfolio theory, the required rates of return and the influence of 
various risk factors have been considered. 
The literature review leads to a number of questions which are considered in Section 
3.2 of Chapter 3 and which have subsequently affected the design of the instant 
questionnaire particularly insofar as it differs from the questionnaire used in the 
precedent surveys. In summary, the questionnaire used in the precedent studies was 
used as the basis and was amended to take account of local issues or where they did 











areas of research. First, the valuation techniques were studied by stage of investment 
cycle on the premise that a VC might use a different technique for a seed investment 
as opposed to a management buy-out. Second, a glossary was included to ensure 
conceptual consistency. Third, the respondents were asked to identify whether they 
had empowerment/development objectives and whether they were listed. This was to 
enable a deeper understanding of the required rates of return. Fourth, the evaluation 
criteria and risk factors were amended to take some of the issues raised in this 
literature review into account. Fifth, the list of valuation techniques was extended to 
include OPT/APT, inter alia. Sixth, the portfolio strategy section focused on whether 
VCs regarded their portfolios as well-diversified. Seventh, an independent data 
recipient, PricewaterhouseCoopers, was used to ensure the respondent's anonymity. 
Finally, the study was extended beyond the membership if SAVCA to ensure a more 
inclusive picture of the South African VC industry. 













"The essence of risk management lies in maximizing the areas where we have some 
control over the outcome while minimizing the areas where we have absolutely no 
control over the outcome and the linkage between effect and cause is hidden from us." 
(Peter L Bernstein)5o 
This chapter deals first with the methodology used by~the precedent studies. Second, 
it identifies some differences between the methodology of the precedent studies and 
the instant study and the reasons therefore, especially the changes to the instant 
questionnaire. Third, the methodology used in the instant survey is documented. The 
fourth section deals with the identification of potential respondents. The fifth section 
sets out the statistical processes which were employed. The sixth section deals with 
the re-statement of required rates of return to take account of the weakness of the 
South African Rand compared to the stronger European currencies. The seventh 
section sets out the hypotheses. The eighth and final section sets out the limitations of 
this study. 
3.1 METHODOLOGY OF THE PRECEDENT STUDIES 
The precedent studies all follow a similar pattern. This is to be expected since there 
were common researchers and collaboration in the studies. The questionnaire that 
was set up for the UK study (Wright & Robbie 1996) was translated into local 
languages and a few additional questions were added for the study of Belgium, the 
Netherlands and France (Manigart et al 1997). Simplified versions of these 
questionnaires were then used for the studies in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia (Karsai et 











al 1998) and India (Wright et al 2000). The questionnaires were sent out to full 
members of the respective national venture capital associations where such 
associations existed, or to lists of respondents gathered from other sources. Table 3.1 
below sets out the broad details of each survey. 
The University of Nottingham's Centre for Management Buy-Out Research made the 












Country UK France Belgium Netherlands Hungary Slovakia Poland India 
Questionnaires 114 133 28 58 12 5 12 47 
sent out 
Number of 66 32 14 24 9 3 6 31 
usable 
responses 
Response rate 58% 24% 50% 41% 75% 60% 50% 66% 
Year of study 1994 1995-6 1995-6 1995-6 1996-7 1996-7 1996-7 1999 
Source of British Association Belgium Nederlandse Vereniging voor Hungarian - - -
respondents Venture Fran9aise des Venturing Participartiemaatschappijen Venture 
Capital Investisseurs Association and Dutch members of the Capital 
Association en Capital and and Belgian EVCA Association 
French members of .. 













3.2 VARIATIONS FROM THE PRECEDENT STUDIES 
The questionnaire used in Wright & Robbie 1996 was used as the initial basis of the 
instant questionnaire, particularly where comparative results were sought. The 
comparative questions were changed where either they required localisation or where 
the questions were regarded as inappropriate or had not elicited a valuable response for 
the original researchers. However, insofar as the ambit of the instant study was 
extended beyond that of the precedent studies, extensive changes were effected. These 
changes were based on various issues raised and referred to in Chapter 2. 
The key differences between the precedent questionnaire and the instant questionnaire 
were as follows: 
1 The original questionnaire enquired about the information (and sources thereof) used 
by VCs during due diligence and valuation. This was ignored as not falling within 
the ambit of the instant study. 
2 The instant questionnaire was extended to include an enquiry as to the valuation 
methods used by SA VCs during the different stages of the lifecycle of an 
investment (for example, seed, early stage, expansion, buy-out etc). This is in 
recognition of the fact that a seed investment has unpredictable future cash flows 
while a leveraged buy-out is far more predictable. Decision-making risk is 
increased by lack of information. Therefore it would seem reasonable to postulate 
that the early stage risk element might not be accounted for by merely increasing the 
required rate of return, but also by using valuation~ techniques that take into account 
the lack of information available to value an earlier stage investment opportunity. 
Certainly there is anecdotal evidence of this and it was considered possible that this 
might yield interesting empirical results. 
3 A glossary was attached to the instant questionnaire. 
4 Some localisation was applied. For example, the instant questionnaire enquired of 











African issue which is found in other countries where there may have been social or 
legal inequities which a government may be endeavouring to regularise. Funds were 
also asked whether they were listed on the local stock exchange. 
5 The evaluation criteria and specific risk factors which affect the required rate of 
return were trimmed where regarded appropriate and extended to include criteria and 
factors which had either been identified in the literature review or were identified 
anecdotally by the researcher or other SA VC practitioners. For example, a question 
was asked whether owning the majority of the equity or control increased or 
decreased investment risk. While on the face of it it would have been a reasonable 
hypothesis merely to assume that having control reduced risk, the question was 
framed in an open-ended fashion to avoid prejudging the result. Further, more 
potential criteria were introduced to cover the evaluation of the technology of the 
product or service (Bachher 1995). Also, Fausnaugh 1995:22 notes that "industry-
related managerial experience may reside in team members other than the founding 
entrepreneur". Thus the questionnaire was couched to include questions not only 
about "the entrepreneur" but included "the entrepreneur's team". Finally, a 
significant inclusion was a new question which enquired as to the importance of the 
integrity of the entrepreneurial team. 
6 The list of valuation methods was similarly trimmed and extended. While some of 
the changes were superficial, OPT/APT was included along with the "venture capital 
method" of valuation 51 as alternatives. 
7 A new inclusion under "Risk Factors" was the risk of the behaviour of the 
entrepreneurial team being unpredictable (Cooper 1977). 
8 A question was included which enquired about portfolio strategy, whether funds 
actively pursued any kind of portfolio strategy and whether VCs regarded their 
portfolios as well-diversified or not. The importance of this was twofold. First it 
tested the notion that an investor should seek a risk premium over and above a well-
diversified portfolio rather than on his or her own portfolio. Second, it tested 











whether there is a tendency amongst SA VCs to focus their investment portfolios as 
do many of their developed country counterparts. This is not expected to be the case 
because the SA economy is relatively small. 
Because the researcher is active in the VC industry, respondents had to be assured that 
the responses would be de-personalised and that the researcher would receive them 
anonymously through the intermediation of an independent data recipient. The 
precedent studies did not need to offer this anonymity. It is possible, although unlikely, 
that this may have affected the results received in the precedent studies as opposed to 
those for the instant study. 
In addition to the instant questionnaire varying from those of the precedent surveys, the 
prospective respondents which were approached included a number of non-SA VCA 
members. SAVCA was only constituted in 1999 and there are still a number of active 
and, in some cases, very significant VCs which are: not members. These additional 
participants were either identified through other surveys (such as Capital B Management 
1999:48, Campbell 2000, Mullet 1998:8lff) or through the researcher's exposure to the 
VC industry generally in SA. 
3.3 THE INSTANT METHODOLOGY 
The method of empirical research comprised the follo~ing steps: 
1 A sample was identified that was large enough to be statistically significant. As 
many VCs as possible were approached. A response of at least 30 was regarded as 
large enough to derive meaningful results. The membership list of SA VCA was 
used as well as approaching non-members in the researcher's private database. 66 
questionnaires were subsequently sent out during November 2000. The method of 











2 The draft questionnaire was pre-tested on several academic colleagues and business 
confidants in the VC market before being finalised. Notwithstanding an effort to 
ensure that it was concise, the questionnaire was about 15 pages long. Respondents 
confirmed that it took about 30 minutes for a reasonably experienced VC to 
complete - there were very few text-oriented questions. An effort was made to 
ensure that the questionnaire was clear and, upon completion, respondents were 
asked to rate the questionnaire's clarity on a five point Likert scale. 
3 A questionnaire was used because, notwithstanding that more sophisticated methods 
have been recommended by other researchers (Hall & Hofer 1993; Zacharakis 1995 
and Zacharakis & Meyer 1998), a large number of South African VC respondents 
were sought and the information required in the questionnaire was considerable. 
4 To avoid any conceptual confusion the instant questionnaire defined "venture 
capital" and "private equity" as being interchangeable and the terms were "used 
synonymously to describe equity or quasi-equity investments in (generally) unlisted 
businesses seeking strong growth (ie this excludes so-called 'lifestyle' businesses)". 
Also, the glossary which was used for the SA VCAlKPMG survey (KPMG 2000) 
was used as the basis of the glossary used in the instant study and is reproduced as 
Annexure 7.4. Finally, the instant survey questionnaire was carefully worded to 
ensure that it was clear to the respondents which stage of the decision-making 
process (first phase filtering, second phase evaluation etc) was being researched in 
each case. 
5 The questionnaire was distributed to the participants as follows: 
• The VCs were first telephoned to enlist their participation. Only one of the 
potential participants refused at this stage to participate. A stamped, addressed 
envelope accompanied the hard copy questionnaire so that the respondent could 
conveniently return the completed questionnaire to the independent data 
recipient, PricewaterhouseCoopers. Email was used sparingly because of the 
risk that some corporate firewalls might not support the formatting of the 
questionnaire III MS Word. The covering letter, letter from 












• The VC institutions were asked to complete a questionnaire for each separate 
fund they managed. This was because the different funds might have different 
investment considerations and, where they had the same investment 
considerations, this would be more representative of the entire industry. Further, 
and in keeping with this approach, respondents were asked to apply their fund's 
criteria and only in the absence thereof, to give their own views. 
• The responses were collated anonymously by PricewaterhouseCoopers so as to 
ensure the confidentiality of participants. PricewaterhouseCoopers de-
personalised the responses and delivered two sets of data to the researcher: a list 
of respondents and a separate data set of the responses. The individual data thus 
remain anonymous. 
6 It was crucial to ensure the participation of the largest VC institutions in the market. 
The likely difficulties in this regard were the following: 
• Lack of confidentiality - even if confidentiality was assured by the researcher, 
the researcher was an executive director of a V~ fund in South Africa and might 
have been seen as a competitor. In addition to the independent data recipient, all 
participants were assured in writing that they would not be identified 
individually in the thesis (or otherwise) and that they would receive a copy of the 
final thesis. 
• Lack of time or interest in completing the questionnaire, or other personal or 
policy reasons. Follow up calls were made. Personal visits were occasionally 
arranged during which the respondents were encouraged to complete the 
questionnaire. Respondents were assured that a copy of the results would be 
made available to them. 
7 The anonymous data were centralised electronically In raw form for statistical 
analysis. 
The final questionnaire was divided into several conceptual sections: 











2 Investment appraisal. This section required the rating of pre-determined evaluation 
criteria according to the following sub-sections: 
• Personality and characteristics of the entrepreneurial team, 
• Experience of entrepreneurial team, 
• Characteristics of the product of service, 
• Characteristics of the target market, 
• Operational issues which must be well-positioned or in good order, 
• Financial considerations (other than the required rate of return or gearing ratios), 
and 
• Stage in the business cycle of the investment (seed, expansion etc). 
3 Targeted rates of return and risk indicators. This section focused on the application 
of the required rates of return and those matters which affect risk and therefore 
might influence the required rate of return. The factors which might affect the 
required rate of return were divided into general factors (largely relating to the state 
of the economy and the risk-free rate), and specific factors which might only apply 
to individual investments. 
4 Valuation methods. This section enquired as to the use of different valuation 
methods for each of the different stages of the business cycle (from seed through to 
replacement). In addition, respondents were asked about how they established a 
final valuation (assuming that more than one valuation method was used). 
5 Required rate of return. This section enquired about the overall required rate for all 
investments and then endeavoured to establish what the different rates were for each 
stage in the business cycle of an investment. The effect of the investment's debt-
equity ratio was also raised. 
6 Portfolio strategy. Respondents were asked whether they applied any kind of 
portfolio strategy to their investments, and if so, what the level of sophistication of 
that strategy was. 
7 Venture capital association. This section was for categorisation purposes. 
8 Clarity of Questionnaire. The respondents were given an opportunity to evaluate the 











3.4 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL RESPONDENTS 
Of the 54 full members of SA VCA at the time of sending out the questionnaire, only 41 
were identified as being appropriate for the study52. Those which were excluded were 
members which primarily supplied debt or funded lifestyle businesses or for which 
venture capital was only a small subset of their business activities (3 in total). One 
intermediary was excluded. In addition, 9 were no longer in business perhaps partially 
as a consequence of the market shakeout which took place in 2000. In addition to the 41 
full members of SAVCA referred to above, one of the .19 associate members of SAVCA 
(SA VCA 2000) was also identified as a potential respondent. Thus a total of 42 
SA VCA members were targeted. 
An investigation of the non-members of SA VCA revealed that there are a number of 
institutions and business angels which make occasional VC investments, but this is not 
their primary business and they were accordingly excluded. However, a further 33 
potential participants which were not members of SA VCA were identified as potential 
respondents. Of these, 5 were no longer in business, 2 were intermediaries and no 
contact details could be found for a further 2 potential respondents. Accordingly, 24 
potential respondents were identified which were not members of SAVCA. Thus a total 
of 66 SA VCA members and non-members were identified as potential respondents. 
While the number of VCs in South Africa is in a state of flux, there are probably no 
more than 65 VC institutions which have raised funds over which they generally have 
discretionary control. Of the 66 potential respondents, 6 corporate groups had 2 
members each and 2 corporate groups had 3 members each53 . Excluding the effects of 
this double counting (10 such funds or entities), only 56 VC institutions were identified. 
It is estimated that there may be a further 5 or 10 VC institutions in SA which the 
researcher was unable to contact. These figures are largely consistent with those of the 
SAVCAlKPMG survey for 2000 (KPMG 2001). 
52 See also Section 2.2, Chapter 2, which deals with the definition of 'venture capitalist'. 
53 These additional members in each corporate group were either different funds or different VC entities 











It is surmised that the researcher's effort to extend the ambit of this study beyond the 
membership of SA VCA may have yielded results which would be different to a study of 
SA VCA members alone would have yielded. A number of non-member respondents 
are smaller VC participants which may not yet have felt it necessary to pay to become 
members of SA VCA. These kinds of respondents may be expected to be involved in 
smaller and often earlier stage investments than their SAVCA counterparts. All the 
large buy-out funds in South Africa are now members of SA VCA. 
3.5 STATISTICAL PROCESSES 
The following statistical analyses were employed: 
• Exploratory Data Analysis was used to filter and check the integrity of the data 
• Standard deviations were computed for each of the attitudinal responses to 
identify the degree of reliability of each finding. 
• Simple mean, mode and median calculations were computed to explore the 
sample's required rates of return, inter alia. 
• Both non-parametric and parametric analyses were conducted. Insofar as the 
overall required rates of return were not normally distributed, it was necessary to 
conduct non-parametric tests on these data. 
Response bias is difficult to control for ex ante (Aylward 1998b:29), but two tests were 
used ex post to check for systematic response bias: 
1 The absolute number of industry participants as indicated by the number of potential 
respondents identified in the instant study was coplpared to the aggregate industry 
data compiled in the SAVCAlKPMG 2001 report. Although the total number ofVC 
institutions identified in the instant study was slightly more than that of the 
SAVCAlKPMG 2001 survey, the numbers were consistent. 
2 The organisation type of the respondents was compared to aggregate industry data 











because the SAVCAlKPMG survey for 2001 identified VC firms or institutions 
(approximately 49 percent were independent, 43 percent were captive and 9 percent 
were public sector captives). In the instant study, the individual VC funds were 
analysed (approximately 55 percent were independent, 41 percent were captive and 
4 percent were public sector captives). The difference in respect of public sector 
captives can be ascribed to the inclusion of the IDC by SAVCAlKPMG, but its 
explicit exclusion in the instant study because the IDC is not strictly a venture 
capital institution in terms of the definition set out in Section 2 of Chapter 2. These 
figures suggest that the instant sample was largely representative of the industry. 
Furthermore, in terms of the law of large numbers, the larger the sample, the more likely 
it is to be representative of the total universe. Hence, because of the reach of the instant 
study, it is more likely to be representative of the VC industry. 
3.6 RESTATEMENT OF REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN FOR A SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONTEXT 
Manigart et al 1997 compares the required rates of return amongst the UK, France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Since it was unclear whether the various rates were 
nominal or real (ie whether they had been adjusted for inflation differences), an email 
enquiry was made of one of the researchers who responded that no such adjustment had 
been made because such an adjustment was regarded as unnecessary. While the 
nominal risk-free rates may not be materially different between these four countries, 
they are indeed important in comparing the required returns with those of South African 
venture capitalists. Consequently all the returns have been re-calculated in Rand-
equivalent figures. This was done by establishing the mean of the 10 year sovereign 
bond rates of each of the relevant countries for the relevant period (10 year rates were 
deemed appropriate because most venture capital funds run for approximately this 
period of time). The difference between the South African long bond rate54 and the 
54 The R153 matures in February 2010 and is the most liquid South African 10 year sovereign bond. The 











developed country bond rates were then added to the results as calculated by Manigart et 
a11997. The nominal required rates of return as stated in SA Rands are set out in Table 
4.13. However, for international comparison purposes Annexure 7.6 reflects the risk 
premia component of the required rates of return of the precedent studies and the instant 
study (ie they explicitly exclude the national risk free rates). 
Note that the SA VCs have increased their required rates of return by about 2 percent 
since the mid to late 1990s when market conditions were better but no adjustment has 
been made for this. 55 
3.7 HYPOTHESES 
Based on the literature review in Chapter 2, the following hypotheses in respect of the 
evaluation criteria, required rates of return and v luation techniques in the South 
African VC market are postulated: 
A EV ALUA nON CRITERIA 
A 1 The most important evaluation criteria will comprise the characteristics of the 
entrepreneurial team relating to personality and experience. 
B REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN 
B 1 When foreign and locally owned respondents are compared, foreign respondents 
will require higher rates of return. 
B2 More mature respondents will require higher rates of return than less mature 
respondents. 
B3 Development respondents will not require as high returns as non-development 
respondents. 
B4 Listed respondents will require a higher return t~an unlisted respondents. 
55 See section 4.4 REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN ('Changes to the required rate of return since the 











B5 Independent respondents will require higher rates of return than captives and 
semi-captives. 
B6 Empowerment respondents will not require as high returns as non-empowerment 
respondents. 
B7 The required rates of return will have increased since the mid to late I 990s. 
C VALUATION 
C 1 The most commonly used technique will be the DCF method in all of the 
investment stages. This will be because the management and accounting figures 
will not usually give as reliable a picture of the earlier stages of a new business as 
cash flow. 
C2 DCF will become more important at the later stages of investment such as the 
buy-outs and buy-ins. This will be because these transactions are typically 
leveraged with debt. In the earlier stages rule of thumb techniques and 
comparables for recent transactions in the sector will predominate because there is 
so little information that a more scientific approach is difficult. 
C3 OPT and dividend yield will be two of the least lfsed techniques. OPT will not be 
used because there is insufficient information to utilise a Black-Scholes model. 
The dividend yield method will be unpopular because the relative lack of maturity 
will mean that there will not be a historic pattern of dividends from which to 
derive comfort. 
C4 The SA VCAlBVCA valuation guidelines will not have had an effect on the 
valuation techniques used by VCs when valuing an opportunity for investment 
purposes. This will be because these guidelines are only used for performance 
evaluation. 
3.8 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
1 Hall & Hofer's 1993 research of the criteria applied by (US) VCs commences 
with a critique of the methodology of using ex post facto information gathering 











biases and recall ability of respondents. These criticisms are echoed later by 
Zacharakis 1995, Zacharakis & Meyer 1998 and Bachher 1995. Zacharakis 1995 
and Zacharakis & Meyer 1998 take issue with the accuracy of ex post interviews 
and surveys because of the existence of ex post rationalisation and recall biases. 
"Such biases likely inhibit how accurately people can introspect about their own 
thought processes ... Experts who tend to rely on intuition more than non-
experts ... are notoriously poor introspectors ... VCs, experts in new venture 
financing, also typically rely on intuition ... " (Zacharakis & Meyer 1998:59). For 
example, they suggest that VCs fixate on the entrepreneur because of his or her 
past successes or dynamic personality, thus reporting the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur as more important than they actually were to the VC at the time of 
making the decision. This limitation is problematic. The instant study is 
currently, to the knowledge of the researcher, the most extensive, representative 
and detailed study of the pre-investment process in the South African venture 
capital industry. Since there is so little existing research on the South African 
venture capital industry, the results of the instant should be interpreted with 
caution and be regarded as exploratory. 
2 It is possible that the use of questionnaires may direct the respondent through a 
predetermined process which does not reflect his or her experience of the process. 
For example, asking what discount rates are used and what risk factors might be 
considered in adjusting the required rate of return may be misleading because 
there is an inherent assumption that risk is primarily priced into the required rate 
of return. This may not always be the case. It is possible that one VC may price 
the risk of overstated projected cash flows by applying an aggressive required rate 
of return as a discount rate, while another VC may subject the cash flows to a 
certainty equivalent56 before a more modest required rate of return is applied. 
There is no indication in the literature that this issue has been researched or 
addressed in any way in past research and this may be an interesting avenue for 
further study. Such a study might also consider the theoretical limitations of using 
IRRs insofar as they relate to the re-investment rate assumption and 











accommodation for changing required rates of return over the term of an 
investment. 
3 Insofar as the questionnaire is concerned, some ~quality may have been sacrificed 
in the drive for a large sample. However, it is submitted that at worst this would 
have affected some of the attitudinal questions relating to evaluation criteria and 
risk factors. However, other issues which were surveyed, such as required rates of 
return and valuation methods, may be satisfactorily surveyed using a 
questionnaire. The advantages of a large sample were expected to enable the 
researcher to draw statistically significant conclusions and thus outweigh the 
disadvantages of using a questionnaire. 
4 Access to information is one of the greatest challenges facing researchers of the 
VC industry. VCs are generally very busy and often asked to participate in 
industry presentations, events and a mixed bag of surveys and may suffer from 
"survey fatigue,,57. It is possible that this could lead to non-representative samples 
and ill-considered responses. It is submitted that it is unlikely that this limitation 
is true of the instant study - the researcher was overwhelmed by the level of 
participation and interest in this study.58 
5 The limitations of using an attitudinal scale such as a Likert scale include the 
possibility that different respondents may attach varying weights to the numerical 
scores. In addition, the complexity inherent in the trade-offs of selecting between 
varying criteria, risk factors or valuation methods may not be adequately 
captured59. To the extent that the same respondents answered the instant 
questionnaire, the attitudinal scale will capture the relative rankings of South 
African criteria and this should not pose a major problem. However, insofar as 
comparing the scores from other studies is concerned, the absolute scores should 
57 Unfortunately this has not led to much published work on the industry. 
58 SA VCA could fulfil a valuable service to its members by centralising and co-ordinating legitimate 
surveys in conjunction with the various academic and other bodies which intend researching the VC 
industry. For example, SAVCA might consider appointing a representative body of respected VC 
academics who could review intended studies and recommend a unified research approach to SAVCA on 
an annual basis. SAVCA could then consider endorsing a single or several limited "approved" surveys. 












be interpreted with caution and reliance should only be made on the relative 
rankings of criteria. 
6 There is a risk of a "goodwill" factor driving responses such that they are assumed 
to be what the researcher is seeking. To a small extent this limitation is countered 
by the use of auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, as an independent data recipient. 
7 The statistical results could have been calculated in two ways: either per fund or 
weighted by fund size. Neither approach is necessarily better than the other but 
ideally one would calculate the results on both bases for comparative purposes. 
Nonetheless, an email enquiry was made of one of the precedent researchers 
(Manigart et al 1997) who advised that they had calculated the results per 
respondent and had not weighted them by fund size. In the instant study the 
results were not weighted by fund size for two reasons: first, the precedent studies 
did not weight the responses by fund size 60 and, second, it would have led to a 
potential breach of anonymity because it would have made it possible to identify 
many of the respondents on the basis of the size of their funds. 
8 The size of the response sample appears on the face of it to be significant (about 
70 percent of the entire SA VC industry by number). However, once one drills 
down to the required rate of return by stage of investment, for example, the 
number of responses in respect of public sector VCs drops to a level where the 
statistical significance is less reliable. Attention is drawn to this limitation in the 
discussion of the results. 
9 Most previous European studies, such as the precedent studies, have simply 
comprised a mailing to all full members of the local national venture capital 
association. In the instant study, care was taken to establish the quality of the 
respondents as being those institutions with discretionary control over funds 
which they have raised. This may affect the comparability of the results. In 
addition, an effort was made to extend the study beyond the ambit merely of the 
members of SA VCA and to try and include non-members. This was particularly 
60 In fact, none of the studies surveyed in the literature review endeavour to weight their results by the size 











important because SA VCA is a young association and will only reach maturity in 
years to come. However, it is possible that there is some selection bias which 
arose as a result of the widening of this study beyond members of the local 
association. 
10 The clarity of a questionnaire is crucial if one is seeking valid results. The 
researcher took great trouble to ensure that the questionnaire was clear - it was 
pre-tested and checked with a number of industry players and academic 
colleagues. The questionnaire asked the respondents to rate how clear they found 
it. Certainly, some of the subsequent responses indicate that there may have been 
confusion regarding several questions (which are identified and discussed later). 
11 A problem inherent in virtually all quantitative studies of the decision-making 
process of VCs is that it is impossible to determine whether the responses should 
be regarded as those of the institution as a whole. or whether they are the responses 
of individuals and may have been different had they been completed by a different 
individual within the same institution. The questionnaire is clear in that it requires 
the views of the fund and not the individual but this does not obviate this as a 
potential limitation. 
12 As identified in the literature review, the theoretical question arises as to whether, 
in selecting the required rate of return, the venture capitalist is seeking an equity 
premium on his or her own portfolio, on a well-diversified portfolio or on a 
consolidated portfolio. The resolution of this issue is not contemplated in this 
study and, although it is a potential weakness, it is submitted that it would not 
have a material effect on the results. In any event, at a practical level, it may be 
reasonable to assume that where the average required rate of return reflects the 
fact that a portion of venture capitalists do not have well-diversified or 











Comparison of Instant Study witb tbe Precedent Studies 
Manigart et al 1997, Karsai et all997, Karsai et al 1998, Wright & Robbie 19%, Wright etal2000 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
OF VENTURE CAPITAL MARKET 
Venture capital association 
Number of venture capitalists 
Relevant year 
Amount of venture capital invested/available for investment 

















133 approached 58 approached 
1995-6 1995-6 
81 
Belgium Hungary Poland Slovakia India 
n=14 n=9 n=6 n=3 n=31 
EVCA HVCA Unclear Unclear IVCA 
28 approached 17 members 12 approached 5 main finns 47 total 
1995-6 1996-1997 1996-1997 1996-1997 1999 
US$4 to 500m 
(excluding EBRD 
and pan-CEE funds) US$96m c US$ 550m 










4.1 RESPONSE RATE OF THE SURVEY 
The response to the instant survey, set out in Table 4.2, was very gratifying and, to the 
researcher's knowledge, it would appear to be have had as good a response rate as any 
similar survey done anywhere else in the world. It is also one of the most extensive 
surveys of its kind done on the South African VC industry, both by respondent number 
and response rate. 
Country South Africa 
Questionnaires sent out 66 
Number of usable 51 
responses 
Response rate 77% 
Year of study Ending December 2000 
Source of respondents South African Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association and the researcher's private database 
Table 4.2 
The response rate from members of SA VCA was 88% while the response rate from non-
members was 58%. The split between the respondents was 73% being members of 
SAVCA and 27% being non-members. It is submitted that this study is representative 
of the VC industry in South Africa as at the end of December 2000. 
The geographic location of the respondents was as follows: 
Split by respondents to Split by members of SA VCA 
instant study which were targeted as potential 
respondents 
Gauteng 76 percent 79 percent 
Cape Town 20 percent 17 percent 











The highlights of the results are set out below. For the sake of clarity, a five point 
Likert scale was used, with 5 representing the highest or most favourable score. It is 
important to remember that "respondents" refer to individual VC funds, not VC firms or 
institutions which manage VC funds. In addition, comments will be made regarding the 
"maturity" and "sophistication" of the South African VC market. By "maturity" is 
meant the point in the business cycle of the VC industry, not the degree of sophistication 
of the practice of the participants (for which the term "sophistication" is reserved). 
4.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND & CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
RESPONDENTS 
The split between the types of respondent is set out in Table 4.3. 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY INSTITUTIONAL 
BACKGROUND AND CHARACTERISTICS 
Characteristic FreQuencv Percent 
Company Type? 
Captive 17 33.3 
Independent 28 54.9 
Semi -captive 4 7.8 
Public Sector 2 3.9 
Other 0 0.0 
Total 51 100.0 
Empowerment 
objective? 
No 39 76.5 
Yes 12 23.5 
Total 51 100.0 
Development 
Objective? 
No 38 74.5 
Yes 13 25.5 
Total 51 100.0 
JSE listing? 
No 41 80.4 
Yes 10 19.6 












The characteristics of the individual respondent funds are set out in Table 4.4. 





New investments in 
the last 3 years 
Current investments 
Managers 




() Frequency of mode 













Mode Min. Max. Std 
Dev. 
3.00 (12) 0.00 40.00 6.31 
6.00 (6) 0.00 70.00 11.59 
T 1.00 58.00 10.98 
3.00 (12) 1.00 15.00 2.36 
4.00 (8) 1.00 20.00 5.05 
The average fund has been in business for a mean of 4 years and 9 months. It is curious 
that the number of new investments made in the last 3 years (excluding follow-on 
investments, rights issues in existing investments or the like) and number of current 
investments is almost identical. The most likely explanation for this is that funds would 
also have been exiting investments (which are not recorded in this study), thereby 
resulting in a neutral net position over the three years61. Indeed, if the number of new 
investments made in the last 3 years (a mean of 11.22 is extrapolated across an 
estimated 75 individual funds), this suggests that over 800 VC investments have been 
made in different companies or businesses in the last three years. This is broadly 
consistent with the results of the SAVCAlKPMG studies for 2000 and 2001 which show 
an increase in investments by number over previous years62. 
If the mean number of executives or managers per fund (3.83) is extrapolated to an 
estimated 75 total institutional funds, the total number of investment 
executives/managers is about 287. Based on previous studies (KPMG 2000, Campbell 
1999), this suggests that the employment market has been stagnant since KPMG did 
61 Note also that the wide variation between the mean, median and mode scores in Table 4.4 suggest that 
the results are probably not normally distributed. 
62 KPMG found that the previous numbers of investments in new companies or businesses were 143 in 
1998, 220 in 1999 (KPMG 2000) and 264 investments were made by the surveyed respondents of the 











their report for 199963 • This is in keeping with the trend apparent from the identification 
of9 VC firms (representing 13 funds) which no longer appear active. 
The level of the persons completing the questionnaire was very senior (23 percent were 
managers, 29 percent were partners and 48 percent were managing directors or chief 
executive officers). Their average VC experience was a median of 4 years and 3 months 
and a mean of6 years and 3 months64. The Manigart et al1997 participants had had far 
more extensive experience: the Belgian participants had had a median of 9 years and 6 
months and the Dutch participants a median of 14 years. This suggest that the South 
African VC industry is relatively inexperienced. 
The majority ownership of 84 percent of respondents was local and the remaining 16 
percent had foreign majority ownership. An increased number of foreign participants in 
the South African VC market will broaden the international skills and contact base of 
the local VC industry. 
71 percent of respondents are full members of SAVCA and 2 percent are associate 
members. Only 6 percent of South African VCs are members of any other venture 
capital associations - they are all members of EVCA. This is a suggestion of the 
insularity of the South African VC industry. 
The investment preferences and actual practice of the industry are examined. In the UK, 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands, Manigart et al 1997 finds a high correlation 
between the preferences of funds and their actual investment activity (which is not the 
case in South Africa). Table 4.5 sets out where the r€?spondents have actually invested 
their funds (calculated by number of investments, not by value). 
63 However, the SA VCAIKPMG survey for 2000 restated its fmdings for 1999 and found that there were 
319 "investment professionals" working in the industry in 2000 and there had been 293 in 1999. The 
difference may be definitional: the instant study endeavours to identify "investment 
executives/managers" . 
64 A further interesting result is that the mean experience of the person who completed the questionnaire 
exceeds the mean period for which the funds have been involved in VC. Most of the parties completing 
the questionnaire were very senior and this result is in keeping with the notion that, because of their 
greater experience, they will have worked either informally in the VC industry or alternatively for other 











Comparison of Instant Study with the Precedent Studies 
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Investment preference (I ='definitely not' to 5='definitely must be' 2.0 
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Had the data been normally distributed aT-test could have been used. However the data 
were not normally distributed so the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test, being a non-
parametric test, was used to determine whether actual investments made in each stage of 
the business cycle to date by each respondent matched that fund's stated investment 
preferences by stage. There was significant difference in the ratings (in Question 2 
compared to those in Question 6: p-value = 0.028). Thus the various funds' prior 
investments had not been made according to their current stated preferences by 
investment stage. This suggests that either South African VCs are inconsistent (which is 
a further suggestion of unsophistication) or that they have adjusted their mandate in the 
light of changes in the VC market. The latter would seem to be more likely because 
there has been considerable change of VC market conditions in the last few years and 
many funds are likely to have have reconsidered their positioning in the market. If this 
is so, this flexibility is an indication of sophistication. 
4.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA 
The evaluation criteria which were examined in the questionnaire are listed first by 
category of criteria in Tables 4.6 to 4.12. These criteria, including their standard 
deviations, modes, medians, minimum and maximum scores are set out more fully in 
Annexure 7.5. The criteria identified below only describe what South African VCs 
regard as important, but shed no light on whether the application of these criteria will 
result in better investment returns or not. 
PERSONALITY AND EXPERIENCE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM 
The personality and experience of the entrepreneurial team is frequently cited as the 
main determinant of the success of the underlying VC investment. As reflected in Table 
4.6, the evaluation criteria applied by South African VC funds show that by far the most 











highest score (4.90), but it had by far the lowest standard deviation (0.3), showing great 
congruence of opinion. 
Familiarity with the target market, or 'domain knowledge', ranked second (4.65) in 
South Africa. In the UK (4.54), Hungary (4.6), Poland (4.6), Slovakia (4.0), India (4.6), 
the single most important issue was a thorough knowledge by the entrepreneurial team 
in their field of endeavour. This is not an unexpected result. Results were not available 
for France, the Netherlands and Belgium. If the criterion relating to integrity is 
excluded (it was not asked in the precedent studies), this would have also been the most 
important issue for South African yes. 
The capability for sustained, intense effort (4.63) followed as third most important 
criterion in South Africa. Next came good judgement (4.57) followed by the need for 
the entrepreneur to have made a significant investment himself or herself in the investee 
(4.55). A reference from a trustworthy source was regarded as only moderately 
important. A formal education was regarded as the least important entrepreneurial 
characteristic that was raised (although this response had the highest standard deviation 












RANKINGS OF CRITERIA DURING INVESTMENT APPRAISAL 
PERSONALITY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 
ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM 
Description Mean* Valid N Std. 
Dev. 
Has integrity 4.90 51 0.30 
Is capable of sustained, intense effort 4.63 51 0.56 
Has good judgement 4.57 51 0.57 
Has a significant investment or stake in the investee 4.55 51 0.64 
Is able to evaluate and react to risk well 4.47 51 0.54 
Displays strategic vision 4.45 51 0.64 
Has good personal "chemistry" with VC 3.90 51 0.83 
Attends to detail 3.84 51 0.70 
Is articulate in discussing hislher venture 3.75 51 0.82 
Was referred to VC by a trustworthy source 3.12 51 0.93 
Has a good relevant formal education 2.80 51 0.94 
EXPERIENCE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM 
Description Mean* Valid N Std. 
Dev. 
Is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by 4.65 51 0.52 
venture 
Good references are available on the entrepreneur 4.25 51 0.77 
Has good relevant business and industry experience 4.23 50 0.79 
Has demonstrated leadership/managerial ability in the 4.18 51 0.79 
past 
Has a track record relevant to venture 4.14 51 0.69 
Table 4.6 
* Where 5=essential and 1 =irrelevant 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRODUCT OR SERVICE 
Research has suggested that, while the quality of the entrepreneurial team is regarded as 
key, VCs give far greater credence to the product or service than they realise. Whereas 
the scores for the entrepreneurial team were high with standard deviations generally 
below 1, the scores for this section were lower with standard deviations generally 
exceeding 1. This suggests that there was less agreement amongst respondents. The 
highest rated items were that the product had been developed to the point of a 
functioning prototype (3.82) and that the product or service had a good lead time on the 
market (3.80). The least important issue was that the product or service could be 











RANKINGS OF CRITERIA DURING INVESTMENT APPRAISAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRODUCT OR SERVICE 
Description Mean* Valid N Std. 
Dev. 
Has been developed to the point of a functioning prototype 3.82 50 1.29 
Has a good lead-time on the market competition 3.80 51 0.94 
E~oys demonstrated market acceptance 3.71 51 0.88 
Has propriety intellectual property 3.71 51 1.12 
May be described as "high tech" 2.79 51 1.28 
Table 4.7 
* Where 5=essential and 1 =irrelevant 
TARGET MARKET 
Research has also suggested that, in addition to the quality of the entrepreneurial team 
and the product or service, they also place far greater importance on the market, 
especially the level of competition, than they realise, Table 4.8 shows that the most 
important characteristic of the target market was that it enjoyed a significant growth rate 
(4.25) with a standard deviation of 0.69 suggesting relatively high agreement amongst 
respondents on this issue. It was also important that the investee should be participating 
in an industry in which the VC wished to invest and that there should be good barriers to 
entry. Interestingly, it was not important to VCs whether the product or service created 
a new market or not. 
RANKINGS OF CRITERIA DURING INVESTMENT APPRAISAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGET MARKET 
Description Mean* Valid Std. 
N Dev. 
Enjoys a significant growth rate 4.25 51 0.69 
The venture is in an industry in which VC wishes to invest 4.20 51 0.80 
There are good barriers to entry 4.01 51 0.72 
Potential for overseas markets 3.84 51 1.07 
Little threat of competition during the initial investment period 3.42 51 0.78 
The venture is in an industry with which the VC is familiar 3.24 51 1.16 
Is large 3.23 51 1.45 
Will create a new market 2.65 51 0.87 
Is mature 2.35 51 0.96 
Table 4.8 












The most important operational issue was whether the entrepreneur had gained control 
of key resources in advance of an investment being made (4.16). The quality of the 
general employees was regarded as the second most important characteristic. Although 
the existence of a suitable employee incentive scheme rated lowest (3.37), it had the 
highest standard deviation which suggests that there was disagreement amongst VCs as 
to this characteristic. Table 4.9 summarises these results. 
RANKINGS OF CRITERIA DURING INVESTMENT APPRAISAL 
OPERATIONAL ISSUES WHICH MUST BE 
IN GOOD ORDER 
Description Mean* Valid N Std. Dev. 
Entrepreneur has gained control of key resources 4.16 50 0.74 
General employees are of good quality 4.14 51 0.63 
Distribution system/channels 3.71 51 0.86 
Production techniques/facilities 3.41 51 0.92 
Existence of a suitable employee incentive scheme 3.37 51 1.13 
Table 4.9 
* Where 5=essential and 1 =irrelevant 
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Table 4.10 shows that the ability to add value beyond the mere provision of cash was 
the most important financial consideration (4.25). The coherence and thoroughness of 
the business plan rated as the next most important characteristic. The least important 
issues were whether the business was profitable or cash flow positive (2.84) followed 











RANKINGS OF CRITERIA DURING INVESTMENT APPRAISAL 
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Description Mean* Valid N Std. 
Dev. 
VC is able to add value to the investee beyond merely 4.25 51 0.77 
the provision of capital 
A coherent and thorough business plan 4.22 51 0.76 
An investment that can be easily made liquid (e.g. IPO) 3.93 51 1.09 
Financial control systems are in a good state 3.73 51 1.08 
The expected percentage shareholding falls within a 3.69 51 1.07 
given ran~e 
Meets 'key' financial ratio benchmarks 3.61 51 1.10 
Investments must require funding above a defined 3.60 50 1.23 .. 
mmlmumSlze 
The venture is already profitable or cash flow positive 2.84 51 1.21 
There is an indegendent co-investor 1.98 51 0.91 
Table 4.10 
* Where 5=essential and 1 =irrelevant 
PREFERENCES FOR THE STAGE IN THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
It has already been noted that the intended preferences of South African VCs by stage 
differ from their past practice, suggesting there is poor congruence. Only the results for 
the UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium were available for comparison with South 
Africa. 
The South African mean results, set out in Table 4.11, for seed and start-up were 
calculated and reveal that South African VCs (scoring: 2.6 on the Likert scale65) are not 
as eager to invest in earlier stage as their British peers (3.3), but are more eager than 
France (2.1), the Netherlands (1.9) and Belgium (2.3). SA VCs have the greatest 
appetite for expansion/development stage investments, scoring 4.16 (while this is not 
regarded as attractive in the UK). This is followed by management buy-outs (3.56) as 
the next most attractive inn SA. Interestingly, in comparison to the UK, where there is a 
strong buy-out industry, SA reflects a higher preference for MBOs and MBIs. Another 
apparent anomaly in South Africa is an appetite for management buy-ins (3.34) 
65 This was done by taking the mean of the means reflected in Table 4.11 for both 'early stage/start-up' 
(3.11) and 'seed capital' (2.02). The number of observations is almost identical (51 and 50) which would 











notwithstanding that very few VCs have so far actually made an investment in a 
management buy-in. The seed stage (2.02) ranked slightly less attractive than the 
secondary purchase or replacement stage (2.74). Replacement transactions are regarded 
as being largely unattractive in all the above countries, although SA had the highest 
preference (2.74). The stage in the business cycle is regarded as a rough proxy for risk. 
For reasons stated in Section 3.8, Chapter 3, interpretation of these comparisons should 
be treated with caution. 
RANKINGS OF CRITERIA DURING INVESTMENT APPRAISAL 
PREFERENCE FOR STAGE IN 
BUSINESS CYCLE 
Descrintion Mean* Std. Dev. Valid N 
Development! expansion 4.16 0.78 51 
Management buyout (MBO) 3.56 1.26 50 
Management buy-in (MBI) 3.34 1.08 50 
Early stage/start-up investment 3.11 1.29 51 
Secondary purchase/replacement 2.74 0.99 50 
Seed capital investment 2.02 1.33 50 
Table 4.11 
* Where 5=very attractive and 1 =very unattractive 
OVERALL RATING OF CONSIDERA nONS 
When all of the considerations ar  lined up next to each other, regardless of the way in 
which they were categorised in the questionnaire, how do they rank? As appears from 
Table 4.12, the quality of the entrepreneurial team is clearly the key issue for South 
African VCs and this relates to the first 7 items in Table 4.12 (scoring 4.45 through to 
4.90). The focus on integrity (4.90) is probably due to the reliance of the VC on the 
entrepreneurial team rather than on more conventional corporate governance (which 
includes a board of directors' right to replace poor management) and the inability of 
smaller companies to secure a strong financial director who can counterbalance the 
managing director. For example, the state of the financial control systems (3.73) is 
regarded as less important than a number of other eQ.trepreneurial team issues, which 
may be an acknowledgment of this in that most VCs expect that the financial control 











the integrity of the entrepreneurial team66. Certainly they need good references (4.25). 
It is not, however, as important that the VC and the entrepreneur have good "chemistry" 
(3.90) - other features of the entrepreneurial team are more important. 
It was anticipated that in a South African context . there would be an unequivocal 
requirement for a so-called "A" team because there is a shortage of management in 
South Africa. While Campbell 2000 surmises that financial capital may one day replace 
intellectual capital in importance, it is submitted that this is a luxury afforded to better 
developed countries such as the USA where VCs have access to a large pool of 
managerial talent and are prepared to pay internationally competitive remuneration. In 
South Africa, the challenge is greater - there are relatively less people with 
internationally competitive management skill and, if management is sought abroad, it is 
usually very expensive. South African VCs face a considerable challenge in the battle 
for management talent. 
Caution will be expressed shortly when considering the inherent value of knowing the 
overall required rate of return. This same issue arises in the consideration of evaluation 
criteria: depending on the weighting in the response sample, the criteria may be 
different. If there are a large proportion of early stage investors in the sample, the 
requirement for the venture to be cash flow positive may be less highly ranked. That 
this is possible appears from the low requirement that the investee is already cash flow 
positive (2.84). There is a high standard deviation, suggesting a lack of congruence. 
This is not unexpected - on one hand, a buy-out can only be structured if there is a cash 
flow to service the debt or preference shares, and on the other hand, an early stage is 
quite likely not going to be generating cash.67 
Also of interest is the fact that investments need not be "high tech" to attract VC 
attention (2.79, SD 1.28).68 VCs do not regard the creation of a new market as very 
important (2.65) - far more important are that the market is growing and the 
entrepreneurial team has obtained control of key resources (4.16) and created barriers to 
66 The Business Day reported on a study done by the Hay Group and, interestingly, noted that 
"entrepreneurs are more likely to display high levels of integrity than company CEs ... " (Business Day 
2001). 
67 This comment also applies to the requirement for a functioning prototype (3.82). 











competitive entry (4.01) or there is little initial threat of competition (3.42) or has a 
good lead time on the market (3.80). 
A surprising result is the low importance attached to an independent co-investor (1.98, 
SD 0.91). In many other countries co-investment cind investment consortia are the 
standard practice and it would be interesting to find out what the ranking is of this 
criterion in other countries. On one hand it suggests a lack of sophistication and perhaps 
that the market is immature. On the other hand, it suggests that the market is very 
competitive and VCs are not prepared to share their investments. This latter possibility 
would suggest a mature VC market had developed in South Africa. It is submitted that 
the South African market is mature yet with some lack of sophistication. 
It should be noted that the time lapse between the instant study in South Africa and the 
precedent studies is five years (France, Netherlands and Belgium) and six years (United 
Kingdom). This may have an effect on the comparative results set out in Tables 4.12, 
4.13,4.14 and 4.16. It is submitted that this effect would have been less insofar as risk 












RANKINGS OF INVESTMENT APPRAISAL CRITERIA (UNGROUPED) 
Rank Description South Africa UK 
2000 1994 
Mean Std. Mean 
Dev. 
1 Entrepreneurial team has integrity 4.90 0.30 N/a** 
2 Entrepreneurial team is thoroughly familiar with the 4.65 0.52 4.54 
market targeted by venture 
3 Entrepreneurial team is capable of sustained, intense 4.63 0.56 4.25 
effort 
4 Entrepreneurial team has good judgement 4.57 0.57 N/a 
5 Entrepreneurial team has a significant investment or 4.55 0.64 N/a 
stake in the investee 
6 Entrepreneurial team is able to evaluate and react to risk 4.47 0.54 4.41 
well 
7 Entrepreneurial team displays strategic vision 4.45 0.64 N/a 
8 VC is able to add value to the investee beyond merely 4.25 0.77 N/a 
provision of capital 
9 Market enjoys a significant growth rate 4.25 0.69 3.61 
10 Good references are available on the entrepreneurial 4.25 0.77 4.20 
team 
11 Entrepreneurial team has good relevant business and 4.23 0.79 N/a 
industry experience 
12 A coherent and thorough business plan 4.22 0.76 4.20 
13 The venture is in an industry sector in which the VC 4.20 0.80 N/a 
wishes to invest 
14 Entrepreneurial team has demonstrated 
; 
4.18 0.79 4.54 
leadership/managerial ability in the past 
15 Entrepreneurial team has gained control of key resources 4.16 0.74 N/a 
16 General employees are of good quality 4.14 0.63 3.91 
17 Entrepreneurial team has a track record relevant to 4.14 0.69 4.24 
venture 
18 There are good barriers to entry 4.01 0.72 N/a 
19 An investment that can be easily made liquid (e.g. IPO) 3.93 1.09 N/a 
20 Entrepreneurial team has good personal "chemistry" 3.90 0.83 N/a 
with the VC 
21 Potential for overseas markets 3.84 1.07 N/a 
22 Entrepreneurial team attends to detail 3.84 0.70 3.50 
23 Product or service has been developed to the point of a 3.82 1.29 3.71 
functioning prototype 
24 Product or service has a good lead-time on the market 3.80 0.94 N/a 
com~etition 
25 Entrepreneurial team is articulate in discussing the 3.75 0.82 2.82 
venture 
26 Financial control systems are in a good state 3.73 1.08 4.14 
27 Distribution system/channels are in a good state 3.71 0.86 N/a 
28 Product or service enjoys demonstrated market 3.71 0.88 3.82 
acceptance 











30 The expected % shareholding falls within a given range 
31 Meets 'key' financial ratio benchmarks 
32 Investment must require funding above a defined . . . 
mmlmumSlze 
33 Little threat of competition during the initial investment 
period 
34 Production techniques/facilities are in a good state 
35 Existence of a suitable employee incentive scheme 
36 The venture is in an industry sector with which the VC 
is familiar 
37 The market is large 
38 The investee was referred to the VC by a trustworthy 
source 
39 The investee is already profitable or cash flow positive 
40 Entrepreneurial team has a good relevant formal 
education 
41 Product or service may be described as "high tech" 
42 Product or service will create a new market 
43 The market is mature 
44 There is an independent co-investor 
Table 4.12 
* Where 5=essential and 1 =irrelevant 
** Result not available 
Thus the hypothesis is supported by the results: 
3.69 1.07 N/a 
3.61 1.10 N/a 
3.60 1.23 N/a 
3.42 0.78 N/a 
3.41 0.92 N/a 
3.37 1.13 N/a 
3.24 1.16 N/a 
3.23 1.45 N/a 
3.12 0.93 N/a 
2.84 1.21 N/a 
2.80 0.94 N/a 
2.79 1.28 N/a 
2.65 0.87 N/a 
2.35 0.96 N/a 
1.98 0.91 N/a 
A 1 The most important evaluation criteria will comprise the characteristics of the 
entrepreneurial team relating to personality and experience. 
4.4 REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN 
OVERALL REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN 
The overall mean required rate of return in Rands per fund was 35.1 percent (median: 30 
percent; mode 30 percent)69. It should be noted that this return is not normally 
distributed and for good reason. The overall required rate of return is the combination 











The majority of respondents invest in the later stages of expansion, buy-out and buy-in. 
These stages are generally regarded as less risky than seed and early stage. Therefore it 
is to be expected that the majority of respondents demand lower rates of return, around 
20 to 30 percent, and that there should be a diminishing weighting in favour of the 
higher rates of return (being 30 to 40 percent and 40 to 50 percent) as reflected in the 
histogram in Figure 5 in Annexure 7.5. 
A word of caution: many studies have investigated the overall required rates of return 
of VCs. However, this can be misleading when viewed in isolation. It fails to 
incorporate the element of risk which each respondent fund is prepared to assume. By 
way of example, a buy-out fund which requires an overall rate of return of 30 percent 
probably has a more aggressive expectation than a seed investment fund which requires 
a return of 50%. The investment stage is generally regarded as a good proxy for risk. It 
should be noted that both the instant and the precedent questionnaires enquired about 
the overall required return after tax without explicitly identifying whether net or gross 
returns were sougheo. Obviously there is an implicit assumption that an overall after-
tax return is a net return. However, the after-tax required rate of return by a specific 
investment stage would comprise a subset of the overall required return without a full 
cost allocation and would therefore most likely consist of a gross return with a notional 
tax adjustment. Because of this difference in calculation of the required rates of return 
for the overall fund versus the specific investment stage, the required rates of return by 
each stage of investment were subsequently analysed for comparison inter se. 
In Section 2.9 of Chapter 2, the question was raised as to whether the required rates of 
return were based on well-diversified portfolios or whether they were based on 
undiversified portfolios. The response to the questionnaire was that a majority (53 
percent) of the respondents indicated that they regarded their portfolios as well-
diversified. 
69 This corroborates the estimate of36% in Capital B Management 1999. 











REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN BY INVESTMENT STAGE 
The median required rates of return were calculated for each investment stage. Several 
respondents furnished required rates of return for stages in which they had either very 
limited existing exposure or had very limited intentions to invest in that stage in the 
future. These observations were excluded for this exercise. Thereafter, the median 
required rates of return for selected characteristics were calculated. Some of the results 
for the selected characteristics were inconclusive because of the small number of 
observations. The reliability of results should be regarded as merely indicative where 
the numbers of observations are limited. In each figure, the trend line for all responses 
is superimposed for comparison purposes. 
All respondents 
When all median responses are considered by stage, the following trend emerges 
(Figure 4.1): 
• The earlier the stage, the higher the required rate of return. The median required rates 
of return diminish in a curvilinear fashion from the seed stage through to the MBO 
stage and then level out for the MBO, MBI and replacement stage. This is in 
keeping with financial theory in that the earlier stage investments are regarded as 
more risky investments and therefore the required rates of return diminish as the 
investment stage becomes later. 
• Investment stage appears to be a good proxy for risk because the required rates of 
return are higher for the earlier stages. The higher required rates are a reward for 
assuming greater risk. 
• Based on the above assumption, the risk profiles of MBOs, MBls and replacement 
transactions are regarded as similar by South African ves and the least risky. This 
differs from the precedent studies insofar as both expansion stage investments in the 
UK and France, and replacement transactions in France, are seen as having a lower 
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REQUIRED NOMINAL MEDIAN INTERNAL ~ RATES OF RETURN PER 
INVESTMENT STAGE AS ADJUSTED FOR SOUTH AFRICAN RANDS 
MEDIAN OF SOUTH UK 
REOUIRED IRRs AFRICA 1994 
2000 (add 7%) 
Overall (all stages) 30%* 37%** 
Seed/start-up/early 56-70%*** 53-62% 
Expansion! development 36-45% 33-37% 
MBO 31-35% 38-42% 
MBI 31-35% 38-42% 
Secondary/replacement 31-35% Not asked 
*The mean nominal required rate of return is 35% 
**The mean nominal required rate of return is 36%73 
FRANCE BELGIUM/ 
1995 NL 1995 






~ 34-38% <29% 
***The seed stage median is 71 to 100% and the start-up/early stage median is 56 to 
70% 
Table 4.13 
It is useful to note that since the mid to late 1990s the required rates of return of SA VCs 
have increased by about 2 percent. No adjustment has been made to the figures used for 
comparatives below, but this should be borne in mind. 
These results were adjusted to returns in South African Rands (see Table 4.13 and 
Annexure 7.6). Although the mean overall required rates are almost the same for South 
Africa (35.1 %) and The UK (36.2%), the median for SA is lower (30%) than the UK 
(37%). SA has a lower median overall required rate of return than France (33%), but 
higher than the Netherlands and Belgium (together: 24%). For reasons advanced earlier, 
the overall required rate is strongly influenced by the overall preference of VCs for the 
stage of investment and can be misleading. 
An examination of the required rates by stage, converted to South African Rands, 
reveals that SA has the highest required rates for seed, start-up and expansion stage 
73 Note that the overall return for the UK is skewed by the exclusion of the required rates of return at the 











investments. Insofar as buy-outs are concerned, along with the Netherlands and 
Belgium, SA has the lowest required rates. No results were available for Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and India. There is not much difference between the countries in 
respect of replacement investments, although the Netherlands and Belgium require 
slightly lower rates. These differences in required rates of return between South Africa 
and the developed countries of the UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium may be 
based on broad country risk and the nature of the South African VC market. For 
example, the VC markets are less efficient in the earlier stages of the business cycle 
(seed, start-up and expansion) and more so in the later stages (MBO, MBI, 
replacement). Thus earlier stage investments may ten~ to reflect a more insular required 
rate of return while the later stages, being more efficient, thus reflect a required rate of 
return that is more in keeping with international trends. This might explain why the 
South African required rates are so much higher for earlier stages - they reflect a broad 
risk which incorporates not just country risk in the traditional sense, but also the risk 
associated with being farther away from developed world markets and trends and also 
not having the necessary network and experience to break into the foreign markets. At 
the later stages, one would expect the required rates to be more closely aligned with 
international rates. 
Local or foreign ownership of respondent 
Foreign or local respondents were determined by those which have a majority South 
African or foreign ownership. There were insufficient responses from the foreign 
respondents (12) to present a conclusive result. The foreign respondents were more 
reticent about their required rates of return, often not returning a figure in the 
questionnaire. Figure 4.2 shows that the median required rates of return of local 
respondents mirrored the sample of all respondents. 
return for the UK is probably overstated on the high side, so the rate cannot be properly compared to the 
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Notc lhat it i, the ncwcr re>pO lKlcnts whi~h ]!cncrally in"cst in the seed 'tage and they 
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maturer respondents require lower rates of return. Note that previous studies have 
shown that maturer firms require higher rates of return than newer VC firms (Tate 1989) 
and that VCs in more mature or developed markets, such as in the UK, require higher 
rates of return than in less developed markets such as France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Manigart et al 1997). 
The hypothesis was not supported by the results: 
B2 More mature respondents will require higher rates of return than less mature 
respondents. 
The evidence from the instant study that maturer VCs require lower rates of return for 
MBOs or MBIs requires some explanation. Using the age ofa fund as a rough proxy for 
the fund's collective experience, the following possibilities exist: 
1. South Africa may not be a developed or mature market. There is evidence that, 
while the market is approaching maturity, there is some lack of sophistication. 
2. More mature funds may have built up a track record and control larger sums for 
investment. It may be more efficient for them to invest in larger deals, typically 
MBOs and MBIs. 
3. More mature funds have the experience to gIve a "haircut" to the financial 
projections of entrepreneurs before applying the required rate of return, thereby 
applying a melange of a certainty equivalent and a required rate of return. 
4. More mature funds may see a better quality of deal flow through having been in the 
business for a longer period. 
5. More mature funds may identify potential winners more efficiently and their 
experience may enable them to manage and avoid risk better, either through better 
selection or through better value-added monitoring. 
6. Less mature funds may control for their lack of experience in items 2 to 5 above by 
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Development vs non-development respondents 
This distinction was between those respondents which had a development objective and 
those which did not (Figures 4.5 and 4.6). Clearly, and not unexpectedly, the non-
development respondents mirrored the sample of all respondents and required higher 
rates of return than the development respondents. 
The results support the hypothesis: 
B3 Development respondents will not require as high returns as non-development 
respondents. 
This result suggests that the development funds are fulfilling their mandates in two 
ways: 
1. They require lower rates of return for investments which fall into their definition 
of development. 
2. They appear to be active in the earlier stages of investment, a stage when it is 
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earlier stages of the business cycle (seed and start-up) (Figure 4.9). Therefore there is 
support for the hypothesis: 
B5 Independent respondents will require higher rates of return than captives and 
semi-captives. 
Some possible reasons for this include the following: 
1. Captives and semi captives typically have access to the networks of their parents 
which are often early customers of the investee. This can accelerate an 
investee's early stage business, thereby removing some of the risk. The parent 
network may also provide other skills and experience which enable captive 
funds to better manage their investee risk and r~sulting in them being prepared to 
accept lower rates of return. 
2. The captives may be subject to strategic imperatives of the parent which limit 
their ability to find appropriate transactions and they are forced to pay slightly 
more for deals. 
3. The captives may be na1ve and have the difficulties associated with a big 
company culture. Mullet 1998 has pointed out that captives very often do not 
remunerate as well as independents, particular insofar as carried interese4 is 
concerned. Thus they may not attract as good a quality staff as independents. 
4. Captives can afford to be patient. They only raise funding from their parent and 
this is very often a simpler (but not necessarily easier) relationship to manage. 
Note also that the findings of Wright and Robbie 1996 are applicable here. Captives 
in the UK prefer later stage MBOs and MBIs. Independents have broader 
preferences. 
74 'Carried interest' is the portion of the fund's growth which is shared with the managers of the fund as 
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Empowerment vs non-empowerment respondents 
This distinction was between those respondents which had an empowerment objective 
(eg for a previously disadvantaged group) and those which did not. Figure 4.10 clearly, 
and not unexpectedly shows that the empowerment respondents required a lower rate of 
return than the non-empowerment respondents (Figure 4.11) for the start-up stage, 
expansion stage and MBOs and replacement transactions with the inconclusive 
exception of seed stage investments (note that the sample is too small to draw any 
conclusions regarding the apparent required rates of return at the seed stage). 
There is therefore support for the hypothesis: 
B6 Empowerment respondents will not require as high returns as non-empowerment 
respondents. 
These results are intuitively correct. Empowerment funds would appear to be fulfilling 
their mandates in the narrow sense (as defined by KNC 2001b) based purely on their 
required rates of return. The low number of observations in the seed stage suggests that 
empowerment funds may not be fulfilling an empowerment need in the broad sense (as 
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ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN 
The South African respondents require that their investments meet a standard IRR 
according to the risk band of the investment scoring 3.90 out of a possible score of 5.00, 
indicating a less sophisticated approach. Thereafter South African respondents require 
that the return be based on the specific risk characteristics of the investment (3.74). 
Less important was that the investment should meet a standard IRR regardless of the 
risk profile (3.27). 
In Hungary (4.0) and India (4.3), the preferred way of determining the required rate of 
return is to base it on a standard, regardless of risk. This is a very mechanistic approach. 
In Poland (3.8) and South Africa (3.9), the preferred method is to determine the required 
rate based on the risk band in which the investment falls. In Slovakia (4.3) and The UK 
(3.6), preference is given to basing the return on the specific risk characteristics of the 
investment. Obviously the other ways of establishing the required rates are also used in 
each of these countries. Results were not available for France, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. This would suggest that South African practice is more sophisticated than the 











Comparison of Instant Study with the Precedent Studies 
Manigart et al 1997, Karsai et al 1997, Karsai et al 1998, Wright & Robbie 1996 Wright et .12000 
Soutb Africa 
ASSESSMENT OF REOUIRED 
RATE OF RETURN 
1 =:'irrelevant' to S='essential' 
We require the investments to meet a standard required rate of 
return on equity (IRR) regardless of risk profile 3.3 
We require the investments to meet a standard required rate of 
return on equity (IRR), according to tbe risk band oftbe investment 3.9 
We require the investments to meet a standard required rate of 
return on equity (IRR), according to the characteristics of each 
investment 
We require a rate of return which yields a total cash return 









France Netherlands Belgium Hungary Poland Slovakia India 
NOT REFLECTED IN PAPER 4.0 3.6 3.3 4.3 
3.4 3.8 3.7 4.0 
3.1 3.4 4.3 3.7 











CHANGES TO THE REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN SINCE THE MID TO 
LATE 1990s 
The buoyant market conditions of the mid to late 1990s have been followed by a more 
sober market reality. While one might have expected required rates of return to have 
increased, the effect of the market downturn has been surprisingly unimportant to the 
required rates of return. 72 percent of respondents had not changed their required 
rates. 15 percent had increased their required rate and 13 percent had decreased their 
required rate. The mean changes to the rates appear to be skewed by an inconsistent 
outlier - one respondent claimed to have decreased its required rate of return by 30%. 
The results were calculated without the outlier and revealed that those which had 
decreased their required rate had done so by a mean of 5.63 percent (median: 5 
percent), those which had increased their required rate~had done so by a mean of 5.25 
percent (median: 5 percent) and, when combined, the median (+2.25 percent) and 
mean overall change (+1.63 percent) suggest that the required rate of return has 
increased by about 2 percent over the last few years.75 The results, both with and 
without the outlier, are set out more fully in Annexure 7.5. 
The hypothesis is supported, albeit not convincingly, by the results: 
B7 The required rates o/return will have increased since the mid to late 1990s. 
EFFECT OF THE DEBT-EQUITY RATIO ON THE REQUIRED RATES OF 
RETURN 
The debt-equity ratio affected the required rates of return at the different stages in the 
investment cycle as set out in Table 4.15 and Figure 4.12. 
75 Notwithstanding that it appears as if the VC community in South Africa regard themselves as 
unaffected by declines in the economy, there is anecdotal evidence that the number of transactions 
available to VCs had declined noticeably by March 2001 (variou,s telephone conversations with South 
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South African VCs regard changes in the prime rate as a more important indicator of 
risk than their European counterparts in the precedent studies. South Africa has had 
volatile interest rates and debt is regarded cautiously. : 
4.5 RISK INDICATORS INFLUENCING THE REOUIRED RATE OF 
RETURN 
Respondents were directed to interpret risk broadly to include operating, financial and 
market risk. These risk factors, including their standard deviations, modes, medians, 
minimum and maximum scores are set out more fully in Annexure 7.5. 
The distinction between risk indicators and factors which influence the required rate 
of return was made in the precedent studies. This distinction was ignored in the 
instant study because an indicator of risk would potentially affect the required rate of 
return. The risk indicators were divided into general risk factors and specific risk 
factors, both of which might be regarded as important, thereby affecting the required 
rate of return. This would be particularly true where a VC required an IRR 
commensurate with the specific risk characteristics of the individual investment. 
GENERAL RISK INDICATORS 
Table 4.16 reflects that the most important risk factor was unequivocally the market 
conditions relating to the particular proposal (4.61) with a relatively low standard 
deviation of 0.6. The state of the industrial or product sector of the investment was 
next most important (3.95). Least important were, penultimately, changes in returns 
for long-term gilts (2.44) and, finally, the inflow of funds into the VC market (2.40). 
It is not unexpected that changes in long-term gilts are regarded as relatively 
unimportant. This is because when a VC is seeking a required rate of return in excess 











required rate of return. This is generally compounded by the considerable uncertainty 
surrounding future cash flows However, what is interesting is the relative 
unimportance accorded inflows into the VC market. Gompers & Lerner 2000 has 
shown that this can have a significant impact on valuations of investees. 
RANKINGS OF RISK FACTORS 
GENERAL FACTORS 
Description South Africa UK* 
2000 1994 
Valid N Mean** Mean 
Market conditions relating to a particular 51 4.61 3.34 
proposal 
The state of the industrial/product sector of 50 3.95 3.11 
the investment 
General economic conditions 51 3.45 3.16 
Changes in ~rices for quoted equities 49 3.36 2.48 
Changes in the prime rate 50 2.94 2.52 
Changes in returns for long-term gilts 50 2.44 2.14 
Quantity of inflow of funds into the 50 2.40 Not asked 
VClQrivate e~uity market 
Table 4.16 
* Selected factors, Wright & Robbie 1996:161 
** Where 5=always important and 1 =never important 
SPECIFIC RISK INDICATORS 
Insofar as specific risk factors are concerned these results corroborated the findings 
(Table 4.17) of previous studies. South African VCs accord management skills the 
greatest importance as a risk indicator. A very interesting result was that South 
African VCs ranked the second most important specific risk factor as being the risk 
that the behaviour of the entrepreneur might be unpre4ictable (4.67)76. The latter risk 
factor enjoyed a very low standard deviation (0.48) indicating great agreement 
amongst respondents in this regard. In both Slovakia and SA (where it was the third 
most important specific risk factor) the financial contribution by management is seen 
as an important indicator of risk, presumably because as a form of 'signalling'. This 
was followed by the degree of competitiveness of the market. Other than Hungary, 
the expected time to exit is rated more highly amongst SA VCs than VCs from the 











precedent studies. The quality and robustness of corporate governance is also highly 
rated. It is notable that so many of the important specific risk factors relate to 
management. The geographic region of the investment may also affect the required 
rates of SA VCs (3.4) scoring similarly to Hungary, Poland and France. This is a 
further suggestion of insularity. 
RANKINGS OF RISK FACTORS SCORING> 4.00 -
SPECIFIC FACTORS 
DescriDtion Valid N Mean* 
1 Quali!y of managerial skills 51 4.76 
2 Predictability or unpredictability of behaviour of the 51 4.67 
entrepreneurial team 
3 Level of financial contribution by management 51 4.35 
4 Competitiveness of the market 51 4.24 
5 Expected length of time to exit from the investment 50 4.12 
6 Quality and robustness of corporate governance 51 4.12 
7 Possibility of a total write-off of the investment if it 50 4.04 
fails 
8 Degree of planning and strategy for exit from the 51 4.00 
investment 
Table 4.17 
* Where 5=always important and 1 =never important 
Respondents were asked whether they regarded ownership of a majority of the equity 
or control as an indicator of increased risk, decreased risk, or as being irrelevant. 
Unexpectedly, the response was split relatively evenly. It is interesting to note that 
ownership of a majority of the equity or control of an investment should meet such a 
mixed response between those which would regard it as an increase in risk (34 
percent), those which would regard it as a decrease in risk (26 percent) and those 
which would regard it as irrelevant to risk (40 percent). This result may reflect the 
view that owning control or the majority of an investment results in the VC becoming 
the financier of last resort and bearing responsibility for the success of the investment. 
Alternatively, it may be regarded as more desirable to have control of an investment 
when things are not progressing well because it gives the VC the power to make 
necessary changes (a robust form of corporate governance). Finally, the result may 
also reflect that some VCs feel that owning the majority of an investment gives them 











open-ended that it may have confused two types of risk: the risk of control and the 
risk arising out of an increased exposure to an investment. 
Insofar as the effect of an earlier round of funding on the perception of risk was 
concerned, 45 percent regarded it as increasing risk, alfuough 27 percent regarded it as 
irrelevant and 29 percent regarded it as actually decreasing risk. The fact that such a 
large number of respondents regarded an earlier round of funding as decreasing risk 
(29 percent) is counter-intuitive because the earlier rounds of funding are usually (but 
not always) associated with the earlier stages of the business cycle. This is further 
evidence of a lack of sophistication in the South African VC industry. 
In line with expectations, the majority of respondents (90 percent) were not prepared 
to pay a premium for being able to add good value and 52 percent expected a discount 
for this. 
4.6 VALUATION METHODS 
The valuation methods were examined as at each investment stage from seed through 
to replacement stage and are summarised in Table 4.18. The valuation methods were 
rated on a scale of 5 being "almost always" and 1 being "almost never". The 
valuation methods, including their standard deviations, modes, medians, minimum 











RANKING OF VALUATION METHODS (ALL STAGES) 
~ Valuation Method Mean* 
1 Discounted future cash flows 4.37 
2 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. historic or prospective 3.89 
!price/earnings ratio or EBIT multiple) 
3 Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector 3.79 
4 Industry comparables or special 'rule of thumb' 3.62 
5 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio applied to future earnings at 3.30 
the time of expected exit and discounted back to present value) 
6 Recent PE ratio of the parent company's shares 2.99 
7 Cash amount invested to date plus possible premium 2.91 
8 Responses to attempts to solicit competing offers 2.87 
9 Liquidation value of asset 2.71 
10 Historic cost book value 2.58 
11 Replacement value 2.53 
12 Option pricing or similar valuation methods 2.08 
13 Dividend yield basis 2.03 
Table 4.18 
* Where 5=almost always and 1 =almost never 
Universally, the single most important valuation method was the discounted cash flow 
method and, while predominating at all stages, it scored less in the earlier stages. 
Industry comparables or special "rules of thumb", recent transaction prices in the 
sector and the "venture capital" method were more important in the seed and start-up 
stage, diminishing in importance as the stage became later. From the expansion or 
development stage, the second most important method was the capitalised sustainable 
earnings (historic or future). The least important method was the dividend yield 
method in the seed and start-up stages, becoming supplanted by the option pricing 
method as least important in the stages from expansion onwards. These results are 
graphed in Figure 4.13. 
Two interesting results are worth noting. One is the high ranking of the use of a 
recent PIE of the parent company's shares (2.99). The other is the fact that any kind 
of option pricing (2.08) is used at all to value investees. The precedent studies did not 
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manipulated and is not open to interpretation. This conclusion is supported broadly 
by the results in the CEE countries but not by those from Belgium and the 
Netherlands. 
VCs in SA (4.4), Poland (4.4), Hungary (4.7), the Netherlands and Belgium (together: 
3.8) all use DCF as their primary valuation method. The UK (4.2) and France (4.2) 
primarily use earnings multiples - in SA (3.9) this is the second most popular method. 
The third most important method in SA is the use of recent comparable transaction 
prices (3.8). The dividend yield method was scored lowest by SA (2.0) and France 
(2.0). Interestingly, in Slovakia it is the preferred valuation method (4.3). 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR VALUATION METHODS, BY STAGE 
Valuation Seed Start-up Expansion MBO/MBI Replacement 
method 
DCF 1.24 0.96 0.69 0.69 0.73 
PIE 1.20 1.02 1.00 1.05 0.98 
Table 4.19 
Since South African VCs use several different methods, most VCs base their final 
valuation on one particular method (4.06), the same approach as VCs in the UK, 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Alternatively, they try and resolve the 
differences in the results produced by several prefen:ed valuation methods (3.80)77. 
This suggests some sophistication in the South African market. "Gut feeling" or 
intuition rated 3.33, although its standard deviation of 1.21 suggests that there were 
differences of opinion amongst respondents in this regard78• It is interesting that the 
lowest scores were for using the lowest valuation (2.43) and finally using the highest 
valuation (1.59). It is a further indication that the market is reaching maturity if VCs 
recognise that they are unable simply to use the lowest valuation to value an investee. 
This is the result of a healthy competitive environment and is a suggestion of market 
maturity. 
77 This alternative was not offered to respondents in the precedent studies. 
78 The following comment was made by one of the respondents: "The "gut feel" method of valuation is 
probably the one relied on the most - even if not admitted to - and will change as market conditions 











The role of intuition in the VC process is not to be underestimated. The evaluation 
criteria and risk factors are heavily influenced by the importance of good 
management. The evaluation of the entrepreneurial team is very subjective, so "gut 
feeling" is expected to be important. A number of respondents had the temerity to 
concede the importance of this in their responses and echoed the notion that, while 
there exists an objectively true probability about a future event, human ignorance is 
unable to determine what that probability is: "There is little likelihood of our 
discovering a method of recognising particular probabilities, without any assistance 
whatever from intuition or direct judgment ... A proposition is not probable because 
we think it so" (Keynes 1921 :3). 
The following hypotheses in respect of valuation were answered in the affirmative: 
C 1 The most commonly used technique will be the DCF method in all of the 
investment stages. 
C2 DCF will become more important in the later stages of investment such as buy-
outs and buy-ins. 
C3 OPT and dividend yield will be two of the least used techniques. 
INFLUENCE OF THE BVCAlSA VCA V ALUA nON GUIDELINES ON 
VALUATION TECHNIQUES 
KPMG 2000 identified 18 VCs which had adopted the BVCA Valuation Guidelines 
during 1999 (the subsequently adopted SAVCA Valuation Guidelines are based 
almost verbatim on those of the BVCA). This study finds that during 2000, a total of 
28 respondents, representing 57 percent of respondents, had adopted the 
BVCAlSAVCA Valuation Guidelines. The adoption of the SAVCA or BVCA 
Valuation Guidelines by SA VCs appears to be an impressive improvement on the 
1999 findings of SA VCAlKPMG survey79. However, the SA VCAlKPMG survey for 
2000 found only 13 VC firms which had adopted either the BVCA or the SA VCA 
Valuation Guidelines. 
79 Note that the instant survey reports on VC funds as opposed to the SAVCAlKPMG survey which 












This appears to be an anomaly but the most likely explanation lies in the drafting of 
the questionnaire. The instant survey asks whether the SAVCA Valuation Guidelines 
have been adopted (ie in principle), while the SAVCAlKPMG surveys ask whether 
the reported IRRs were calculated in accordance with the guidelines. One might be 
forgiven for cynically concluding that, notwithstanding the adoption of the Valuation 
Guidelines, VC funds are selective in their actual application depending on the result 
the guidelines will produce. While this may be a sign of an immature and 
unsophisticated market, it is certainly also an indication of the competitiveness that 
has arisen in the industry in South Africa. 
Interestingly, 21 percent of those which had adopted the Valuation Guidelines were 
not members of SAVCA. Not unexpectedly, 94 percent confirmed that the Valuation 
Guidelines had not had an effect on their valuation techniques on entry into their 
investments. 
The hypothesis is therefore supported: 
C4 The SAVCAlBVCA valuation guidelines will not have had an effect on the 
valuation techniques used by VCs when valuing an opportunity for investment 
purposes. 
4.7 PORTFOLIO STRATEGY 
79 percent of all respondents apply some form of portfolio strategy. 60 percent of all 
respondents apply a portfolio strategy to ensure that they make a number of 
investments, none of which exceed a certain minimum percentage (say, 15 percent). 
42 percent of all respondents actively favour investments which reduce the overall 
risk of their portfolio while maintaining the targeted return (ie an optimal portfolio 
comprising investments with high returns but with risk profiles which are negatively 
correlated as far as possible). This is a sophisticated approach by South African VCs. 
29 percent of all respondents apply a portfolio strategy of consolidation by favouring 











correlated in an effort to establish greater certainty in respect of the distribution of 
likely returns. This suggests that the market is reaching maturity if VCs are able to 
focus on niche areas in the market. 53 percent of all respondents regard their 
portfolios as well-diversified, 16 percent as consolidated and 31 percent expressed no 
particular view in this regard. 
4.8 CLARITY OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questionnaire was lengthy and reasonably compl~x in places. Respondents were 
asked to rate the clarity of the questionnaire to ensure that the responses were based 
on a sound footing. 84 percent found it clear or very clear (4 or 5 on the five point 
Likert scale) with only 3 respondents finding it unclear. The research challenge was 
to try and cover as broad a spectrum of stages and issues using as simple a 
questionnaire as possible. While not without its faults, it appears that the 
questionnaire was effective. 
4.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has dealt with the results of the instant survey. The survey received 
extensive support from the VC industry. The evaluation criteria were identified and 
show results largely in keeping with international studies in that characteristics of the 
entrepreneurial team are most highly rated. The required rates of return are analysed 
by stage and indicate that different groupings of VCs (independents, captives, 
immature funds, empowerment funds etc) have different required rates of return and 
reasons are advanced for this. Risk indicators are analysed to determine their effect 
on the required rates of return. Thereafter, valuation techniques are considered by 
investment stage and the DCF method enjoys predominance. Finally, it is shown that 











African market appears to be mature and VCs appear sophisticated. However, some 
of the results point to an industry which has pockets of unsophistication and a market 
which is occasionally immature. 
The conclusions are drawn more fully and the implications for South African VCs and 












"If human nature felt no temptation to take a chance ... there might not be much 
investment merely as a result of cold calculation." (John Maynard Keynes)80 
This chapter first presents the conclusions. Second, the implications for South 
African VCs are analysed. Third, the implications for South African entrepreneurs 
conclusions are presented. Finally, the fourth section suggests areas of further 
research. 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
The efficiency of the private markets is important in ensuring a healthy economy. 
This study set out to shed light on the decision-making process applied by South 
African venture capitalists when they allocate capital. In particular the study focused 
on the considerations applied to the general evaluation of investment opportunities, 
the valuation process and the broad application of portfolio theory. The valuation 
process was further subdivided into the evaluation of risk, the required rates of return 
by investment stage and the valuation techniques employed by investment stage. 
Thereafter, the South African results were compared with international practices. 
The research, which was based on work instigated by the University of Nottingham's 
Centre for Management Buy-Out Research, was successful in reaching a large 
proportion of the South African VC community and in covering a broad number of 
issues. The results are largely in keeping with the theory of finance insofar as it 











relates to venture capital. However, the results should be interpreted with caution due 
to the limitations of the study which include recall bias and ex post rationalisation. 
The study commences with an extensive review of the literature in which important 
conceptual and definitional issues are addressed and the precedent studies are 
considered. Thereafter the methodology is discussed. The questionnaire used in the 
precedent studies was modified and extended to meet the objectives of this study and 
also to obtain comparable results. The questionnaire was distributed amongst both 
members and non-members of SA VCA and achieved a 77% response rate. 
Quantitative statistical analyses were conducted. The rates of return from 
comparative studies were re-calculated to take account of the differences m 
currencies. The risk premia were also calculated for the purposes of comparison. 
The general characteristics of the South African VC industry suggest that it is 
reaching maturity and is relatively sophisticated by international standards. 
Nonetheless, there is still evidence of a lack of sophistication and maturity. A major 
cause of this is the relative lack of experience of the South African VC industry. 
There are also suggestions that the industry is insular. Finally, in reaching maturity 
the growth of the VC industry appears to have slowed with the recent confluent 
weakening of the technology and small cap sectors of the market. 
In keeping with most similar studies around the worl~, South African VCs seek out 
quality entrepreneurial teams. They do this using an array of evaluation criteria which 
endeavour to flush out the risks inherent in the investments they are evaluating. In 
South Africa VCs overwhelmingly seek strong management. Far less important are 
market issues, followed by product or service issues. This may reflect the perceived 
dearth of management talent in South Africa. Insofar as management is concerned, 
there is an almost absolute requirement that management demonstrates integrity. In 
addition, management must possess a thorough familiarity with the market, a 
capability for sustained intense effort, good judgement and have a significant stake in 
the business. 
The overall mean nominal required rate of return 6f South African VCs is 35% 











of a group of investors can be misleading because it fails to take into account the 
underlying risk profile of those investors. For this reason, this study analyses the 
required rates of return of different groupings of VCs by investment stage. It yielded 
results consistent with financial theory as it applies to:venture capital: the earlier the 
stage of investment, the higher the perceived risk profile of that investment. The 
study finds that more mature VC funds have lower required rates of return than less 
mature funds. Funds with a development or empowerment objective have lower 
required rates of return than those without. Independent funds require higher rates of 
return than captive and semi-captive funds. The required rates of return have only 
increased by about 2% since the more buoyant mid to late 1990s. The debt-equity 
ratio has an increasing effect on the required rates of return as the investment moves 
through the earlier stages of investment to the later stages. While the required rate of 
an investment is generally determined by the risk band in which it falls, the effect of 
the debt equity ratio is dependent upon an asse~sment of the individual risk 
characteristics of the investment. 
The general and specific factors which affect risk and required return were ranked by 
South African VCs and the results are in keeping with international results. The 
general factors identify the lack of importance of the state of the general economy and 
long-term gilts to the VC's required rate of return, but the importance of the state of 
the actual sector in which the investee participates. Insofar as specific risks are 
concerned, management is of particular importance as an indicator of risk, both in 
respect of the quality of management and the predictability of management's 
behaviour. 
An analysis was done of the valuation methods which are used at the different stages 
of the investment cycle. South African VCs prefer to use the discounted cash flow 
method of valuation at all stages of the investment, although different techniques are 
also used in the earlier stages of the investment cycle. A final valuation is based on a 
preferred method while using the other methods as a check. Gut feeling is an 
important component of this process. Also, this research confirms that the newly 
adopted SAVCA (BVCA) Valuation Guidelines have not affected the valuation 











Most South African VCs apply reasonably sophisticated portfolio theory to their 
investment portfolios and the majority regard their portfolios as well-diversified. 
The venture capital investment process is simple in theory. It is very complex in 
practice and it is submitted that few studies to date have truly captured the richness 
and lush complexity of a process which is extremely difficult to study. 
The implications for both South African entrepreneurs and South African VCs are 
presented next in an effort to provide better understanding to entrepreneurs seeking 
funding and to VCs who are interested in how their practices compare internationally. 
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN ENTREPRENEURS 
There are some important implications for South African entrepreneurs: 
1 The South African VC industry is largely (but not entirely) mature. Many VCs 
are not very experienced in VC itself although they may bring extensive 
experience from other disciplines. They generally expect to add value to their 
investments beyond the mere provision of capital and expect to be rewarded for 
this by investing on favourable terms. In addition, research shows that VCs do 
indeed add value to their investments. Note that most VCs do not wish to have 
control of their investees but they often protect themselves by providing for veto 
rights on important issues in a shareholders agreement. 
This suggests that entrepreneurs seeking VC funding should court those VCs with 
whom they think that they can work fruitfully because the VC investor will expect 
to get involved in the investment, certainly at a strategic level. Entrepreneurs 
should also seek out those VCs which will add the most value and weigh up the 
cost of this carefully, even if it means a lower valuation of their investment than 
desired by the entrepreneur. If entrepreneurs are unwilling to have rigorous non-











2 Entrepreneurs should manage their fundraising efforts in light of the evaluation 
criteria used by South African VCs. The key issues revolve around the 
entrepreneurial team and are very difficult to measure objectively. A VC will 
endeavour to get references on the entrepreneurial team. Accordingly, 
entrepreneurs must ensure that they are constantly building their reputation as 
people who have, in order of importance: 
• high integrity, 
• predictable behaviour, 
• excellent domain knowledge, 
• energy and stamina, 
• good judgement, 
• significant personal exposure to and investment in one's own business, 
• strategic vision, and 
• relevant experience. 
Personal 'chemistry' with the VC is important but is less important than the 
above. 
The importance of integrity and domain knowledge suggests that, while 
entrepreneurs need to market themselves to VCs, they should avoid making 
unfounded or exaggerated claims during the process of attracting VC funding 
because if this is uncovered during the due diligence process the VC will be 
inclined to conclude that, at best, the entrepreneur does not understand his or her 
business or, at worst, that the entrepreneur is dishonest. Either way, the VC will 
draw an unfavourable inference. 138 
3 Entrepreneurs should ensure that their businesses are in high growth markets and 
that the VCs which they approach have an interest in their industry. The business 
does not need to be profitable or cash flow positive (depending, of course, on the 
stage in the business cycle - an MBO or MBI clearly cannot sustain itself if it is 
not generating cash). The business does not need to be 'high tech'. Entrepreneurs 
need to articulate their business in a thorough an~ coherent business plan which 
must include a cash flow statement - DCF is the preferred technique for valuing 











that robust and transparent corporate governance is apparent. This requires strong 
non-executive board members and compliance with the King Commission 
recommendations (as far as appropriate given the stage in the business cycle of the 
investment). 
4 Entrepreneurs should avoid trying to sell shares as opposed to doing a rights issue 
which injects funding into their business. Most VCs prefer not to do replacement 
capital transactions. Insofar as entrepreneurs have seed and start-up businesses, 
they should ensure that there is no debt in the business. Finally, VCs do not attach 
much additional value to a product which creates a new market. 
5 Entrepreneurs can expect that their businesses will be valued by VCs on a DCF 
basis irrespective of the stage in the business cycle, although other techniques are 
used in the earlier stages of the investment cycle. Future and historic price 
earnings ratios are the second most important technique, followed by using 
comparable transactions as a basis for valuation. A VC will typically use one 
preferred method and then use other methods s a check. Gut feeling is an 
important component of the VC valuation process. 
6 The required rates of return are generally most affected by the state of the market 
for the specific proposal, followed by the state of the industry in which the 
business finds itself. Changes in the prime rate or long bond rates are not very 
important. Specific risks which will lead to an increase in the required rate 
include, in order: 
• even if the entrepreneurial team IS good enough, deficiencies III the 
entrepreneurial team, 
• the possibility of unpredictable behaviour by the entrepreneurial team, 
• a low level of financial contribution by the entrepreneurial team, 
• increased competitiveness in the market, 
• an expected long period of time until a return is realised on the investment, 
and 











7 The overall mean required rate of return amongst SA VCs is 35.1 percent (median 
and mode: 30 percent). Table 5.1 sets out the median required rates of return by 
stage and also a matrix of what types of VC will generally require a lower return. 
The matrix should be seen as indicative only. 
8 VCs do not generally wish to own the majority of the equity or have control. 
Therefore, a simple test is to establish whether the amount of required VC funding 
exceeds the current value of the investment (ie pre-money) on a fair valuation. If 
so, this may not be attractive to the VC and it may be that the entrepreneur should 
rather be seeking funding from an industry strategic partner rather than a venture 
capitalist. 
9 A large number of VCs are members of SA VCA and they accordingly subscribe 
to the SA VCA Code of Conduct which demands ethical behaviour from members. 
Many VCs also subscribe to the SAVCA Valuation Guidelines. These SAVCA 
standards are not legally enforceable, but SAVCA is growing in stature and 
credibility. Therefore, although no guarantee of ethical behaviour, entrepreneurs 
should take comfort in dealing with VCs which are members of SA VCA - this 











Seed Start-u~ Ex~ansion MBO MBI Re~lacement 
Median 71-100% 56-70% 36-45% 31-35% 31- 31-35% 
reguired 35% 
rates 
TYQes of Less than 5 Less than 5 5 or more yrs 
VC yrsm yrs in business in business 
.. 
business regumng 
lower Development Development Development Development 
rates, by Unlisted 
stage Captive/ Captive/ semi-
semi -captive captive 




* Sample is too small for this to be conclusive 
5.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN VENTURE CAPITALISTS 
The South African VC industry has progressed considerably in recent years. This 
research bears out some implications for South African VCs: 
1 Insofar as international practice is concerned, there has been little progress in 
developing a normative model of the venture capital investment process. The role 
of intuition and experience make this even more difficult to establish. 
Accordingly, while local VC practices can be compared to international practices, 
there is no guarantee that that these will result in improved investment selection 
and performance. Accordingly, any foreign practices need to be treated with 











2 There is evidence from South African VC practices that the market is reaching 
maturity. This is borne out by the annual KPMG/SA VCA survey. 
3 While there is evidence of the local industry being comparatively sophisticated, 
there are numerous examples of unsophisticated practices which have been 
identified in Chapter 4. These are invariably practices which fly in the face of 
trite financial theory of venture capital and this can be remedied through 
continuing education. 
4 The importance accorded the integrity of the entrepreneur begs the question as to 
how best this integrity is established. Certainly, it would be a simple screening 
tool to make immediate discreet and thorough enquiries about the entrepreneur if 
an investment opportunity appears interesting. If integrity is lacking, the 
investigation can then be quickly and inoffensively terminated. 
5 Venture capital has been described as ajoumeyman's profession. The importance 
of subjective assessment in venture capital suggests that the value of experience 
should not be underestimated. "Gut feel" or intuition is very often a result of 
experience and, where good financial, strategic and economic analysis is unable to 
answer all the questions, VCs should incorporate subjective judgment into their 
decision-making process with equanimity. 
6 While the South African VC industry has some peculiarities not typically found in 
more developed markets, such as empowerment issues, it would appear to be 











5.4 AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following areas of further study might yield valuable results: 
1 Considerable research has been focused on positive models of VC investment 
- an entrepreneur can no longer be heard to complain that he or she has no 
idea what a VC will expect of his or her proposal. Henceforth the most 
valuable research which would benefit venture capitalists would be to find out 
which VC practices result in the best investment performance. This would 
necessitate the design of separate normative models of VC investment in 
respect of each of the following: evaluation criteria (which could be further 
subdivided into the different broad categories of evaluation criteria), valuation 
methods, required rates of return, and portfolio strategies. This is not a 
challenge to be assumed lightly. 
2 A better understanding of the valuation process in a venture capital setting 
would be valuable: Do VCs price risk only through a required rate of return, 
do they apply a certainty equivalent to the projected cash flows and use a 
standard required rate of return, or do they use a mix of both approaches? If, 
as is possible, VCs use the last approach, what does this imply for studies of 
required rates of return and how much more complex might the practical 
valuation process be in a private setting than in the public markets? 
3 The nature and effect of the various contractual mechanisms utilised by VCs 
in South Africa and the way in which they ~ are used to manage risk and 
increase value (particularly through the inherent use of options in the staging 
of investments) would prove useful not only to VC practitioners, but also to 
legal practitioners. The relationship between this "contracting technology" 
and VC valuations might also be usefully examined. 
4 While the theory of valuation is clear, this research of the practical application 
of valuation theory leaves one with a sense of disquiet. Perhaps some 











glossed over. Perhaps the approach adopted in this study is too simplistic to 
capture the richness of venture capital valuations. Concern has been raised in 
this study regarding the practical use of required rates of return (Chapter 3 
Section 8, 'Limitations of this study') and the theoretical shortcomings of 
IRRs (Chapter 2 Section 9, 'Determination of required rate of return'). 
Further qualitative research on this matter is in order so that more suitable 
quantitative methodologies may be devised. A case study approach would be 
appropriate to address this issue. 
5 Application of the research methodologies of Zacharakis 1995 and Zacharakis 
& Meyer 1998 to a South African VC setting would likely result in a more 
refined understanding of the evaluation practices ofVCs. 
6 A study of the demand side of the VC process could be conducted. This 
would focus on the decision-making process of the entrepreneur seeking 
funding from a VC (Wright & Robbie 1998). 
7 Studies to date that have examined the decision-making process of VCs have 
been based largely on the views of individuals within a VC institution. These 
views are not necessarily a true reflection of:the VC institution's collective 
process (Wright & Robbie 1998). An examination of the "investment 
committee" or board of directors' approval process might provide useful 
insights into a different dimension of the decision-making process. 
8 Application of the research methodology of Gompers & Lerner 2000 to a 
South African VC setting would provide an understanding of the key drivers 
behind the valuation of VC investments. It is quite probable that this would 
lead to the same conclusion, ie that unlike the public markets the values of VC 
investments are driven by demand pressure. 
9 A detailed study of the required rates of return within the various industry 
sectors may yield interesting results. This would need to be accompanied by 
an evaluation of the relative risk of each sector and an exposition of the 











10 Since the issue of entrepreneur integrity is s<? important to VCs, it may be 
interesting to examine how, in practice, VCs establish the integrity of an 
entrepreneur. 
Of minor historical interest might be a study of the change of VC evaluation criteria 
over the passage of time - which criteria change and which remain the same. The 
difficulty with this would be finding comparable studies conducted over a sufficiently 
long period of time. 
5.5 AFTERWORD - THE IMPACT OF CONTINUED MARKET 
WEAKNESS IN 2001 
A shake-out in the technology market which commenced in March 2000 has 
snowballed into 2001 with numerous knock-on effects. With a potential US recession 
already looming in mid 2001, the markets were left reeling in the aftershock of the 
attack on the W orId Trade Centre in September 2001. 
To put the market drop in context, herewith the declines in a number of selected 
indices: 
• On 8 October 1998 NASDAQ bottomed out at 1 357 due to the Asian 
emerging market crisis. It peaked on 10 March 2000 at 5 133 and then fell 
72% back to 1 418 on 27 September 2001. 
• Another TMT-heavy index, the Nikkei, peaked at 20 748 on 4 April 2000 
before falling 55% to 9 383 on 21 September 2001. 
• In South Africa, the ALSI peaked at 9 336 on 18 January 2000 before falling 
to 7 171 on 21 September 2001. 
• The South African IT index fell from 1 349 on 9 March 2000 to 221 on 27 
September 2001. 
• The South African Media index fell from 19 418 on 27 March 2000 to 4 806 











• The South African Telecommunications index fell from 862 on 16 March 
2000 to 261 on 27 September 2001. 
This has had dire consequences for the performance of the VC industry: 
• Interest in technology companies and small capitalisation companies has 
turned full circle with a flight to quality being experienced - government 
bonds and, where equities have been sought, 'blue chip' stocks have been 
preferred. 
• The NASDAQ, the bellwether of technology performance, is no longer an 
obvious place of exit for VCs. The IPO market has dried up in most countries. 
• The weakening of the technology market has exposed the underbelly of most 
of the rest of the market which has experienced a considerable correction in 
valuation. 
• Emerging market currencies have suffered and their markets have had mixed 
fortunes. In addition, the opportunity for expansion to developed countries has 
been exacerbated as the developed countries experience their own economic 
problems. 
• Terms such as 'B2B' (business-to-business) and 'C2C' (consumer-to-
consumer) have been replaced with terms like 'P2P' (path-to-profitability) and 
'R2R' (retum-to-rationality). 'Market share' and 'revenue growth' have been 
jettisoned in preference for 'profit' and 'cash flow'. 
• VC funds world-wide have been caught unawares by the market shift and, 
while the pain may be delayed in some instances, performance can be 
expected to be significantly poorer than in recent years. 
• A large number of VC funds are fully invested but have fledgling investees 
requiring further funding to survive. In many cases it is unlikely that funding 
will be forthcoming and these companies will fail. The domino effect of this 
on the technology market is probably not yet over. 
• Institutional investors world-wide are approaching VC fund investment 
cautiously and funding commitments have already started to slow dramatically 
in the USA. 81 
81 Venture Economics and the National Venture Capital Association released statistics on 30 July 2001 
which show that second quarter investment by US VCs had dropped by 61 % compared to the same 











• While this is probably a cyclical correction, it is likely to be reasonably 
protracted and will leave many reputations tarnished. 
• South Africa never got caught up in the technQlogy bubble to the same extent 
as in Europe and the USA. In addition, the US VC market is highly 
specialised in that a VC, focusing on a particular investment stage, would 
often fund an investee until the next round of funding. At this stage new VCs 
would be sought for the next round, implying that many early stage investees 
were not funded to achieve profitability but to achieve a status of 'next round 
investability' . Being relatively small, this has not been a characteristic of the 
South African industry. While the South African technology market has had 
its own spectacular collapse, the market excess and hence the collapse, has 
been more muted. 
• Similarly, although also more muted, the South African VC market is seeing a 
fallout as both performance has weakened and the ability to raise funding has 
been curtailed. Even though many South African VC funds do not participate 
in the technology industry, they too have suffered. 
What impact might the above have on the results and conclusions ofthis study? 
1. Some of the evaluation criteria may have been affected: 
1.1. Personality and experience of the entrepreneurial team: It is unlikely that the 
ranking ofthese criteria will have changed significantly. 
1.2. Characteristics of the product or service: It is unlikely that the ranking of 
these criteria will have changed significantly. 
1.3. Target market: It is possible that the maturit~ of the target market may now 
be more important. 
1.4. Operational issues: It is unlikely that the ranking of these criteria will have 
changed significantly. 
1.5. Financial considerations: The importance of being able to achieve an IPO 
may be less. The importance of being cash flow positive or profitable is 
almost certain to be more important, as is the presence of an independent co-
investor (there is certainly anecdotal evidence in the South African market 
that both are now more important than they were previously). 
return of 18.2% for the year to 30 June 2001 in comparison to negative returns on both the NASDAQ 












1.6. Preferences for the stage in the business cycle: There is currently a 
burgeoning ofVC funds taking listed companies private, usually through buy-
outs. Also, with the public markets as volatile as they currently are, many 
VCs which are not prevented as such by their mandates, appear to be 
purchasing stakes in listed companies. This is because the returns could 
potentially be very good as the market recovers without having to assume the 
various risks, including the lack of critical mass, in small unlisted companies. 
Accordingly we could expect to see MBOs and secondary 
purchase/replacement transactions being more important. It must, however, 
be stressed that most VCs would still rather see their cash going into the 
company than into the hands of exiting shareholders. 
1.7. Overall, it is anticipated that the importance accorded management teams will 
remain paramount, perhaps even becoming more important. A singular 
development in South African corporate life has been the exposure of large 
scale failures (Macmed Health Care Ltd, Leisurenet Ltd and Regal Treasury 
Bank Holdings Ltd, to name a few) due to poor corporate governance and a 
flagrant disregard for integrity. Due to this, coupled with technology issues 
becoming more abstruse, it is submitted that integrity will remain ever more 
important. 
2. The required rates of return can be expected to have increased, although the 
results of the study suggest that this change may, in the context of the high returns 
required by Yes, not be significant (perhaps an increase of 5% at most). The 
extent of the increases will be greater at the earlier stages of the investment cycle 
and smaller at a the later stages. However, what ,is more likely, is that VCs are 
applying a healthy dose of realism to projections and giving them a 'haircut' prior 
to applying their required rate of return. The conundrum that this presents to the 
accepted wisdom of the study of required rates of return in VC, is addressed 
earlier in this study. It is likely that the effect by stage has been that required rates 
for earlier stage investments will have increased more than later stage 
investments. It is difficult to comment on the effect on the different types of 
funds. 
2.1. Foreign funds which have advanced hard currenCIes to invest may now 











2.2. Development funds may retain their relatively lower required rates of return 
so as to pursue their development and empowerment objectives. It is in times 
like this that development objectives become particularly important. 
2.3. Listed VC funds and VC managers are fast disappearing as the value of being 
listed is questioned and many listed funds are considering going private. If 
being listed as a VC fund goes out of style in years to come, the distinction 
between listed and unlisted VC funds and VC managers will be irrelevant 
because there will no longer be any listed funds. 
2.4. Captive funds are affected by two opposing forces: The benefit of a strong 
parent balance sheet may be offset by an increased need of the parent to focus 
its resources on its core business. It is difficult to offer a general comment on 
the effect of this, but it is likely that most parent companies are tending to 
focus on their core businesses and are accordingly withdrawing from VC 
activities. 
3. The fall in interest rates may make debt more attractive in South African VC 
investees but it is harder to raise debt in the current market. The effect on the 
study's findings on the impact of the debt-equity ratio is not likely to be 
significant. 
4. The risk indicators were divided into general and specific risk indicators. 
Amongst the general risk indicators, it is possible that the scarcity of funds 
flowing into the VC market may now be more highly ranked as a general risk. 
Other than this, there is unlikely to be much change to these. Of the specific risk 
factors, some of the lower ranking factors such as length of time to exit and 
method of exit may now be more important than th~y were, but it is submitted that 
the three highest ranking issues, which all relate to management, will continue to 
rank highest. 
5. Insofar as the ranking of valuation methods is concerned, it is likely that variations 
of the discounted cash flow method will remain most important, particularly given 
the increased focus on cash flow. However, earnings multiples may increase in 
importance because more VCs may now eschew investments without earnings. 
6. The importance of a robust portfolio strategy is now being borne out. It is one 
thing to have a portfolio strategy but it is another thing to apply it with discipline 
in present market conditions. It is possible that many VC funds now are 











where they were unable to raise further funding. There are many anecdotal 
examples of this in the South African industry. 
In general it is therefore unlikely that many of the findings and conclusions will have 
changed other than perhaps a slight increase in the required rates of return, an 
increasing importance on cash flow and profitability, and an increase in the 
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Fax No: (021) 689-7582 
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5 November 2000 
MASTERS IN FINANCE, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
SOUTH AFRICAN VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY SURVEY 
I am currently studying towards a Masters in Finance at the University of Cape Town. 
My supervisor is Professor Enrico Uliana, Head of the Department of Accounting, UCT 
(euliana@commerce.uct.ac.za). I have identified an area of finance not previously 
studied in South Africa. The results of this survey will be used to submit a thesis in 
partial fulfilment of the requirements of a Masters in Finance degree. 
This study builds on and extends a series of international studies and endeavours to 
answer the following research problem: 
When considering a venture capital investment, what considerations do South African 
venture capitalists apply to: 
1. the general evaluation of venture capital and private equity investment 
opportunities, 
2. specifically in respect of the valuation of venture capital and private equity 
investment opportunities, 
• the evaluation of risk, 
• the required rate of return at each stage in the business cycle of the investment 
opportunity (eg seed, start-up, expansion, buy-out etc) 
• the valuation methods employed at each stage, and 
3. the broad application of portfolio theory to their funds~ and, 
where comparative data are available in respect of the above three issues, how do these 
considerations compare internationally? 
Venture-backed investments have a higher rate of success than those without venture 
backing. However, some potentially viable projects get rejected by venture capital and 
private equity professionals. This study should aid practitioners in understanding both 
their own decision-making process and comparative international practices. It should 
assist entrepreneurs in better understanding the expectations and demands of venture 
capital/private equity investors and the way in which their proposals are valued. It is 
hoped that this study may contribute to the efficiency of a market which is important 
for the growth of our economy. 
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For the purposes of this survey, the European convention has been adopted in terms of 
which "VENTURE CAPITAL" and "PRIVATE EQUITY" are used interchangeably. 
Both terms are synonymously used to describe equity or quasi-equity investments in 
(generally) unlisted businesses seeking strong growth (ie this excludes so-called 
"lifestyle" businesses). In addition, a Glossary is attached to the questionnaire. 
The views of as many South African venture capitalists and private equity 
practitioners are being sought. In particular, I am seeking the views of each separate 
fund managed by an institution. In answering the questionnaire, the views and policies 
of your fund should be reflected, and only in the absence thereof, should your 
personal views be expressed. The survey should take no longer than 30 minutes to 
complete. 
Individual firms, funds or persons will not be identified in the thesis. All responses 
will be treated confidentially and anonymously. Upon completion (March 2001), the 
results will be made available to all participants and all SAVCA members. 
In considering your participation, please note the following: 
1. I am an executive of VenFin Limited, the listed tt<chnology investment company 
that was previously the Rembrandt Group Ltd. VenFin, based in Stellenbosch, 
invests off its own balance sheet and does not compete for investor funds. While 
VenFin may compete for investment opportunities, it subscribes to a co-operative 
market strategy and actively pursues consortium investments with other market 
participants. VenFin is a founder member of, SA VCA and adheres to the 
principles and ethical values ofSAVCA. 
2. PricewaterhouseCoopers have agreed to assist in ensuring the confidentiality and 
anonymity of responses. The completed questionnaire should be sent by email 
(tom.blok@za.pwcglobal.com) or by pre-paid post to Tom Blok, a partner of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. PricewaterhouseCoopers will collate the responses. 
Two separate sets of data will then be delivered to myself: 
2.1 one file, in random order as to respondent, which reflects the individual 
responses, and 
2.2 a separate file in alphabetical order which lists the respondents, but 
which does not identify the respondents with their responses. 
The individual data will thus remain anonymous. Please see the attached letter 
from PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Your participation is crucial to the success of this study and is greatly appreciated. 
Please respond by 15 December 2000 and feel free to contact me if you have any 
queries. I look forward to your positive response. 
Kind regards 
MARK TAYLOR 



























2 September 2000 
To the respondent 
RESPONSE TO THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE: M TAYLOR 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc 
Reg. no. 1998/12055121 
Sanbel 




Telephone +27 (21) 940 4100 
Facsimile +27 (21) 948 6817 
Direct phone +27 - 21 - 940 4248 
Direct fax +27 - 21 - 949 9503 
PricewaterhouseCoopers is supporting Mark Taylor ~with his thesis by providing an 
independent service to receive, collate and depersonalise research questionnaires. As 
recipient of this letter, you have been identified as a contributor to his research. 
We hereby confirm that the following procedures will be followed for all responses to this 
research. 
1. All responses will be sent to PricewaterhouseCoope:r:s, either bye-mail or regular post. 
2. Once all responses are received, or the deadline for submissions is reached, the 
information contained on the responses will be collated on a spreadsheet prepared by 
the researcher. Any references to the organisation or individual submitting the 
response will be removed from the return. 
3. We will provide Mark with two electronic files : 
~ One file, with no reference to the respondent, which collated the individual 
responses; and 
~ A second file, listing the respondents in alphabetical order, but which does not link 
the respondents to the individual responses. 
These procedures will ensure the confidentiality of the information provided, and the 
anonymity of the individual respondents. 
Should you have any queries on these procedures, or require any additional information, 
please contact Tom Blok at (021) 940 4248. 
Yours faithfully 
TOMBLOK 
Partner: Global Risk Management Solutions 
C Beggs, I S Fourie - Joint Chief Executive Officers 
H J E van Wyk Director - managing Western Cape region 
Resident directors J F Basson, T Blok, H F Bosman, C Bredenhann, J M Calitz, J N W de Kock, C G de Wet, N H Doman, G J Kruger, B B Lubbe, 
E A Maritz, S M Roberts, A E van Riet, J M van Wyk, J P van Wyk, W ~ Vi'iiers, A Wentzel, D J Westcott, J L Wilkinson 
The Company's principal place of business is at 2 Eglin Road, SunninghiJIOllere a list of the directors' names is available for inspection. 
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concept. ",hid, are undedinffl in tl", que'tionnaire). In ",,;wering the questionnaire, lhe vi.w, and policies 











L (.j V,l,i,h of the fol low ing o""~rshi r "~leg:on~' hoc" d",crilx-" YO"" v"nture ''''P""I fund" Plc,,"',- lid, 
II", ,.elc" ~nl cal<gu,-y box 
U Oth er : Pk,,, "",eif)' __ _ 
(h) Docs yoor lund have an L"l(X>wL,m.nt ohj,-"t,,,,, (",g_ for , p'e",oosly diS<ldv,ntage d group)') 
YcsO '<00 
(c j 1'>0<-, !'-"" fun,1 h.we 0 developm"", object ive? 
Ye,o ,",00 
(dl Are you liSled on the Joh~nnM"g St",.- k E,,-h'"ge'! 
Ye,O'<oO 
2_ h ...- th" dlfjercnt stage, of v"nture "'r Ll,,1 financing. please irnli"Jk. for th e b>1 three year; (1/3/97 
(0 29/2/2(j()j) or • il l).1ll<:1. 1 y,'or ending as do,e a., p,o"s ih l~ to th IS), the r>r"por1 ion oC your 
inwstlll~nt' in the follo" ,n!; '.k!;''''L'>' by appro,imm,- nllmkr of LllVeStJr>ent, "lid value. 'JOTE: 
-Il'e "",,, ,I ute ,'~ Ill~' ore optioooi. PI~-"".. provi(ie iILlG,,l the l>crcenlage hreakdowll_ 
",-,.-<:1 
SI011-up"" ""]v slO g<; 
h Inn, 1 Olli d fV e i 00 mrn! 
\1anagemc"t huyoUL (MBO ) 









AW"'x , ".Iue 





PI~a.,e IT, dicale the approximale percent.,,'" of yo ur mdivi,i",,1 inve>1ment' by number (irre'P"diw of 
100al d",,1 ,ize) which fall in ~.ch of tl", fo llo wing , i,,, catcgonc", 
I_e,, 'hall 
a/·>~~o > 1).~J!l:BJ Om ~% 
III lerm, "I' Y"'" venture eopit,( fund: 
~R10m-1{2.\m 
=:J'% 
(al IIow mall Y years has y,-"" funu beet, il1""lvod in vol11ure ,'apiwl'! 
~~I{I OOm 
L,..J ~-;, 
, (h) \'"Jal is ll'" numher of llew iTwesl1\lt1lts m.de ill lhe la" tllTee year, (c< cllKi iT"~ 
C"llow_un invL-"'ITnCnl,. rights I""""S in exi,ling inve,tments, or the lik~)'! 
("] How many curl'~1ll in"e,rmenb doe" your f lilld h'I\ e~ 
(e) Is the rn'Jocity OWlJo:,-,hip of YOUl' fum ll"~ign ()f Jocal~ 














5. In general, when evaluating investment proposals, how important are the following factors? Where 
appropriate (for example, where you are a seed or early stage investor) the criteria may be regarded as 
relating not just to the existing status of the potential investee, but to what is realistically planned. 
Please rate each factor out of 5 where 5=essential, 4=important, 3=moderately important, 2=slightly 
important, and 1 =irrelevant. 
(a) THE PERSONALITY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE .ENTREPRENEUR (INCLUDING THE 
ENTREPRENEUR'S MANAGEMENT TEAM) 
Essential Irrelevant 
Is capable of sustained, intense effort 05 04 03 02 01 
Is able to evaluate and react to risk well 05 04 03 02 01 
Is articulate in discussing hislher venture 05 04 03 02 01 
Attends to detail 05 04 03 02 01 
Has good personal "chemistry" with you 05 04 03 02 01 
Has a good relevant formal education 05 04 03 02 01 
Has good judgement 05 04 03 02 01 
Has integrity 05 04 03 02 01 
Displays strategic vision 05 04 03 02 01 
Was referred to me by a trustworthy source 05 04 03 02 01 
Has a significant investment or stake in the investee 05 04 03 02 01 
(b) ENTREPRENEUR'S EXPERIENCE (INCLUDING THAT OF THE ENTREPRENEUR'S TEAM) 
Essential Irrelevant 
Is thoroUghly familiar with the market targeted by venture 05 04 03 02 01 
Has demonstrated leadership/managerial ability in the past 05 04 03 02 01 
Has a track record relevant to venture 05 04 03 02 01 
Good references are available on the entrepreneur 05 04 03 02 01 
Has good relevant business and industry experience 05 04 03 02 01 
(c) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRODUCT OR SERVICE 
Essential Irrelevant 
Has proprietary intellectual property which can be 
protected either legally (eg copyright, patent or design) 
or practically (eg by secrecy) 05 04 03 02 01 
Has a good lead-time on the market competition 05 04 03 02 01 
Enjoys demonstrated market acceptance 05 04 03 02 01 
Has been developed to the point of a functioning prototype 05 04 03 02 01 











(d) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TARGET MARKET 
Essential Irrelevant 
Enjoys a significant growth rate 05 04 03 02 01 
The venture is in an industry with which I am familiar 05 04 03 02 01 
The venture is in an industry in which I wish to invest 05 04 03 02 01 
There are good barriers to entry 05 04 03 02 01 
Little threat of competition during the initial investment period 05 04 03 02 01 
Will create a new market 05 04 03 02 01 
Is mature 05 04 03 02 01 
Potential for overseas markets 05 04 03 02 01 
Is large 05 04 03 02 01 
(e) OPERATIONAL ISSUES WHICH MUST BE WELL-POSITIONED OR IN GOOD ORDER 
Essential Irrelevant 
Distribution system/channels 05 04 03 02 01 
Production techniques/facilities 05 04 03 02 01 
Entrepreneur has gained control of key resources 
(e.g. technology which is proprietary or exclusively 
licensed, or key strategic partners, etc) 05 04 03 02 01 
General employees are of good quality 05 04 03 02 01 
Existence of a suitable employee incentive scheme 05 04 03 02 01 
(f) FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Essential Irrelevant 
Meets 'key' financial ratio benchmarks 05 04 03 02 01 
A coherent and thorough business plan 05 04 03 02 01 
An investment that can be easily made liquid (e.g. IPO 
or trade sale) or clearly and easily exited 05 04 03 02 01 
Investments must require funding above a defined minimum size 05 04 03 02 01 
The venture is already profitable or cash flow positive 05 04 03 02 01 
The expected % shareholding falls within a given range 05 04 03 02 01 
Financial control systems are in a good state 05 04 03 02 01 
You are able to add value to the investee beyond merely 
providing capital 05 04 03 02 01 











6. \\·l,en a<certaming; the ",vestment st"g;e, how illlportan! L< it Ihm the inyesm,ent " 'll'" of t1>" 
fo llowing;~ Ple= rate each foctor o\Jt of 5, " h,c"" 5- "ery a!!roclive, 4- preferably, 3 ind ill"rent. 
2- preferably nol and 1 -y~'Ty unatIT""liYe. 
VeryattmctLye Very un~l tracLivc 
Saoondary purcha<c},eplacement OJ 0 ' 03 m 0 ' 
\fa "agelllen! buyout ("mOl 0' 0, 0) m 0' 
!>.hnagelllent huy_in ( \tBI ) 0' 0' 0' m 0' 
~mentlexpansion 05 0' 0; m 0, 
I;arl)' S(~g;cJ'Lar!:!,I' invoslm<nt 0' 0' m m 0' 
.s.~,!l ,apilal inycstment 0' 0' m m 0' 
TARGETED RATES OF RETL'R'O AN D R ISK INDICATORS 
7. (.)How do you assess Ihe ta rgeted rates of relurn' 'Risl:' should f>C interpreled hroodly, in:;luding 
operating, lim'nei.l and marhl Ti,k, i.a_ Pica", ,ale each factor ,,!K "r S. wheTe ~ -'In>ng l y a!,'TCC, 
4- agree,3 inditferent. 3- disagrce and l-slron!;ly disaW'-,,_ 
StronglyagTee 
'e,"e ",qui", Ihe Lnye,tmont to meet ~ ,tandard required mte of 
return OIL equity (im",""al taw of relum, III.R). regardless of the 
invc,WO ,ompany', risk proji)e 05 04 
,'Ie require the investmellllo meet a ,tandard required 
tale of relUm On equity ( IRK), ""OOTding to tl" Ti,' oond 
ofthe i",-estme"t 
We require the invesUllen! to meet a spe<:ilic required "Ie of 
return on e'luity (lRR), aCCGrding to the cha",cterisncs of e""h 
05 04 
",vestmcnt 05 04 
We ",quiTo 1 he fundi ng ,t",dure I" meot ,Landard !,>caring Tati.,s 
regardless of th" ris\: profile 05 04 
We require the fUlld ing 'lr"dare 10 meet standard f:Caring ratio 
acoording 10 the risl: band oft1", inveo(ment 05 04 
,'Ie require the funding stmctu", to meet gemng mtio, 
approprta!o 10 eaoh invo'lm<n! OS 04 
,'Ie re'luire a rate of return which yields a tOlal c .. ,h ",(um 





(b) i\ssumilLg you have decided to ilLvest, do you regard the following geneml and 'P'",i l;o Ti,' facl'''-'''' 
imponm1! (and may (I" ,eh..-e il",rease )~lUr targc1ed r4te of retum)'! f'iea,o Talc e:>ch ri,. factor out of 5, 
wh"re 5- always important, 4- u<ually importalLl, J - oometLll,,"s important. 2-",rely imp<lIt.nt .nd 
l- !",vcr important. 
GENERAL fflCTQRS 
Alway, itllf'<lTtant "ie,er important 
Market colLditio"" reiocilLg to a partiouJar proposa l 05 04 03 02 01 











Always important Never important 
Changes in prices for quoted equities 05 04 03 02 01 
Quantity of inflow of funds into the VC/private equity market 05 04 03 02 01 
Changes in returns for long-term gilts 05 04 03 02 01 
Changes in the prime rate 05 04 03 02 01 
The state of the industrial/product sector of the investment 05 04 03 02 01 
SPECIFIC FACTORS 
Always important Never important 
Expected length of time to exit from the investment 05 04 03 02 01 
Degree of participation of existing shareholders in this round 05 04 03 02 01 
Actual cash amount you seek to receive from the investment 05 04 03 02 01 
Degree of planning and strategy for exit from the investment 05 04 03 02 01 
Liquidity of the investment 05 04 03 02 01 
Possibility of a total write-off of the investment if it fails 
(ie degree of 'downside' exposure or salvage value) 05 04 03 02 01 
Geographic distance from the investment 05 04 03 02 01 
Expected gearing ratio 05 04 03 02 01 
Whether you (and the institutional syndicate, where appropriate) 
have the majority of the equity 05 04 03 02 01 
Quality and robustness of corporate governance 05 04 03 02 01 
Competitiveness of the market 05 04 03 02 01 
Small size of the required investment (in Rand terms) 05 04 03 02 01 
Large size of the required investment (in Rand terms) 05 04 03 02 01 
Expected amount of post-deal re-organisation 05 04 03 02 01 
Round of investment (e.g. first, follow-on) 05 04 03 02 01 
Extent to which funding must be advanced up front or whether 
it can be done in tranches upon achievement of milestones 05 04 03 02 01 
Book value-to-market value ratio 05 04 03 02 01 
Quality of managerial skills 05 04 03 02 01 
Predictability or unpredictability of behaviour of the 
entrepreneur and his team 05 04 03 02 01 
Level of financial contribution by management 05 04 03 02 01 











(c) Do you regard the ownership of a majority of the equity or control as an indicator of increased or 
decreased risk or is it irrelevant? 
An increase in risk 0 
Irrelevant to risk 0 
A decrease in risk 0 
(d) Do you regard an earlier round of funding as an indicator of increased or decreased risk or is it irrelevant? 
An increase in risk 0 
Irrelevant to risk 0 
A decrease in risk 0 
(e) Do you require a discount or are you prepared to pay a premium on the investee's valuation if you are 
able to add good value to the investee, or is this irrelevant? 
A discount to valuation 0 
Irrelevant to valuation 0 
A premium to valuation 0 
VALUATION METHODS 
8. Rate the following valuation methods in terms of preference of use (not for portfolio performance 
purposes, but for entry purposes): Please rate each method which you use out of 5, where 5=almost 
always, 4=usually, 3=sometimes, 2=seldom, 1 =almost never. Please ignore the investment stages in 
which your fund does not invest. You may select more than one method. Assume that you are 
making a simple equity investment (ie that there are no contracting techniques involved such as 
staging (by staggering the investment in tranches), convertible debt, performance 'ratchets' or 
'c1awbacks'). 
(a) IF YOU ARE INVESTING IN A SEED INVESTMENT 
Almost Always Almost Never 
Historic cost book value 05 04 03 02 01 
Replacement value 05 04 03 02 01 
Cash amount invested to date plus possible premium 05 04 03 02 01 
Liquidation value of asset 05 04 03 02 01 
Discounted future cash flows 05 04 03 02 01 
Dividend yield basis 05 04 03 02 01 
Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. historic or 
prospective price/earnings ratio or EBIT multiple) 05 04 03 02 01 
Recent PE ratio of the parent company's shares 05 04 03 02 01 
Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector 05 04 03 02 01 











Industry comparahles '" _"",~i al 'rule "fthumb' 
pri~ing ratios (e,g, tu rnover ratios , , ub",ri])"r valu~, etc) 0, 0' 0; m 0' 
"V''11IlLle capiml" m~hoo (PE ratio "Wlied to tumre 
earnings "I Ih" time o fexp~ctffl ~xit alLd di,colLnted 
back lC preseTlt value) 0, 84 m m m 
OplioTl prici ng <" ,imibr ,,"I "ot i,,,, m"tb<>ds 0, 0' 8 .1 m 0' 
C~I;.:r (spc"i fy : ) 05 0' 03 m 0' 
(01 IF YOU LlIU:: I~Vf':iI[t';Q It'; /"J. S'[AKI-1:PlEARIY ~TAGf I~VFS' [ '\1Ft'; ' [ 
Almost Always Almost "<eyer 
Hi'll"-'C c,,,t Ix~,l yaluc 0, 0' 0; 02 0' 
R~pl",emenl YOlue 0' 04 03 02 0' 
Ca,h amolLnt inyestffl to date plu, possible premium 05 0' 0 3 0, 01 
LiqlLidatH)lL value of ,,-,,CI 05 0' 0; 02 01 
Di;.counted f " 'ure cash now, 0 , 0' 0.1 m 01 
DL vidend yield na", 0 , 0' m m 0 1 
Capitaii",d SU,I"lllabk earni ng; (q;, I"'tori c "r 
pro'p"~live pric-c..-cami ng; 1'01'" "r F.HiT mul liple) m 0' 0] m 0' 
Rec-cm PE ralio of tlIC p",ent CCTllp:l.ny'. sh~"" 0, 0' 0; DO 0' 
fl.ec"T11 IIon,o c li<~l price, for a"qLlI,iti<nlS in th" ",clo" DO 0' 0 ;\ DO 0' 
i{e' p"n"" 10 o11empt, to w lic i\ "<~l1p"ling OIT"IS 0, 0' 03 DO 01 
Industry comp",a~l~' or "P"cial'ruk oftllUmb' 
pri~mg r'lio' (q;, tumove,. r'lio<. ,ub',Tihe" .,.1",-" etc) 0, 0' 83 m 0' 
"V'I1lure capll al" m'1 h,~1 (1'1': ralio apphed '" future 
earning'.t lhe tim" ofexpecteJ exi! .nd di,counted 
back!O pI.,~nt YO:lLe,1 0, 0' 0 .1 m 0' 
Option pricrng or ' imilar valuation m~thod, 0 5 0' OJ 02 0> 
Dth,-", (op"cify: 0' 84 OJ 02 0' 
(e) ILX01:. tllif' ID'VI:STIN\J IN AN fXr,""<':ilQ~ ..- DEVFlOPMFN I S'I',\(iE II\V,t:s,nlFXT 
Aim"" ''Il way' Almo't N~ver 
His.loric co,t ho"k value 0' 0' 0' m "' 
~cpioc"menl vo luo GO 0' 03 m m 
Cosh amoum lnv"sted to date pi lL' p'",ihk prcmllLm 05 0' 8:l m 0' 
Liquidation val"" of a>s~t 05 04 03 m 0' 
Di,,-'Oumed future cash flows 05 04 0.1 0 2 0' 











C~pimli""d sustainable eamill~' (e.g. hi,tonc ur 
prospect ive pric"/e~millg, rmiu or El:IlT multipl.) 05 04 0; 02 0 1 
Recent PE rmio of the pJl'ent coll'(lany' s shares a; a, m 02 a, , 
Recel11 transaction price, for >tqui,iti,,,,, ill lbe ,ec"" OJ a, 03 a, a, { 
< 
Response, to attell'l;>i. to ""licH competillg uffen, 05 0 4 03 m 0' 
Industry comparabl", or """"ial 'm]e of lbwnb' 
pricing rO lios ( •. g, turnO\'el' ratios, ,ubscr iber value" etc) 05 0' a; m 0 ' 
"Ven1llre capital" method (PE ratio opplied lO future 
earning< al the lime of expected exil aTId discounlJ:d 
Ir""k 10 pre;ent vat "e) 05 04 m 02 01 
Opo:ion pricing or ,imllar YJluation method, a; 0' 0.' 02 0 1 
Other (spe<:ify, a; a, 0.' a, a, 
{o, II' YOU ARE I"<VESTNCi f}; A HUYO L I' ! ~IHO/MHIl ST"CiE I"<V" ~TMEI\T 
Almost Alway, Altn06t Never 
Hi,loric c",l book "o l"e 05 04 0) 02 01 
Rep laceme", valu" 05 0 4 0) 02 0' 
C .. ,h """,,,m( mw, ted to dole pIllS poss,ble premium 05 0' 0) GO 0, 
Liquidat ion value of as,el a; 0' a; m 0' 
Discoumed future ca,h flow, 05 0' a; m 0< 
Dividend yield b3;;i, OJ 04 a., 02 a, 
Capitahsed ,u,lai""" le earn ing> (e.l;. Imturic ur 
pr"'P"ct ive price/earning:; ratio or EBlT mulnple) 05 04 m 02 01 
Recent PE ratio of !I ... parenl company' , share, a; a, m 02 a, 
Recenl ,,"n;;:.,;[ion prite, for ""4U1 "tiulls 1Tl the ,",clOr a; a, 0 .' a, a , 
Responses to ane,u,m!o ">I,"it compeling offers a; a, 0.' a, 0' 
(nd,, ' try cumparab le, Of "Pec .. 1 'n, le of (hllmb' 
pricing ratios (e.&. lu1'l\0\'~r mtio" sub;;criber \'alue< etc) 0; 0' 03 02 0' 
"Venlure capital" me thod (PE r~tio appli ed to future 
earning' at the ti me of expected exit and di;;counled 
hac'!o pr"",,,, ,·.il"') 0; 0. a; m 0' 
OptiUTI pricmg '>r simiiJr yuhmtion methods 05 0, 0) m 0 ' 
Other ('pecity, , 0; 04 03 m 0 ' 
(,' If. YQ\; ARE I"<VESTI"<G N A SE('OI\DARY PI:RCIlASE OR Rffl.A.(';fMEI'T STAGE 
I~V "SIMEYI 
Almo't Always AIIl'I."t I\ever 
Historic C<l,j book YJlue 05 04 0; 02 01 











Cash amount invested to date plus possible premium 05 04 03 02 01 
Liquidation value of asset 05 04 03 02 01 
Discounted future cash flows 05 04 03 02 01 
Dividend yield basis 05 04 03 02 01 
Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. historic or 
prospective price/earnings ratio or EBIT multiple) 05 04 03 02 01 
Recent PE ratio ofthe parent company's shares Os 04 03 02 01 
Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector 05 04 03 02 01 
Responses to attempts to solicit competing offers 05 04 03 02 01 
Industry comparables or special 'rule of thumb' 
pricing ratios (e.g. turnover ratios, subscriber values etc) 05 04 03 02 01 
"Venture capital" method (PE ratio applied to future 
earnings at the time of expected exit and discounted 
back to present value) 05 04 03 02 01 
Option pricing or similar valuation methods 05 04 03 02 01 
Other (specify: ) 05 04 03 02 01 
OPTIONAL COMMENTS: 
ARRIVING AT FINAL VALUATION 
9. Where more than one valuation method is regularly used, how do you arrive at finallbenchmark 
valuation? Please rate each method out of 5, where 5=almost always, 4=usually, 3=sometimes, 
2=seldom, 1 =almost never. 
Almost Always Almost Never 
Use the highest valuation 05 04 03 02 01 
Use the lowest valuation 05 04 03 02 01 
Use some form of 'averaging' (such as the mode, 
mean or median ofthe valuations) 05 04 03 02 01 
Place greatest weight on one particular method 
and use others as a check 05 04 03 02 01 
Use 'gut feel' or intuition 05 04 03 02 01 
Try and resolve the differences in the methods by 
understanding the reasons therefor 05 04 03 02 01 












RF.Ol'JRED RAn: OF RnrR"I 
10 If the llJ<'eting ofa , [aIldard hclld,mark r"'Juired nltc' ofretul1l 011 c'lully (mlemal rale of rerum, IRR) 
for Ln"estment, is a[ Ie"", ,'oo,irahlc r"g ... dle" of Ih" lTl\'e,lee c()mpany', profile, what b<;rn; hnml 
"'qULrcd ra[e or return (% p,a, m nomin.ltcnm) do yo u currently u,"" 10 n.luale expected aller lax 
relurn, li>t your overall rU[l(f' I I % p.a. 
11 Ir you ,\"lm11l11e a ,pc.otic r"q LlIr~d r"ic o r r<-111rtl 011 "'l LlIl)' for e;oe h I'''''l'''''live '" current 
m"e'tl11<'nt. which of tIle [()Howing batlds wouh1 n,.",[ likely reflect yom ClITfol11 "on,;".1 '"'1 LlIY,,,1 
,-ale ()f relum on c'ILllly 111 ten", of <Ilk, t", ,,-" urn s. for inwsln-.:nl"> Please 19r""" IIH>se i,,,,e<tme nf 




Sian-up.' bpan"ol\,' MilO \1Il1 Sec<)ndary 
Puroh,,".' 
, 
Early [k,'eIOj'll>o nt 
Rep l , 
Iklow 15% ,~ , 
151020'% p .• _ 
21 [025% ~ a. 
26 [0 JI)% .a. 
JIloJS%p,a. 
.161.,45% p ,a, 
461055% • 
~6 to 711'/0 ,a, , 
7Itol()()~';,pa I 
I l IOI%to200% I I , .. O,'e' 2(~~'; • I 
l2,(a) In cOll~:"'n<;Qn with the bllOyant market COnJ I1 Lt\l15 of the 111i,1 to I' te 1 '19!h , does [he b"nchma,~ you 
used ln cllher I() or I I '.pre",n" 
All inc""ast 0 
'\ decrease 0 
(b) If you llJve changed (i'",re.,;cd or decreased) 
m"ny percenlah'" poi"" have }'Oll ohang~d it'! 
The bellchm""" h.s increawd 0 or dc.re.sed 
your l"'nchma,k since the mid to Ime I ms, by how 
13 (J) 0.."" the inve'lee COnlp;iIly" debl_eqllily raloo influence YO<lr "'lJui,ed M e of return on equil)' at Ihe 
foll owin!; stage, ()f the inve,t",em cyde'! 
Sccd Ye,O )\00 
SIOG -up.'e"rlv :<!a~~ \"C, 0 ~.() 0 
Exnan5ioniMwloome ni ,t"I,.'" Yes 0 )\00 
[Illy()ut (\mO/\18I) Yes 0 NoO 











(b) If "Yes", how? (OPTIONAL) 
PORTFOLIO STRATEGY 
14.(a) Do you apply a portfolio strategy to your investment selection (even where your fund has a narrow 
focus)? Yes 0 No 0 
(b) If so, do you: 
(i) ensure that you make a number of investments, none of 
which should exceed a percentage of the total portfolio, 
say, 15%, or 
(ii)actively favour investments which reduce this overall risk of your 
portfolio, while maintaining your targeted return (i.e. an optimal 
portfolio comprising investments with high returns but with risk 
profiles which are negatively correlated as far as possible), or 
(iii)actively favour a certain class of investment or industry and 
apply a consolidation policy (ie a portfolio in which the risk 
profiles are positively correlated in an effort to establish 
greater certainty in respect of the distribution of likely returns), or 
Yes 0 NoO 
Yes 0 NoO 
Yes 0 NoO 
(iv)other: ____________________________ _ 
(c) Do you regard your portfolio of investments as: 
well-diversified 0, or 
consolidated 0, or 
no particular view 0 
VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATIONS AND INFLUENCE 
15.(a) In terms of the valuation of your current portfolio, have you adopted the British Venture Capital 
Association Guidelines for valuation: 
YesO NoO 
(b) If so, has this affected, or do you expect this to affect, your entry valuation techniques (as set out in 
Question II)? 
YesO NoO 











(c) Are you a member or associate member of any venture capital association? 
Member Associate 
South African Venture Capital Association 0 0 
National Venture Capital Association 0 0 
British Venture Capital Association 0 0 




16. Was the questionnaire clear and easily understandable? Please rate out of 5, where 5 = very clear, 4 = 
clear, 3 = indifferent, 2 = unclear, 1 = very unclear. 
Very clear 
05 04 















TO BE SEPARATED BY PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS. 
Completed by: 
Institution: 
Name of Fund: 
Telephone: 
E-mail: 
Date of completion: 
Thank you very much for helping me by completing the questionnaire. Please return this form to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in the prepaid envelope provided: 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
VC Thesis (Taylor) 
PO Box 168 
Belville 7535 
Attention: Mr Tom Blok 
If there are queries please do not hesitate to contact the researcher as follows: 
Postal Address: 
Mark J.G. Taylor 
PO Box 456 
Stellenbosch 7599 
(W) 021 8883387 
(Fax) 021 883 2799 















The majority of this Glossary is reproduced with the kind permission of KP MG and is based 
substantially on that used in the KP MGISA VCA 
Seed capital: 
Start-up and early-stage: 







'1999 Private Equity Survey' 
funding for research, evaluation and development of 
a concept or business before the business starts 
trading. 
funding for new companies being set up or for the 
development of those which have been in business 
for a short time (one to three years). 
funding for the growth and expansion of a company 
which is breaking even or trading profitably. 
funding for the purchase of existing shares III a 
company from other shareholders, be they 
individuals, other venture-backers or the public 
stock market. 
financing to enable a management team, either 
existing (an MBO) or new (an MBI), and their 
backers to acquire their business from the existing 
owners, be it a family, conglomerate, etc. 
those venture capital and private equity companies, 
managers or funds raising and disbursing capital 
raised from third party investors. 
as above, but also managing assets for a parent 
company (typically an insurance company or 
institutional asset manager) which may be 
channelled through open funds or allocated from a 
reserved pool internally and released when 
necessary. 
those disbursing funds solely on behalf of a parent 
or group, typically an insurance company or 
institutional asset manager, often from an 
indeterminate pool of money. 
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SECTION A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF 
VENTURE COMPANIES 
1. Institutional background 
Table 1. Frequency distribution of companIes by institutional background 
characteristics 
Characteristic Frequency Percent 
ComJ!any Type 
Captive 17 33.33 
Independent 28 54.90 
Semi-captive 4 7.84 
Public Sector 2 3.92 
Other 0 0.00 
Total 51 100.00 
Empowerment 
obiective 
No 39 76.47 
Yes 12 23.53 
Total 51 100.00 
Develo~ment 
Objective 
No 38 74.51 
Yes 13 25.49 
Total 51 100.00 
JSE listinl!: 
No 41 80.39 
Yes 10 19.61 
Total 51 100.00 
2. Proportion of number of investments and value 
Table 2. Summary statistics of proportion of Number of Investments by Investment 
cycle (percentage) 
Investment Valid Mean Median Mode Min. Max. Std 
Category N % Dev. 
Seed 50 10.71 0.00 0(29) 0.00 100.00 18.17 
Start-up/early stage 50 32.31 29.70 o ~(9) 0.00 100.00 28.71 
Expansion! dev. 50 34.00 30.00 o (9) 0.00 100.00 28.04 
Mngt buyout (MBO) 50 12.04 0.00 o (28) 0.00 66.70 19.85 
Mngt buyin (MBI) 50 2.52 0.00 o (41) 0.00 34.00 6.69 
SecondarypUfchase 50 8.42 0.00 o (32) 0.00 67.00 15.74 











Table 3. Summary statistics of proportion of Value of Investments by Investment 
cycle (percentage) 
Investment Valid Mean Median Mode Min. 
Category N % 
Seed 47 6.35 0.00 o (28) 0.00 
Start-up/early stage 47 29.64 18.20 o (8) 0.00 
Expansion! develop 47 33.16 24.00 o (9) 0.00 
ment 
Mngt buyout 47 19.18 0.00 o (26) 0.00 
(MBO) 
Mngt buyin (MBI) 47 1.44 0.00 o (41) 0.00 
Secondary purchase 47 10.22 0.00 o (30) 0.00 
() Frequency of mode 
Figure 1. Box & Whisker Plots of Number of Ventures 
by Investment Stage 
120 
100 
'" 80 ~ 
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3. Proportion of investments by size 
Table 4. Summary statistics of proportion of Investments by size 
Category size Valid N Mean Median Mode Min. Max. 
<R2m 48 13.40 0.00 o (26) 0.00 100.00 
>R2m-R5m 48 26.41 15.85 o (13) 0.00 100.00 
>R5m-R10m 48 21.17 16.70 o (17) 0.00 100.00 
>R10m-R25m 48 18.49 15.85 o (19) 0.00 100.00 
>R25m-R50m 48 11.81 0.00 o (26) 0.00 100.00 
>R50-R100m 48 4.16 0.00 o (35) 0.00 50.00 
>RlOOm 48 4.57 0.00 o (38) 0.00 73.00 
() Frequency of mode 
Figure 3. Box & Whisker Plots percentage of investment 
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4. Venture Capital Fund 
--












° Median value 








() Frequency of mode 
















Mode Min. Max. Std 
Dev. 
~ 3.00 (12) 0.00 40.00 6.31 
6.00 (6) 0.00 70.00 11.59 
T 1.00 58.00 10.98 
3.00 (121 1.00 15.00 2.36 











Current investments: 573 
NEW investments: 561 
Investment managers: 184 
T bl 6 F a e d· ·b f b h· requency Istn utlOn 0 companIes )y owners Ip 
Company Ownershio Frequency Percent 
Local 42 84.00 
Foreign 8 16.00 
Total 50 100.00 
T bl 7 F a e d· tr·b f f b . t ·f n requency IS 1 U IOn 0 companIes )y In ervlewee s POSI 10 
Interviewee's (!osition Frequency Percent 
Assistant 0 0.00 
Manager 11 22.92 
Partner 14 29.17 
MD/CEO 23 47.91 
Total 48 100.00 
5. Targeted rates of return and risk indicators 
Table 8. Frequency distribution of companies by targeted rates of return 
and risk indicators 
Equity ownership risk Frequency Percent 
Increase 16 34.04 
Irrelevant 19 40.43 
Decrease 12 ~ 25.53 
Total 47 100.00 
Earlier round of funding Frequency Percent 
risk 
Increase 22 44.90 
Irrelevant 13 26.53 
Decrease 14 28.57 
Total 49 100.00 
Discount or premium value Frequency Percent 
Discount 26 52.00 
Irrelevant 19 38.00 
Premium 5 10.00 
Total 50 100.00 
6. Investment type by bands of current nominal rate of return on equity 
Table 9. Frequency distribution of companies by Investment type by bands of current 
nominal rate of return on equity [All responses included irrespective of whether 
respondent either has in the past, or does in the future, intend to participate in the 
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7. Comparison hdwccn buyout m;,rkct """dit;,,", ;ond benchmark 
Table 10. Fn::qucilcy lli,lribulion of cOIllpam~" by lxllchmark ;ncn::asc 
(~oIllpari,on oct",""" buyoul markd conuiliom and ocllchmar\L) 
Iknchmark .!,.!:c!J.ucncy_ Percent 
incr.:asc 7 14 ,89 
NQ change 34 72..14 
Decrease 6 12.77 
To tal 47 IO(), O() 
Tahle II, SUlIlmary statistics Qfbcnchmar~ perccnta[\e chanl\e by increase or ll"cr~asc 
or combined 
,-, All Data 
Valid N Mean Median Mode Min. Ma.~. Sld 
Dev. 
Increase, 8 5.25 5.00 0.00 10.00 J·~L 
Muillple mode., 
~ I:>;'-creases 
Valid ).[ M~an Median Mode Min Max SId 
De\'. 











Valid N Mean Median Mode Min. Max. Std 
t Dev. 
Combined 13 -.81 0.00 -30.00 10.00 10.70 
T_ - MultIple modes 
(b) Excluding 'outlier' benchmark for VC Company T (-30%) 
Valid N Mean Median Mode Min. Max. Std 
t Dev. 
Increases 8 5.25 5.00 0.00 10.00 3.89 
T= MultIple modes 
Valid N Mean Median Mode Min. Max. Std 
Dev. 
Decreases 4 -5.63 -5.00 -5.00 -10.00 -2.500 3.15 
ValidN Mean Median Mode Min. Max. Std 
t Dev. 
Combined 12 1.63 2.25 -10.00 10.00 6.40 
T= MultIple modes 
[Figure 4 includes the outlier of -30%] 
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8. Debt-equity ratio effect 
Table 12. Frequency distribution of companies by debt-equity ratio effect 
for different stages of the investment cycle 
Investment cycle Frequency Percent 
Seed 
No 23 65.71 
Yes 12 34.29 
Total 35 100.00 
Start-up/early stage 
No 25 64.10 
Yes 14 35.90 
Total 39 . 100.00 
Expansion/development 
stage 
No 20 44.44 
Yes 25 55.56 
Total 45 100.00 
Buyout (MBOIMBI) 
No 9 25.00 
Yes 27 75.00 
Total 36 100.00 
Secondary 
purchase/replacement 
No 10 34.48 
Yes 19 65.52 
Total 29 100.00 
9. Portfolio Strategy 
T bl 13 F a e requency d· t·b f f . bPrt£r tt IS n u Ion 0 com~arues)y 0 010 S ra egy 
Portfolio strategy Freauencv Percent 
No 10 20.83 
Yes 38 79.17 
Total 48 100.00 
Portfolio <15% 
No 9 23.68 
Yes 29 76.32 
Total 38 100.00 
Reduce risk 
No 16 44.44 
Yes 20 56.56 
Total 36 . 100.00 
Consolidation policy 
No 19 57.58 
Yes 14 42.42 












Well-diversified 24 53.33 
Consolidated 7 15.55 
No particular view 14 31.12 
Total 45 100.00 
10. Venture Capital Associations and influence 
Table 14. Frequency distribution of companies by VC Associations and influence 
British VCA guidelines Frequency Percent 
No 21 42.86 
Yes 28 57.14 
Total 49 100.00 
Guidelines effect 
No 46 93.88 
Yes 3 6.12 
Total 49 100.00 
VC ASSOCIATION 
MEMBERSHIP 
SA VC Association 
Member 36 70.59 
Associate 1 1.96 
Neither 14 27.45 
Total 51 100.00 
National VC Association 
Member 0 0.00 
Associate 0 0.00 
Neither 51 100.00 
Total 51 100.00 
British VC Association 
Member 0 0.00 
Associate 0 0.00 
Neither 51 100.00 
Total 51 100.00 
European VC Association 
Member 3 5.88 
Associate 0 0.00 
Neither 48 94.12 











11. Final Comments 
T bl 15 F a e requency d· t·b f IS n u IOn 0 f . b I . t f Q f nnaire companIes y c amy 0 ues 10 
Clarity 2 Frequency Percent 
Very unclear 0 0.00 
Unclear 3 5.88 
Indifferent 5 9.80 
Clear 32 62.75 
Very Clear 11 21.57 
Total 51 100.00 
SECTION B: ANALYSIS OF REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN 
1. Descriptive statistics of required rates of return 
Table 16. Summary statistics of overall required rate of return (%) by Investment Stage/Cycle + 
Investment Mean Median Mode Min. Max Valid Std. Q25 
Stage . N Dev. 
Seed 36.7 30.0 30 (12) 25.0 75.0 25 11.00 30.0 
Start-up 37.2 35.0 30 (14) 25.0 75.0 33 10.70 30.0 
Expansion! 35.9 30.0 30 (17) 25.0 75.0 37 10.20 30.0 
development 
MBO 35.0 30.0 30 (14) 25.0 75.0 28 10.27 30.0 
MBI 35.3 30.0 30 (12) 25.0 75.0 24 10.98 30.0 
Secondary 34.4 30.0 30 (12) 25.0 75.0 20 10.86 30.0 
purch.l replac. 
Total 35.1 30.0 30 (20) 20.0 75.0 48 9.68 30.0 
+ Investment stage/cycle defined by responses in Qll (importance o/investment) 



















Overall required rates of return: 
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SECTION C: ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT APPRAISAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test was used to determine whether actual investments 
in Q2 match with Q6. There was significant difference in the ratings in Q2 compared 
to those in Q6 (p-value = 0.028 or p-value <0.05). 
Table 21. Results of Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test for difference in Q2 and Q6 
Com arison* Valid N T Z 
1. Q2 VS Q6 6 0.00 2.201 
* Hypothesis test based on mean ratings of each investment cycle. 
A. OVERALL RANKINGS: Q5A-Q5F (Rankings of all considerations in order 
of 'importance ') 
Table 22. Rankings* of consideration within each aspect of investment appraisal 
*rankings are based on the mean of the ratings scales/scores 
Item Description Valid Mean 
no. N 
Q5a-8 Has integrity 51 4.90 
Q5b-1 Is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by 51 4.65 
venture 
Q5a-1 Is capable of sustained, intense effort 51 4.63 
Q5a-7 Has good judgement 51 4.57 
Q5a-11 Has a significant investment or stake in the investee 51 4.55 
Q5a-2 Is able to evaluate and react to risk well 51 4.47 
Q5a-9 Displays strategic vision 51 4.45 
Q5f-8 You are able to add value to the investee beyond 51 4.25 
merely 
Q5d-1 Enjoys a significant growth rate 51 4.25 
Q5b-4 Good references are available on the entrepreneur 51 4.25 
Q5b-5 Has good relevant business and industry experience 50 4.23 
Q5f-2 A coherent and thorough business plan 51 4.22 
Q5d-3 The venture is in an industry in which I wish to invest 51 4.20 
Q5b-2 Has demonstrated leadership/managerial ability in the 51 4.18 
past 
Q5e-3 Entrepreneur hasgained control of key resources 50 4.16 
Q5e-4 General employees are of good quality 51 4.14 
Q5b-3 Has a track record relevant to venture 51 4.14 
Q5d-4 There are good barriers to entry 51 4.01 
Q5f-3 An investment that can be easily made liquid (eg IPO) 51 3.93 
Q5a-5 Has good personal "chemistry" with you 51 3.90 
Q5d-8 Potential for overseas markets 51 3.84 
Q5a-4 Attends to detail 51 3.84 
Q5c-4 Has been developed to the point of a functioning 50 3.82 
prototype 
Q5c-2 Has a good lead-time on the market competition 51 3.80 






































Q5f-7 Financial control systems are in a good state 51 3.73 1.08 
Q5e-1 Distribution system/channels 51 3.71 0.86 
Q5c-3 Enjoys demonstrated market acceptance 51 3.71 0.88 
Q5c-1 Has proprietary intellectual property 51 3.71 1.12 
Q5f-6 The expected % shareholding falls within a given 51 3.69 1.07 
range 
Q5f-1 Meets 'key' financial ratio benchmarks 51 3.61 1.10 
Q5f-4 Investments must require funding above a defined 50 3.60 1.23 . . . 
mmImum SIze 
Q5d-5 Little threat of competition during the initial 51 3.42 0.78 
investment period 
Q5e-2 Production techniques/facilities 51 3.41 0.92 
Q5e-5 Existence of a suitable employee incentive scheme 51 3.37 1.13 
Q5d-2 The venture is in an industry with which I am familiar 51 3.24 1.16 
Q5d-9 Is large 51 3.23 1.45 
Q5a-10 Was referred to me by a trustworthy source 51 3.12 0.93 
Q5f-5 The venture is already profitable or cash flow positive 51 2.84 1.21 
Q5a-6 Has a good relevant formal education 51 2.80 0.94 
Q5c-5 May be described as "high tech" 51 2.79 1.28 
Q5d-6 Will create a new market 51 2.65 0.87 
Q5d-7 Is mature 51 2.35 0.96 











B. RANKINGS BY CONSIDERATION WITHIN EACH SECTIONIP ART: 
Q2-Q9 
Table 23. Rankings* of consideration within each aspect of investment appraisal 
*rankings are based on the mean of the ratings scales/scores 
Item Description Valid N Mean 
no. 
Q5-A PERSONALITY AND ENTREPRENEUR 
CHARACTER 
Q5a-8 Has integrity 51 4.90 
Q5a-1 Is capable of sustained, intense effort 51 4.63 
Q5a-7 Has good judgement 51 4.57 
Q5a-11 Has a significant investment or stake in the investee 51 4.55 
Q5a-2 Is able to evaluate and react to risk well 51 4.47 
Q5a-9 Displays strategic vision 51 4.45 
Q5a-5 Has good personal "chemistry" with you 51 3.90 
Q5a-4 Attends to detail 51 3.84 
Q5a-3 Is articulate in discussing hislher venture 51 3.75 
Q5a-l0 Was referred to me by a trustworthy source 51 3.12 
Q5a-6 Has a good relevant formal education 51 2.80 
Q5-B ENTREPRENEUR EXPERIENCE 
Q5b-l Is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by 51 4.65 
venture 
Q5b-4 Good references are available on the entrepreneur 51 4.25 
Q5b-5 Has good relevant business and industry experience 50 4.23 
Q5b-2 Has demonstrated leadership/managerial ability in 51 4.18 
the past 
Q5b-3 Has a track record relevant to venture 51 4.14 
Q5-C PRODUCT OR SERVICE 
Q5c-4 Has been developed to the point of a functioning 50 3.82 
prototype 
Q5c-2 Has a good lead-time on the market competition 51 3.80 
Q5c-l Has propriety intellectual property 51 3.71 
Q5c-3 Enjoys demonstrated market acceptance 51 3.71 
Q5c-5 May be described as "high tech" 51 2.79 
Q5-D TARGET MARKET 
Q5d-l Enjoys a significant growth rate 51 4.25 
Q5d-3 The venture is in an industry in which I wish ·to 51 4.20 
invest 
Q5d-4 There are good barriers to entry 51 4.01 
Q5d-8 Potential for overseas markets 51 3.84 
Q5d-5 Little threat of competition during the initial 51 3.42 
investment period 
Q5d-2 The venture is in an industry with which I am 51 3.24 
familiar 
Q5d-9 Is large 51 3.23 











Q5d-7 Is mature 51 2.35 
Q5-E OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
Q5e-3 Entrepreneur has gained control of key resources 50 4.16 
Q5e-4 General employees are of good quality 51 4.14 
Q5e-l Distribution system/channels 51 3.71 
Q5e-2 Production techniques/facilities 51 3.41 
Q5e-5 Existence of a suitable employee incentive scheme 51 3.37 
Q5-F FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Q5f-8 You are able to add value to the investee beyond 51 4.25 
merely 
Q5f-2 A coherent and thorough business plan 51 4.22 
Q5f-3 An investment that can be easily made liquid (e.g. 51 3.93 
IPO) 
Q5f-7 Financial control systems are in a good state 51 3.73 
Q5f-6 The expected % shareholding falls within a given 51 3.69 
range 
Q5f-l Meets 'key' financial ratio benchmarks 51 3.61 
Q5f-4 Investments must require funding above a defined 50 3.60 . . . 
mlmmumslze 
Q5f-5 The venture is already profitable or cash flow 51 2.84 
positive 
Q5f-9 There is an independent co-investor 51 1.98 
Q6 INVESTMENT IMPORTANCE 
Q6d Development/expansion 51 4.16 
Q6b Management buyout (MBO) 50 3.56 
Q6c Management buy-in (MBI) 50 3.34 
Q6e Early stage/start-up investment 51 3.11 
Q6a Secondary purchase/replacement 50 2.74 
Q6f Seed capital investment 50 2.02 
Q7-A ASSESSMENT OF TARGETED RATES OF 
RETURN 
Q7a-2 We require the investment to meet a standard 51 3.90 
required 
Q7a-6 We require the funding structure to meet gearing 51 3.80 
ratios 
Q7a-3 We require the investment to meet a specific required 50 3.74 
rate of return on equity (IRR) 
Q7a-7 We require a rate of return which yields a total cash 51 3.65 
return 
Q7a-l We require the investment to meet a standard 51 3.27 
required rate of return on equity (IRR) 
Q7a-5 We require the funding structure to meet standard 51 3.25 
gearing ratios 
Q7a-4 We require the funding structure to meet standard 51 2.48 
gearing ratios 
Q7-B 1. GENERAL FACTORS 











Q7b-7 The state of the industrial/product sector of the 50 3.95 
investment 
Q7b-2 General economic conditions 51 3.45 
Q7b-3 Changes in prices for quoted equities 49 3.36 
Q7b-6 Changes in the prime rate 50 2.94 
Q7b-5 Changes in returns for long-term gilts 50 2.44 
Q7b-4 Quantity of inflow of funds into the VC/private 50 2.40 
equity market 
Q7-B 2. SPECIFIC FACTORS 
Q7b-25 Quality of managerial skills 51 4.76 
Q7b-26 Predictability or unpredictability of behaviour of the 51 4.67 
entrepreneur 
Q7b-27 Level of financial contribution by management 51 4.35 
Q7b-18 Competitiveness of the market 51 4.24 
Q7b-8 Expected length of time to exit from the investment 50 4.12 
Q7b-17 Quality and robustness of corporate governance 51 4.12 
Q7b-13 Possibility of a total write-off of the investment if it 50 4.04 
fails 
Q7b-ll Degree of planning and strategy for exit from the 51 4.00 
investment 
Q7b-9 Degree of participation of existing shareholders in 51 3.96 
this round 
Q7b-10 Actual cash amount you seek to receive from the 51 3.82 
investment 
Q7b-21 Expected amount of post-deal re-organisation 51 3.80 
Q7b-12 Liquidity of the investment 51 3.65 
Q7b-23 Extent to which funding must be advanced up front 51 3.63 
or whether it can be done in tranches upon achieve-
ment of milestones 
Q7b-22 Round of investment (e.g. first, follow-on) 50 3.46 
Q7b-20 Large size of the required investment (in Rand terms) 51 3.37 
Q7b-14 Geographic distance from the investment 51 3.36 
Q7b-15 Expected gearing ratio 51 3.35 
Q7b-19 Small size of the required investment (in Rand terms) 51 3.29 
Q7b-24 Book value-to-market value ratio 51 2.75 
Q7b-16 Whether you (and the institutional syndicate, where 51 2.37 
appropriate) 
Q7b-28 Expected dividend yield 51 2.22 
Q8A INVESTING IN A SEED INVESTMENT 
Q8a-5 Discounted future cash flows 32 4.00 
Q8a-11 Industry comparables or special 'rule of thumb' 30 3.57 
Q8a-9 Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the 31 3.45 
sector 
Q8a-12 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio applied to future 31 3.42 
earnings at the time of expected exit and discounted 
back to present value) 
Q8a-3 Cash amount invested to date pluspossible premium 30 3.40 
Q8a-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. historic or 31 3.39 











Q8a-4 Liquidation value of asset 29 2.52 
Q8a-1O Responses to attempts to solicit competing offers 31 2.52 
Q8a-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent company's shares 30 2.33 
Q8a-13 Option pricing or similar valuation methods 30 2.33 
Q8a-l Historic cost book value 30 2.23 
Q8a-2 Replacement value 30 2.23 
Q8a-6 Dividend yield basis 31 1.65 
Q8a-14 Other (specify:) 48 1.25 
Q8-B INVESTING IN A START-UPIEARLY STAGE 
INVESTM. 
Q8b-5 Discounted future cash flows 40 4.18 
Q8b-12 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio applied to future 40 3.73 
earnings at the time of expected exit and discounted 
back to present value) 
Q8b-ll Industry comparables or special 'rule of thumb' 38 3.71 
Q8b-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. historic or 40 3.68 
prospective price/earnings ratio or EBIT multiple) 
Q8b-9 Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the 39 3.64 
sector 
Q8b-3 Cash amount invested to date plus possible premium 38 3.32 
Q8b-1O Responses to attemQts to solicit com:petin~ offers 39 2.97 
Q8b-4 Liquidation value of asset 38 2.71 
Q8b-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent company's shares 38 2.58 
Q8b-l Historic cost book value 38 2.55 
Q8b-13 Option pricing or similar valuation methods 38 2.42 
Q8b-2 Replacement value 38 2.39 
Q8b-6 Dividend yield basis 39 1.87 
Q8b-14 Other (specify:) 49 1.16 
Q8-C INVESTING IN AN 
EXP ANSIONIDEVELOPMENT 
Q8c-5 Discounted future cash flows 45 4.51 
Q8c-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. historic or 44 4.14 
prospective price/earnings ratio or EBIT multiple) 
Q8c-9 Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the 44 3.95 
sector 
Q8c-ll Industry comparables or special 'rule of thumb' 44 3.73 
Q8c-12 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio applied to future 45 3.29 
earnings at the time of expected exit and discpunted 
back to present value) 
Q8c-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent company's shares 44 3.23 
Q8c-l0 Responses to attempts to solicit competing offers 44 2.93 
Q8c-4 Liquidation value of asset 43 2.84 
Q8c-3 Cash amount invested to date plus possible premium 44 2.70 
Q8c-2 Replacement value 44 2.66 
Q8c-l Historic cost book value 44 2.61 
Q8c-6 Dividend yield basis 44 2.14 
Q8c-13 Option pricing or similar valuation methods 43 2.05 











Q8-D INVESTING IN A BUYOUT(MBOIMBI) 
Q8d-5 Discounted future cash flows 36 4.58 
Q8d-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. historic or 36 4.08 
prospective price/earnings ratio or EBIT multiple) 
Q8d-9 Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the 36 3.92 
sector 
Q8d-11 Industry comparables or special 'rule of thumb' 36 3.50 
Q8d-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent company's shares 36 3.47 
Q8d-12 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio applied to future 37 2.97 
earnings at the time of expected exit and discounted 
back to present value) 
Q8d-1 Historic cost book value 36 2.97 
Q8d-4 Liquidation value of asset 36 2.97 
Q8d-10 Responses to attempts to solicit competing offers 36 2.97 
Q8d-2 Replacement value 36 2.86 
Q8d-3 Cash amount invested to date plus possible premium 36 2.53 
Q8d-6 Dividend yield basis 36 2.33 
Q8d-13 Option pricing or similar valuation methods 36 1.75 
Q8d-14 Other (specify:) 50 1.00 
Q8-E INVESTING IN A SECONDARY 
PURCHASEIREPLAC. 
Q8e-5 Discounted future cash flows 30 4.57 
Q8e-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. historic or 29 4.10 
prospective price/earnings ratio or EBIT multiple) 
Q8e-9 Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the 29 3.93 
sector 
Q8e-11 Industry comparables or special 'rule ofthumb' 29 3.55 
Q8e-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent company's shares 29 3.28 
Q8e-12 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio applied to future 30 3.00 
earnings at the time of expected exit and discounted 
back to present value) 
Q8e-1O Responses to attempts to solicit competing offers 29 2.90 
Q8e-3 Cash amount invested to date plus possible premium 29 2.66 
Q8e-1 Historic cost book value 29 2.45 
Q8e-2 Replacement value 29 2.41 
Q8e-4 Liquidation value of asset 29 2.38 
Q8e-6 Dividend yield basis 29 2.10 
Q8e-13 Option pricing or similar valuation methods 28 1.82 
Q8e-14 Other (specify:) 49 1.00 
Q9 ARRIVING AT FINAL EVALUATION 
Q9d Place greatest weight on one particular method 49 4.06 
Q9f Try and resolve the differences in the methods by 50 3.80 
understanding the reasons therefor 
Qge Use 'gut feel' or intuition 49 3.33 
Q9c Use some form of 'averaging' (such as the mode, 49 2.78 
mean or median of the valuations) 
Q9b Use the lowest valuation 49 2.43 











Table 24. Summary statistics of ratings/scores by consideration/item within each 
aspect of investment appraisal 
Item Description Valid Mean Median Mode Min Max 
No. N 
Q2-3a Seed capital 51 1.51 1.00 1 1 5 
investment 
Q2-3b Early stage/start-up 51 2.49 2.49 3 1 5 
investment 
Q2-3c Development! 51 2.55 3.00 1 1 5 
expanSIOn 
Q2-3d Management buyout 51 1.53 1.00 1 1 4 
(MBO) 
Q2-3e Management buy-in 51 1.10 1.00 1 1 3 
(MBI) 
Q2-3f Secondary 51 1.39 1.00 1 1 4 
purchase/replacement 
Q5a-l Is capable of 51 4.63 5.00 5 3 5 
sustained, intense 
effort 
Q5a-2 Is able to evaluate and 51 4.47 4.47 5 3 5 
react to risk well 
Q5a-3 Is articulate in 51 3.75 4.00 4 2 5 
discussing hislher 
venture 
Q5a-4 Attends to detail 51 3.84 4.00 4 3 5 
Q5a-5 Has good personal 51 3.90 4.00 4 2 5 
"chemistry" with you 
Q5a-6 Has a good relevant 51 2.80 3.00 3 1 5 
formal education 
Q5a-7 Has good judgement 51 4.57 5.00 5 3 5 
Q5a-8 Has integrity 51 4.90 5.00 5 4 5 
Q5a-9 Displays strategic 51 4.45 5.00 5 3 5 
VISIon 
Q5a-l0 Was referred to me by 51 3.12 3.00 3 1 5 
a trustworthy source 
Q5a-ll Has a significant 51 4.55 5.00 5 3 5 
investment or stake 
Q5b-l Is thoroughly familiar 51 4.65 5.00 5 3 5 
with the market 
targeted by venture 
Q5b-2 Has demonstrated 51 4.18 4.00 4 1 5 
leadership/managerial 
ability in the past 
Q5b-3 Has a track record 51 4.14 4.00 4 3 5 
relevant to venture 
Q5b-4 Good references are 51 4.25 4.00 5 2 5 



































Q5b-5 Has good relevant 50 4.23 4.00 4 2 5 0.79 
business and industry 
expenence 
Q5c-l Has propriety 51 3.71 4.00 4 1 5 1.12 
intellectual property 
Q5c-2 Has a good lead-time 51 3.80 4.00 4 1 5 0.94 
on the market 
competition 
Q5c-3 Enjoys demonstrated 51 3.71 4.00 4 1 5 0.88 
market acceptance 
Q5c-4 Has been developed to 50 3.82 4.00 5 1 5 1.29 
the point of a 
functioning prototype 
Q5c-5 May be described as 51 2.79 3.00 3 1 5 1.28 
"high tech" 
Q5d-l Enjoys a significant 51 4.25 4.00 4 3 5 0.69 
growth rate 
Q5d-2 The venture is in an 51 3.24 3.00 4 1 5 1.16 
industry with which I 
am familiar 
Q5d-3 The venture is in an 51 4.20 4.00 4 2 5 0.80 
industry in which I 
wish to invest 
Q5d-4 There are good 51 4.01 4.00 4 3 5 0.72 
barriers to entry 
Q5d-5 Little threat of 51 3.42 3.42 4 2 5 0.78 
competition during 
the initial investment 
period 
Q5d-6 Will create a new 51 2.65 3.00 3 1 4 0.87 
market 
Q5d-7 Is mature 51 2.35 2.00 2 1 4 0.96 
Q5d-8 Potential for overseas 51 3.84 4.00 4 1 5 1.07 
markets 
Q5d-9 Is large 51 3.23 3.00 2 1 9 1.45 
Q5e-l Distribution 51 3.71 4.00 4 1 5 0.86 
system/channels 
Q5e-2 Production 51 3.41 4.00 4 1 5 0.92 
techniques/facilities 
Q5e-3 Entrepreneur has 50 4.16 4.00 4 2 5 0.74 
gained control of key 
resources 
Q5e-4 General employees 51 4.14 4.00 4 2 5 0.63 
are of good quality 
Q5e-5 Existence of a suitable 51 3.37 4.00 4 1 5 1.13 
employee incentive 
scheme 












Q5f-2 A coherent and 51 4.22 4.00 5 3 5 0.76 
thorough business 
plan 
Q5f-3 An investment that 51 3.93 4.00 5 1 5 1.09 
can be easily made 
liquid (e.g. IPO) 
Q5f-4 Investments must 50 3.60 4.00 4 1 5 1.23 
require funding above 
a defined minimum 
size 
Q5f-5 The venture is already 51 2.84 3.00 3 1 5 1.21 
profitable or cash flow 
positive 
Q5f-6 The expected % 51 3.69 4.00 4 1 5 1.07 
shareholding falls 
within a given range 
Q5f-7 Financial control 51 3.73 4.00 4 1 5 1.08 
systems are in a good 
state 
Q5f-8 You are able to add 51 4.25 4.00 5 2 5 0.77 
value to the investee 
beyond merely 
providing capital 
Q5f-9 There is an 51 1.98 2.00 2 1 5 0.91 
independent co-
investor 
Q6a Secondary 50 2.74 3.00 3 1 5 0.99 
purchase/replacement 
Q6b ~anagementbuyout 50 3.56 4.00 4 1 5 1.26 
(~BO) 
Q6c ~anagement buy-in 50 3.34 3.00 3 1 5 1.08 
(~BI) 
Q6d Development! 51 4.16 4.00 4 2 5 0.78 
expansion 
Q6e Early stage/start-up 51 3.11 3.00 3 1 5 1.29 
investment 
Q6f Seed capital 50 2.02 1.00 1 1 5 1.33 
investment 
Q7a-l We require the 51 3.27 4.00 5 1 5 1.50 
investment to meet a 
standard required rate 
of return 
Q7a-2 We require the 51 3.90 4.00 5 1 5 1.32 
investment to meet a 
standard required 
Q7a-3 We require the 50 3.74 4.00 4 1 5 1.17 
investment to meet a 












Q7a-4 We require the 51 2.48 3.00 3 1 5 1.20 
funding structure to 
meet standard gearing 
ratios 
Q7a-5 We require the 51 3.25 3.00 3 1 5 1.09 
funding structure to 
meet standard gearing 
ratios 
Q7a-6 We require the 51 3.80 4.00 4 1 5 1.04 
funding structure to 
meet gearing ratios 
Q7a-7 We require a rate of 51 3.65 4.00 4 1 5 1.25 
return which yields a 
total cash return 
Q7b-l Market conditions 51 4.61 5.00 5 3 5 0.60 
relating to a particular 
proposal 
Q7b-2 General economic 51 3.45 3.00 3 1 5 0.86 
conditions 
Q7b-3 Changes in prices for 49 3.36 3.00 3 1 5 0.85 
quoted equities 
Q7b-4 Quantity of inflow of 50 2.40 2.00 2 1 4 0.97 
funds into the 
VC/private equity 
market 
Q7b-5 Changes in returns for 50 2.44 3.00 3 1 5 1.13 
long-term gilts 
Q7b-6 Changes in the prime 50 2.94 3.00 3 1 5 1.10 
rate 
Q7b-7 The state of the 50 3.95 4.00 4 1 5 0.96 
industrial/product 
sector of the 
investment 
Q7b-8 Expected length of 50 4.12 4.00 4 2 5 0.80 
time to exit from the 
investment 
Q7b-9 Degree of 51 3.96 4.00 4 2 5 0.87 
participation of 
existing shareholders 
in this round 
Q7b-l0 Actual cash amount 51 3.82 4.00 4 1 5 0.84 
you seek to receive 
from the investment 
Q7b-ll Degree of planning 51 4.00 4.00 4 2 5 0.89 
and strategy for exit 
from the investment 












Q7b-13 Possibility of a total 50 4.04 4.00 4 2 5 0.78 
write-off of the 
investment if it fails 
Q7b-14 Geographic distance 51 3.36 3.50 4 1 5 1.02 
from the investment 
Q7b-15 Expected gearing ratio 51 3.35 3.00 4 2 5 0.87 
Q7b-16 VVhetheryou(andthe 51 2.37 2.00 3 1 5 1.02 
institutional syndicate, 
where appropriate) 
Q7b-17 Quality and 51 4.12 4.00 4 1 5 0.82 
robustness of 
corporate governance 
Q7b-18 Competitiveness of 51 4.24 4.00 4 3 5 0.59 
the market 
Q7b-19 Small size of the 51 3.29 3.00 3 1 5 1.03 
required investment 
(in Rand terms) 
Q7b-20 Large size of the 51 3.37 3.00 3 1 5 0.89 
required investment 
(in Rand terms) 
Q7b-21 Expected amount of 51 3.80 4.00 4 1 5 0.96 
post-deal re-
organisation 
Q7b-22 Round of investment 50 3.46 4.00 4 1 5 0.81 
(e.g. first, follow-on) 
Q7b-23 Extent to which 51 3.63 4.00 4 1 5 1.04 
funding must be 
advanced up front 
Q7b-24 Book value-to-market 51 2.75 3.00 3 1 4 1.00 
value ratio 
Q7b-25 Quality of managerial 51 4.76 5.00 5 3 5 0.51 
skills 
Q7b-26 Predictability or 51 4.67 5.00 5 4 5 0.48 
unpredictability of 
behaviour of the 
entrepreneur 
Q7b-27 Level of financial 51 4.35 4.35 5 3 5 0.72 
contribution by 
management 
Q7b-28 Expected dividend 51 2.22 2.00 2 1 5 0.97 
yield 
Q8a-1 Historic cost book 30 2.23 2.00 1 1 4 1.33 
value 
Q8a-2 Replacement value 30 2.23 2.00 1 1 5 1.33 
Q8a-3 Cash amount invested 30 3.40 4.00 4 1 5 1.33 
to date plus possible 
premium 












Q8a-5 Discounted future 32 4.00 4.00 5 1 5 1.24 
cash flows 
Q8a-6 Dividend yield basis 31 1.65 1.00 1 1 4 0.91 
Q8a-7 Capitalised 31 3.39 4.00 4 1 5 1.20 
sustainable earnings 
(e.g. historic or 
prospective price/ 
earnings ratio or EBIT 
multiple) 
Q8a-8 Recent PE ratio of the 30 2.33 2.00 1 1 5 1.37 
parent company's 
shares 
Q8a-9 Recent transaction 31 3.45 4.00 4 1 5 1.18 
prices for acquisitions 
in the sector 
Q8a-l0 Responses to attempts 31 2.52 3.00 3 1 5 1.06 
to solicit competing 
offers 
Q8a-ll Industry comparables 30 3.57 4.00 4 1 5 1.07 
or special 'rule of 
thumb' 
Q8a-12 "Venture capital" 31 3.42 3.00 3 1 5 1.29 
method (PE ratio 
applied to future 
earnings at time of 
expected exit and 
discounted back to 
present value) 
Q8a-13 Option pricing or 30 2.33 2.00 1 1 5 1.15 
similar valuation 
methods 
Q8a-14 Other (specify:) 48 1.25 1.00 1 1 4 0.84 
Q8b-l Historic cost book 38 2.55 2.00 2 1 5 1.33 
value 
Q8b-2 Replacement value 38 2.39 2.00 2 1 5 1.26 
Q8b-3 Cash amount invested 38 3.32 ~.66 4 1 5 1.23 
to date plus possible 
premium 
Q8b-4 Liquidation value of 38 2.71 3.00 3 1 5 1.18 
asset 
Q8b-5 Discounted future 40 4.18 4.00 5 1 5 0.96 
cash flows 
Q8b-6 Dividend yield basis 39 1.87 2.00 2 1 4 0.86 
Q8b-7 Capitalised 40 3.68 4.00 3 1 5 1.02 
sustainable earnings 
(e.g. historic or 
prospective price/ 












Q8b-8 Recent PE ratio of the 38 2.58 3.00 3 1 5 1.15 
parent company's 
shares 
Q8b-9 Recent transaction 39 3.64 4.00 4 1 5 0.96 
prices for acquisitions 
in the sector 
Q8b-l0 Responses to attempts 39 2.97 3.00 4 1 5 1.11 
to solicit competing 
offers 
Q8b-ll Industry comparables 38 3.71 4.00 4 1 5 0.80 
or special 'rule of 
thumb' 
Q8b-12 "Venture capital" 40 3.73 4.00 4 2 5 1.01 
method (PE ratio 
applied to future 
earnings at the time of 
expected exit and 
discounted back to 
present value) 
Q8b-13 Option pricing or 38 2.42 2.00 1 1 5 1.22 
similar valuation 
methods 
Q8b-14 Other (specify:) 49 1.16 1.00 1 1 4 0.66 
Q8c-l Historic cost book 44 2.61 3.00 3 1 5 1.30 
value 
Q8c-2 Replacement value 44 2.66 2.83 2 1 5 1.29 
Q8c-3 Cash amount invested 44 2.70 3.00 3 1 5 1.09 
to date plus possible 
premium 
Q8c-4 Liquidation value of 43 2.84 3.00 3 1 5 1.25 
asset 
Q8c-5 Discounted future 45 4.51 5.00 5 2 5 0.69 
cash flows 
Q8c-6 Dividend yield basis 44 2.14 2.00 1 1 5 1.07 
Q8c-7 Capitalised 44 4.14 4.00 4 1 5 1.00 
sustainable earnings 
(e.g. historic or 
prospective price/ 
earnings ratio or EBIT 
multiple) 
Q8c-8 Recent PE ratio of the 44 3.23 3.00 3 1 5 1.18 
parent company's 
shares 
Q8c-9 Recent transaction 44 3.95 4.00 4 1 5 0.94 
prices for acquisitions 
in the sector 
Q8c-l0 Responses to attempts 44 2.93 3.00 3 1 4 0.97 












Q8c-ll Industry comparables 44 3.73 4.00 4 1 5 0.87 
or special 'rule of 
thumb' 
Q8c-12 "Venture capital" 45 3.29 3.00 3 1 5 1.10 
method (PE ratio 
applied to future 
earnings at the time of 
expected exit and 
discounted back to 
present value) 
Q8c-13 Option pricing or 43 2.05 2.00 I 1 4 1.07 
similar valuation 
methods 
Q8c-14 Other (specify:) 51 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 0.00 
Q8d-l Historic cost book 36 2.97 3.00 3 1 5 1.36 
value 
Q8d-2 Replacement value 36 2.86 3.00 3 1 5 1.40 
Q8d-3 Cash amount invested 36 2.53 2.26 2 1 5 1.21 
to date plus possible 
premium 
Q8d-4 Liquidation value of 36 2.97 3.00 3 1 5 1.28 
asset 
Q8d-5 Discounted future 36 4.58 5.00 5 2 5 0.69 
cash flows 
Q8d-6 Dividend yield basis 36 2.33 2.17 1 1 5 1.17 
Q8d-7 Capitalised 36 4.08 4.00 5 1 5 1.05 
sustainable earnings 
(e.g. historic or 
prospective price/ 
earnings ratio or EBIT 
multiple) 
Q8d-8 Recent PE ratio of the 36 3.47 4.00 4 1 5 1.32 
parent company's 
shares 
Q8d-9 Recent transaction 36 3.92 4.00 5 1 5 1.05 
prices for acquisitions 
in the sector 
Q8d-l0 Responses to attempts 36 2.97 3.00 3 1 5 1.28 
to solicit competing 
offers 
Q8d-ll Industry comparables 36 3.50 4.00 4 1 5 1.23 
or special 'rule of 
thumb' 
Q8d-12 "Venture capital" 37 2.97 3.00 2 1 5 1.24 
method (PE ratio 
applied to future 
earnings at the time of 
expected exit and 












Q8d-13 Option pricing or 36 1.75 1.00 1 1 4 0.97 
similar valuation 
methods 
Q8d-14 Other (specify:) 50 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 0.00 
Q8e-l Historic cost book 29 2.45 2.00 1 1 5 1.38 
value 
Q8e-2 Replacement value 29 2.41 2.00 1 1 5 1.32 
Q8e-3 Cash amount invested 29 2.66 3.00 3 1 5 1.32 
to date plus possible 
~remium 
Q8e-4 Liquidation value of 29 2.38 2.00 2 1 5 1.27 
asset 
Q8e-5 Discounted future 30 4.57 5.00 5 2 5 0.73 
cash flows 
Q8e-6 Dividend yield basis 29 2.10 2.00 1 1 5 1.01 
Q8e-7 Capitalised 29 4.10 4.00 4 1 5 0.98 
sustainable earnings 
(e.g. historic or 
prospective price/ 
earnings ratio or EBIT 
multiple) 
Q8e-8 Recent PE ratio of the 29 3.28 3.00 3 1 5 1.22 
parent company's 
shares 
Q8e-9 Recent transaction 29 3.93 4.00 5 1 5 1.03 
prices for acquisitions 
in the sector 
Q8e-l0 Responses to attempts 29 2.90 3.00 4 1 5 1.29 
to solicit competing 
offers 
Q8e-ll Industry comparables 29 3.55 ~.OO 3 1 5 1.06 
or special 'rule of 
thumb' 
Q8e-12 "Venture capital" 30 3.00 3.00 2 1 5 1.31 
method (PE ratio 
applied to future 
earnings at the time of 
expected exit and 
discounted back to 
present value) 
Q8e-13 Option pricing or 28 1.82 1.91 1 1 4 0.98 
similar valuation 
methods 
Q8e-14 Other (specify:) 49 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 0.00 
Q9a Use the highest 49 1.59 1.00 1 1 3 0.73 
valuation 












Q9c Use some form of 49 2.78 3.00 4 
'averaging' (such as 
the mode, mean or 
median of the 
valuations) 
Q9d Place greatest weight 49 4.06 4.00 4 
on one particular 
method 
Qge Use 'gut feel' or 49 3.33 3.00 3 
intuition 
Q9f Try and resolve the 50 3.80 4.00 4 




Table 25. Frequency distribution of companies by rating scale (1-5)* 





Item No. Description Rating/scale 
1 2 3 4 
Q2-3a Seed capital investment 34 10 6 0 
Q2-3b Early stage/start-up investment 15 11 15 5 
Q2-3c Development/expansion 14 11 13 10 
Q2-3d Management buyout (MBO) 36 8 2 5 
Q2-3e Management buy-in (MBI) 47 3 1 0 
Q2-3f Secondary purchase/replacement 38 8 3 2 
Q5a-l Is capable of sustained, intense effort 0 0 2 15 
Q5a-2 Is able to evaluate and react to risk 0 0 1 25 
well 
Q5a-3 Is articulate in discussing hislher 0 3 16 23 
venture 
Q5a-4 Attends to detail 0 0 17 25 
Q5a-5 Has good personal "chemistry" with 0 1 17 19 
you 
Q5a-6 Has a good relevant formal education 6 9 26 9 
Q5a-7 Has good judgement 0 0 2 18 
Q5a-8 Has integrity 0 0 0 5 
Q5a-9 Displays strategic vision 0 0 4 20 
Q5a-910 Was referred to me by a trustworthy 3 8 22 16 
source 
Q5a-911 Has a significant investment or stake 0 0 4 15 
Q5b-l Is thoroughly familiar with the market 0 0 1 16 
targeted by venture 
Q5b-2 Has demonstrated 1 0 6 26 
leadership/managerial ability in the 
past 
Q5b-3 Has a track record relevant to venture 0 0 9 26 






































Q5b-5 Has good relevant business and 0 2 5 22 21 50 
industry experience 
Q5c-l Ha £ropriety intellectual pro~erty 3 3 14 17 14 51 
Q5c-2 Has a good lead-time on the market 2 3 7 30 9 51 
competition 
Q5c-3 Enjoys demonstrated market 1 2 17 22 9 51 
acceptance 
Q5c-4 Has been developed to the point of a 4 5 7 14 20 50 
functioning prototype 
Q5c-5 May be described as "high tech" 10 11 15 9 6 51 
Q5d-l Enjoys a significant growth rate 0 0 7 24 20 51 
Q5d-2 The venture is in an industry with 3 12 14 14 8 51 
which I am familiar 
Q5d-3 The venture is in an industry in which 0 2 6 23 20 51 
I wish to invest 
Q5d-4 There are good barriers to entry 0 0 13 24 14 51 
Q5d-5 Little threat of competition during the 0 6 20 22 3 51 
initial investment period 
Q5d-6 Will create a new market 6 13 25 7 0 51 
Q5d-7 Is mature 11 17 17 6 0 51 
Q5d-8 Potential for overseas markets 2 3 12 18 16 51 
Q5d-9 Is large 4 13 14 11 8 50 
Q5e-l Distribution system/channels 1 2 16 24 8 51 
Q5e-2 Production techniques/facilities 3 3 18 24 3 51 
Q5e-3 Entrepreneur has gained control of 0 2 4 28 16 50 
key resources 
Q5e-4 General employees are of good 0 1 4 33 13 51 
quality 
Q5e-5 Existence of a suitable employee 5 4 16 19 7 51 
incentive scheme 
Q5f-l Meets 'key' financial ratio 3 5 11 22 10 51 
benchmarks 
Q5f-2 A coherent and thorough business 0 0 10 20 21 51 
plan 
Q5f-3 An investment that can be easily made 1 5 10 15 20 51 
liquid (e.g. IPO) 
Q5f-4 Investments must require funding 4 7 6 21 12 50 
above a defined minimum size 
Q5f-5 The venture is already profitable or 9 8 22 6 6 51 
cash flow positive 
Q5f-6 The expected % shareholding falls 3 2 15 19 12 51 
within a given range 
Q5f-7 Financial control systems are in a 3 3 11 22 12 51 
good state 
Q5f-8 You are able to add value to the 0 1 7 21 22 51 
investee beyond merely providing 
capital 
Q5f-9 There is an independent co-investor 17 21 11 1 1 51 











Q6b Management buyout (MBO) 5 5 10 17 13 50 
Q6c Management buy-in (MBI) 2 9 17 14 8 50 
Q6d Development/expansion 0 2 6 25 18 51 
Q6e Early stage/start-up investment 6 11 14 11 9 51 
Q6f Seed capital investment 27 7 8 4 4 50 
Q7a-l We require the investment to meet a 10 7 7 13 14 51 
standard required rate of return 
Q7a-2 We require the investment to meet a 4 6 4 14 23 51 
standard required 
Q7a-3 We require the investment to meet a 3 6 6 21 14 50 
specific required rate of return 
Q7a-4 We require the funding structure to 14 11 15 9 2 51 
meet standard gearing ratios 
Q7a-5 We require the funding structure to 5 3 24 12 7 51 
meet standard gearing ratios 
Q7a-6 We require the funding structure to 3 1 12 22 13 51 
meet gearing ratios 
Q7a-7 We require a rate of return which 5 3 12 16 15 51 
yields a total cash return 
Q7b-l Market conditions relating to a 0 0 3 14 34 51 
particular proposal 
Q7b-2 General economic conditions 1 4 22 19 5 51 
Q7b-3 Changes in prices for quoted eguities 2 3 22 19 3 49 
Q7b-4 Quantity of inflow of funds into the 10 17 16 7 0 50 
VC/private equity market 
Q7b-5 Changes in returns for long-term gilts 14 9 20 5 2 50 
Q7b-6 Changes in the prime rate 7 8 18 15 2 50 
Q7b-7 The state of the industrial/product 2 1 9 23 15 50 
sector of the investment 
Q7b-8 Expected length of time to exit from 0 1 10 21 18 50 
the investment 
Q7b-9 Degree of participation of existing 0 2 14 19 16 51 
shareholders in this round 
Q7b-910 Actual cash amount you seek to 1 3 8 31 8 51 
receive from the investment 
Q7b-911 Degree of planning and strategy for 0 4 8 23 16 51 
exit from the investment 
Q7b-912 Liquidity of the investment 1 6 15 17 12 51 
Q7b-913 Possibility of a total write-off of the 0 2 8 26 14 50 
investment if it fails 
Q7b-914 Geographic distance from the 3 6 16 21 5 51 
investment 
Q7b-915 Expected gearing ratio 0 9 19 19 4 51 
Q7b-916 Whether you (and the institutional 12 15 18 5 1 51 
syndicate, where appropriate) 
Q7b-917 Quality and robustness of corporate 1 0 8 25 17 51 
governance 











Q7b-919 Small size of the required investment 4 4 21 17 5 51 
(in Rand terms) 
Q7b-920 Large size of the required investment 2 4 22 19 4 51 
(in Rand terms) 
Q7b-921 Expected amount of post-deal re- 2 2 11 25 11 51 
organisation 
Q7b-922 Round of investment (e.g. first, 1 5 16 26 2 50 
follow-on) 
Q7b-923 Extent to which funding must be 2 5 13 21 10 51 
advanced up front or whether it can be 
done in tranches upon achievement of 
milestones 
Q7b-924 Book value-to-market value ratio 7 12 19 13 0 51 
Q7b-925 Quality of managerial skills 0 0 2 8 41 51 
Q7b-926 Predictability or unpredictability of 0 0 0 17 34 51 
behaviour of the entrepreneur 
Q7b-927 Level of financial contribution by 0 0 7 19 25 51 
management 
Q7b-928 Expected dividend yield 13 19 15 3 1 51 
Q8a-1 Historic cost book value 14 4 3 9 0 30 
Q8a-2 Replacement value 13 5 6 4 2 30 
Q8a-3 Cash amount invested to date plus 4 3 7 9 7 30 
possible premium 
Q8a-4 Liquidation value of asset 1.0 5 6 5 3 29 
Q8a-5 Discounted future cash flows 3 1 3 11 14 32 
Q8a-6 Dividend yield basis 19 5 6 1 0 31 
Q8a-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. 2 6 7 10 6 31 
historic or prospective price/ earnings 
ratio or EBIT multiple) 
Q8a-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent 11 8 4 4 3 30 
company's shares 
Q8a-9 Recent transaction prices for 1 7 7 9 7 31 
acquisitions in the sector 
Q8a-910 Responses to attempts to solicit 6 9 11 4 1 31 
competing offers 
Q8a-911 Industry comparables or special 'rule 1 4 8 11 6 30 
of thumb' 
Q8a-912 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio 2 6 9 5 9 31 
applied to future earnings at the time 
of expected exit and discounted back 
to present value) 
Q8a-913 Option pricing or similar valuation 9 8 8 4 1 30 
methods 
Q8a-914 Other (specify:) 44 0 0 4 0 48 
Q8b-1 Historic cost book value 10 11 7 6 4 38 
Q8b-2 Replacement value 11 12 7 5 3 38 
Q8b-3 Cash amount invested to date plus 5 3 11 13 6 38 
possible premium 
Q8b-4 Liquidation value of asset 6 11 13 4 4 38 











Q8b-6 Dividend yield basis 15 16 6 2 0 39 
Q8b-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. 2 1 14 14 9 40 
historic or prospective price/ earnings 
ratio or EBIT multh>le) 
Q8b-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent 8 10 12 6 2 38 
company's shares 
Q8b-9 Recent transaction prices for 1 4 9 19 6 39 
acquisitions in the sector 
Q8b-91O Responses to attempts to solicit 6 5 13 14 1 39 
competing offers 
Q8b-911 Industry comparables or special 'rule 1 1 10 22 4 38 
of thumb' 
Q8b-912 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio 0 5 12 12 11 40 
applied to future earnings at the time 
of expected exit and discounted back 
to present value) 
Q8b-913 Option pricing or similar valuation 11 10 9 6 2 38 
methods 
Q8b-914 Other (specify:) 46 0 1 2 0 49 
Q8c-l Historic cost book value 11 10 13 5 5 44 
Q8c-2 Replacement value 9 13 12 4 6 44 
Q8c-3 Cash amount invested to date plus 7 11 16 8 2 44 
possible premium 
Q8c-4 Liquidation value of asset 7 11 12 8 5 43 
Q8c-5 Discounted future cash flows 0 1 2 15 27 45 
Q8c-6 Dividend yield basis 16 11 13 3 1 44 
Q8c-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. 2 1 4 19 18 44 
historic or prospective price/ earnings 
ratio or EBIT multiple) 
Q8c-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent 6 2 18 12 6 44 
company's shares 
Q8c-9 Recent transaction prices for J 1 11 17 14 44 
acquisitions in the sector 
Q8c-910 Responses to attempts to solicit 5 7 18 14 0 44 
competing offers 
Q8c-911 Industry comparables or special 'rule 2 0 12 24 6 44 
of thumb' 
Q8c-912 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio 2 9 15 12 7 45 
applied to future earnings at the time 
of expected exit and discounted back 
to present value) 
Q8c-913 Option pricing or similar valuation 17 13 7 6 0 43 
methods 
Q8c-914 Other (specify:) 51 0 0 0 0 51 
Q8d-l Historic cost book value 7 6 10 7 6 36 
Q8d-2 Replacement value 8 7 9 6 6 36 
Q8d-3 Cash amount invested to date plus 8 11 10 4 3 36 
possible premium 
Q8d-4 Liquidation value of asset 6 6 12 7 5 36 











Q8d-6 Dividend yield basis 12 7 11 5 1 36 
Q8d-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. 1 3 3 14 15 36 
historic or prospective price/ earnings 
ratio or EBIT multiple) 
Q8d-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent 5 2 9 11 9 36 
company's shares 
Q8d-9 Recent transaction prices for 1 2 9 11 13 36 
acquisitions in the sector 
Q8d-910 Responses to attempts to solicit 7 4 12 9 4 36 
competing offers 
Q8d-911 Industry comparables or special 'rule 4 2 10 12 8 36 
of thumb' 
Q8d-912 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio 4 11 9 8 5 37 
applied to future earnings at the time 
of expected exit and discounted back 
to present value) 
Q8d-913 Option pricing or similar valuation 20 7 7 2 0 36 
methods 
Q8d-914 Other (specify:) SO 0 0 0 0 50 
Q8e-l Historic cost book value 10 6 6 4 3 29 
Q8e-2 Replacement value 9 8 6 3 3 29 
Q8e-3 Cash amount invested to date plus 7 7 7 5 3 29 
possible premium 
Q8e-4 Liquidation value of asset 8 10 6 2 3 29 
Q8e-5 Discounted future cash flows 0 1 1 8 20 30 
Q8e-6 Dividend yield basis 10 8 10 0 1 29 
Q8e-7 Capitalised sustainable earnings (e.g. 1 1 3 13 11 29 
historic or prospective price/ earnings 
ratio or EBIT multiple) 
Q8e-8 Recent PE ratio of the parent 3 4 9 8 5 29 
company's shares 
Q8e-9 Recent transaction prices for 1 1 7 10 10 29 
acquisitions in the sector 
Q8e-910 Responses to attempts to solicit 5 7 6 8 3 29 
competing offers 
Q8e-911 Industry comparables or special 'rule 1 3 10 9 6 29 
of thumb' 
Q8e-912 "Venture capital" method (PE ratio 4 8 7 6 5 30 
applied to future earnings at the time 
of expected exit and discounted back 
to present value) 
Q8e-913 Option pricing or similar valuation 14 7 5 2 0 28 
methods 
Q8e-914 Other (specify:) 49 0 0 0 0 49 
Q9a Use the highest valuation 27 15 7 0 0 49 
Q9b Use the lowest valuation 13 11 18 5 2 49 
Q9c Use some form of 'averaging' (such 10 11 12 12 4 49 












Q9d Place greatest weight on one 2 1 4 27 15 49 
particular method 
Qge Use 'gut feel' or intuition 5 6 15 14 9 49 
Q9f Try and resolve the differences in the 2 5 7 23 13 50 













1. Elementary Concepts - What is "Statistical Significance" (p-Ievel)? 
The statistical significance of a result is an estimated measure of the degree to which 
it is "true" (in the sense of "representative of the population"). More technically, the 
value of the p-Ievel (the term first used by Brownlee, 1960) represents a decreasing 
index of the reliability of a result. The higher the p-Ievel, the less we can believe that 
the observed relation between variables in the sample is a reliable indicator of the 
relation between the respective variables in the population. Specifically, the p-Ievel 
represents the probability of error that is involved in accepting our observed result as 
valid, that is, as "representative of the population." For example, a p-Ievel of .05 
(i.e.,1/20) indicates that there is a 5% probability that the relation between the 
variables found in our sample is a "fluke." In other words, assuming that in the 
population there was no relation between those variables whatsoever, and we were 
repeating experiments like ours one after another, we could expect that approximately 
in every 20 replications of the experiment there would be one in which the relation 
between the variables in question would be equal or stronger than in ours. In many 
areas of research, the p-Ievel of .05 is customarily treated as a "border-line 
acceptable" error level. 
2. Elementary Concepts - How to Determine that a Result is "Really" 
Significant 
There is no way to avoid arbitrar ness in the final decision as to what level of 
significance will be treated as really "significant." That is, the selection of some level 
of significance, up to which the results will be rejected as invalid, is arbitrary. In 
practice, the final decision usually depends on whether the outcome was predicted a 
priori or only found post hoc in the course of mCl)ly analyses and comparisons 
performed on the data set, on the total amount of consistent supportive evidence in the 
entire data set, and on "traditions" existing in the particular area of research. 
Typically, in many sciences, results that yield p::; .05 are considered borderline 
statistically significant but remember that this level of significance still involves a 
pretty high probability of error (5%). Results that are significant at the p::; .01 level 
are commonly considered statistically significant, and p::; .005 or p::; .001 levels are 
often called "highly" significant. But remember that those classifications represent 
nothing else but arbitrary conventions that are only informally based on general 
research experience. 












RISK PREMIA COMPONENT FOR COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN 
REQUIRED MEDIAN RISK PREMIA PER INVESTMENT STAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
MEDIAN OF REQUIRED IRRs UK (1994) FRANCE (1995) BELGIUMlNL SOUTH AFRICA 
(1995) (2000) 
Overall (all stages) 22%* 17% 8% 16%* 
Seedlstart-up/early 34-47% 28-47% 24-28% 42-56% 
Expansion! development 18-22% 13-17% 14-18% 22-31% 
MBO 23-27% 18-22% 14-18% 17-21 % 
MBI 23-27% 18-22% 14-18% 17-21% 
Secondary Not asked 18-22% <13% 17-21% 
Risk-free rate: 8.20% 7.60% 7.20% 13.80% 
Risk premia for international comparisons: 
Nominal median required rate of return less the mean of the monthly closes of the national long bond rate over 1 calendar year. 
*The mean risk premium for both the UK and SA is 21 %. 
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